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Protecting Autonomy in Non-consensual Sexual Offences: A Kantian Critique 
The current law has been criticised on the basis that it does not provide a clear definition of 
consent.  This criticism is important, particularly in light of the fact that the Sexual Offences 
Act 2003 adopts a consent-centric model in relation to the protection of sexual autonomy.  
Therefore, it is vital that the current model provides effective protection in relation to sexual 
autonomy.   
This thesis will focus on the protection of autonomy in non-consensual sexual offences in 
sections 1-4 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.  It will be argued that sexual autonomy is a 
concept which should be protected and that Kantian autonomy is an effective method for the 
protection of sexual autonomy.  Focusing on Kant’s supreme principle of morality and the 
universalising aspect of Kantian autonomy, the thesis will argue that a re-interpretation of 
Kantian philosophy is an effective method for protecting sexual autonomy.  The thesis will 
analyse the application of Kantian autonomy in a practical context in cases involving 
deception and non-violent coercion.  It will be argued that a Kantian approach is an effective 
model for the protection of sexual autonomy in cases where a defendant procures sexual 
activity through deception or non-violent coercion.   
The barriers to the application of Kantian autonomy will be examined in order to determine 
whether Kantian autonomy is a viable model for the protection of sexual autonomy in a 
practical context.  This thesis concludes that a Kantian approach is capable of protecting 
sexual autonomy, in a practical context, in cases involving deception and non-violent 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
This thesis will conduct a critical analysis of the law of non-consensual sexual offences,
1
 in 
England and Wales, to determine whether the current law of sexual offences is consistent 
with Kantian autonomy.  The thesis will focus on non-consensual sexual offences such as 
rape and sexual assault, because the reported cases are primarily concerned with these 
offences.  The underlying research hypothesis is that Kantian autonomy is an effective 
method for protecting sexual autonomy.   
There is a considerable amount of scholarship providing critical analysis of the current law of 
sexual offences.
2
  There is also substantial academic writing on Kantian autonomy.
3
  This 
thesis offers a critical analysis of the law of sexual offences using Kantian autonomy to 
determine whether the law of sexual offences adequately protects sexual autonomy.  It will 
also offer a re-interpretation of Kantian autonomy in order to overcome any barriers which 
may hinder its application in a practical context.  
In his analysis of human agency, Kant begins with the proposition that all practical rules 
appear to us as imperatives (commands).  Kantian morality cannot be based on purely 
empirical considerations, such as desires and interests, because these factors are variable and 
contingent.
4
  Kant asserts that there are two types of imperatives, a categorical and 
hypothetical.  Hypothetical Imperatives (HI) are based on desires and inclinations, and 
command individuals to act on ends which are based on interest.  The categorical imperative 
(CI), on the other hand, can be used as a moral rule which prevents individuals from acting 
immorally. The CI is unconditional and cannot be discarded, unlike desires and interests, 
                                                 
1
 Sexual Offences Act 2003, ss 1 - 4. 
2
 E.g. V. Tadros, ‘No Consent: A Historical Critique of the Actus Reus of Rape’ (1999) 3(3) Edin LR 317; P. N. 
S. Rumney, ‘The review of sex offences and rape law reform: another false dawn?’ (2001) 64(6) MLR 890; J. 
Temkin, Rape and the Legal Process (2
nd
 edn, OUP 2002); E. Finch and V. E. Munro, ‘Intoxicated consent and 
the boundaries of drug assisted rape’ [2003] Crim LR 773; S. Cooper and A. Reed, ‘Informed consent and the 
transmission of sexual disease: Dadson revivified’ (2007) 71(5) J Crim Law 461; T. Khan, ‘Voluntary 
intoxication and consent in cases of rape’ (2013) 177(8) CL & J 114; N. Wortley, ‘Limiting the scope of the 
conclusive presumptions in the Sexual Offences Act 2003’ (2013) 77(5) J Crim L 370 .    
3
 J. Christman (ed), The Inner Citadel: Essay on Individual Autonomy (OUP 1989); P. Powlesland, ‘Male rape 
and the quest for gender-neutrality in the Sexual Offences Act 2003’ (2005) 1(1) CSLR 11; M. D. White, 
Kantian Ethics and Economics: Autonomy, Dignity and Character (SUP 2011). 
4
 I. Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (H. J. Paton tr, Routledge 1989), 77.  
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because morality is grounded in an individual’s own reason.
5
   In order for individuals to act 
morally, the CI must serve as their ultimate norm.  Acting according to the CI is made 
possible because rational individuals view the world from two standpoints,
6
 the sensible 
world and the intelligible world.
7
  Quek notes that: 
When we imagine ourselves trying to understand how we affect and are affected in 
the world of sense (the ‘phenomenal world’), we have to regard ourselves as subject 
to the laws of causal determination. Because we reason practically about how we 
should act, we belong to the intelligible world (the ‘noumenal world’), where we 




In order to attain freedom, in a Kantian sense, individuals are required to view themselves 
from the standpoint of a rational agent, not merely an object.  Individuals, according to 
Kantian autonomy, are not merely empirical beings, but are also members of the intelligible 
world.
9
  Individuals who view themselves and others from the standpoint of an object risk 
acting in violation of the CI and, therefore, their actions may lack autonomy.    This thesis 
will argue that a CI can assist in the protection of sexual autonomy in a practical context.   
 
Autonomy  
It will be shown that since the removal of the resistance requirement from the offences of 
rape, the law of non-consensual sexual offences has undergone a radical change.   
The earliest judicial statement that rape is a violation of autonomy was probably the case of 
Coker v Georgia, in which the Supreme Court stated that: 
We do not discount the seriousness of rape as a crime.  It is highly reprehensible, 
both in a moral sense and in its almost total contempt for the personal integrity and 
                                                 
5
 Ibid, 78. 
6




 J. Quek, ‘Our brain “Kant” tell us? A Kantian perspective of how neuroscience challenges our notions of 
moral responsibility and the legal implications’ [2012] UCL JL and J 22, 25.   
9
 Kant Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (n4), 111.   
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autonomy of the female victim and for the latter’s privilege of choosing with whom 




The case of Coker provides an explanation as to the distinctive violation affected by rape, in 
that it violates the complainant’s sexual autonomy by impacting on the complainant’s right to 
choose with whom to engage in sexual intercourse.  






 highlight the importance of treating 
the consent of sexual autonomy as rape law’s central principle.  According to Falk:  
[T]he central value protected by sexual offense provisions is sexual autonomy or 
sexual integrity, the violation of which represents a unique, not readily comparable, 
type of harm to the victim.
14
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, stated in Prosecutor v 
Kunarac, that the ‘true common denominator’ of rape may be the ‘violation of sexual 
autonomy’.
15
  According to Germany's constitution (the Grundgesetz or Basic Law) states, at 
Article 1(1), that, ‘human dignity shall be inviolable’.  The philosophy of Immanuel Kant has 
been described as a major influence on the Basic Law and the German Federal Constitutional 
Court.  In the Microcensus case,
16
 the German Constitutional Court explained that: 
In light of this image of man, every human being is entitled to social recognition 
and respect in the community. The state violates human dignity when it treats 
persons as mere objects. 
17
  
The above quote clearly draws on Kantian autonomy which states that: 
                                                 
10
 (1977) 433 US 584, 597. 
11
 J. Herring, ‘Mistaken Sex’, [2005] Crim LR 511. 
12
 V. E. Munro, ‘Constructing Consent: Legislating Freedom and Legitimating Constraints in the Expression of 
Sexual Autonomy (2008) 41 Akron LR 923.  
13
 S. J. Schulhofer, Unwanted Sex: Culture of Intimidation and Failure of Law (HUP 2000).   
14
 P. J. Falk, ‘Rape By Drugs: A Statutory Overview and Proposals for Reform’ (2002) 44 Ariz LR 131, 187.   
15
 Prosecutor v Kunarac, Case No IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment, paragraph 440 (International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia February 22, 2002), para 440.  
16
  (1969) 27 BVerfGE 271. 
17
 Microconsensus (1969) 27 BVerfGE 1.  
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Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in 




This thesis will examine Kant’s supreme principle of morality in order to demonstrate that 
Kant’s Formula of Universal Law (FUL) can assist in protecting sexual autonomy in cases 
involving deception and non-violent coercion.   
 
Kantian autonomy 
The importance of Kantian philosophy is highlighted by Waldron who states that: 
The philosophical writings of Immanuel Kant continue to exert a powerful 
influence in legal philosophy.  In theoretical discussions of criminal law, the law of 
property, tort law, and many other areas, Kant’s works are widely regarded as an 




This thesis will provide a critical analysis of Kantian autonomy in order to examine the 
barriers to its application in a practical context.  It will be shown that a Kantian model for the 
protection of sexual autonomy is a far more effective method than a non-consent centric 
model.  The thesis will also highlight that Kantian autonomy can be applied to the current law 
of non-consensual sexual offences,
20
 in order to increase the protection of sexual autonomy in 
relation to cases involving deception, fraud and mistake.     
Kantian philosophy can be applied to the protection of sexual autonomy because the concept 
of freedom plays an important role in Kantian autonomy.  In his lectures on ethics, Kant is 
reported to have stated that ‘[f]reedom...is the capacity which confers unlimited usefulness on 
all the others’, and that it is ‘the highest degree of life’.
21
  Freedom plays a part in the 
                                                 
18
 Kant Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (n4), 91. 
19
 J. Waldron, ‘Kant’s Legal Positivism’ (1995) 109 Harv LR 1535, 1535-36.   
20
 Sections 1-4 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.  
21
 I. Kant, Lectures on Ethics (P. Heath tr, CUP 1997), 347.   
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definition of autonomy, because autonomy is sometimes synonymous with freedom.
22
  This 
thesis will provide a critical analysis of Kantian autonomy in order to determine to what 
extent Kantian autonomy can be applied in a practical context to cases involving procuring 
sexual activity through the use of deception and non-violent coercion.  It will be argued that 
Kantian philosophy can be applied to the current law of non-consensual sexual offences in 
order to enhance the protection of sexual autonomy, specifically in relation to cases involving 
deception, mistake and non-violent coercion.  The advantage of using Kantian philosophy, 
for the protection of sexual autonomy, in preference to other principles, such as the harm 
principle, is best illustrated using Kant’s example of the false promisor who wishes to borrow 
money but has no intention of returning it: 
‘Whenever I believe myself short of money, I will borrow money and promise to 
pay it back though I know this will never be done.’  Now this principle of self-love 
or personal advantage is perhaps quite compatible with my own entire future 
welfare; only there remains the question ‘Is it right?’ I therefore transform the 
demand of self-love into a universal law and frame my question thus: ‘How would 
things stand if my maxim became a universal law?’ I then see straight away that this 
maxim
23
 can never rank as a universal law of nature and be self-consistent, but must 
necessarily contradict itself.  For the universality of a law that every one [sic] 
believing himself to be in need can make any promise he pleases with the intention 
not to keep it would make promising, and the very purpose of promising, itself 
impossible, since no one would believe he was being promised anything, but would 
laugh at utterances of this kind as empty shams.
24
   
From the above example, it appears that Kantian autonomy offers an alternative account of 
duties and rights, distinct from utilitarian and libertarian accounts.  Kantian autonomy rejects 
false promises, not simply because of their harmful consequences, but because they are at 
odds with the CI.  Making a false promise is wrong, according to Kant, because the false 
promisor is placing his needs and desires above the interests of others.  The universalising 
                                                 
22
 J. Rubenfeld, ‘The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of Sexual Autonomy’ (2013) 122 The Yale 
Law Journal 1372, 1418. 
23
 A principle that gives the reason for a person’s actions.   
24
 Kant Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (n4), 85. 
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aspect of Kantian autonomy serves as an indicator in determining if the action an individual 
is about to take places his interests and circumstances above the interests of others.  It will be 
argued that Kantian autonomy can provide a deontological framework that a rational person 
could use to make moral decisions in relation to procuring sexual activity.   
 
Background to the current law of sexual offences 
The Government considered that the existing law on sexual offences was ‘archaic, incoherent 
and discriminatory,’ and that it failed to reflect ‘changes in society and social attitudes’.
25
  
The recommendation was a Home Office-led review entitled Setting the Boundaries.
26
  The 
principle recommendations of this review were developed into a White Paper, Protecting the 
Public,
27
 which set out the main policy framework on which the Government were to 
legislate.  The key principle contained within the White Paper appears to have been the 
modernisation of the law.  Lacey reports that the existing law on sexual offences was badly in 
need of reform because it had developed in a piecemeal fashion and was inconsistent.
28
  The 
Home Office-led review of sex offences, also known as the Sex Offences Review (SOR), 
made recommendations regarding personal autonomy.  The Government considered the 
clarification of the law on consent as particularly important.
29
  The focus of the SOR’s 
recommendations was on personal autonomy, on the prevention of sexual abuse or 
exploitation and on the removal of discrimination in sex offences legislation.
30
  In relation to 
sexual autonomy and consent, the SOR stated that: 
[T]he criminal law has a vital role to play where sexual activity is not consensual, or 
where society decides that children and other very vulnerable people require protection 
and should not be able to consent. It is quite proper to argue in such situations that an 
adult’s right to exercise sexual autonomy in their private life is not absolute, and society 
                                                 
25
 Home Office, Protecting the Public: Strengthening Protection Against Sex Offenders and Reforming the Law 
on Sexual Offences (Cm 5668 2002), para 4.   
26
 Home Office, Setting the Boundaries: Reforming the Law on Sex Offences, Volume 1 (2000).  
27
 Home Office Protecting the Public (n25).    
28
 N. Lacey, ‘Beset by Boundaries: the Home Office Review of Sex Offences’ [2001] Crim LR 3. 
29
 HL Deb 13 February 2003, vol 644, col 772, per Lord Falconer.    
30
 R. Card, A. A. Gillespie and M. Hirst, Sexual Offences (Jordan Publishing 2008), 2.  
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may properly apply standards through the criminal law which are intended to protect 
the family as an institution as well as individuals from abuse.
31
  
Despite emphasising the importance of sexual autonomy, the SOR failed to provide a 
definition of this concept.  The principle statute before the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (SOA 
2003)
32
 was the Sexual Offences Act 1956 (SOA 1956).  The SOA 1956 was a consolidation 
statute, and the majority of the offences contained therein were drawn from Victorian 
statutes.
33
  Consequently, the SOA 1956 did not reflect recent changes in morality, society 
and social attitudes.  Many of the offences were gender-specific in terms of both the offender 
and the victim.  As a result, one of the aims of the Home Office recommendations was that 
the law should set out clearly what was unacceptable behaviour and provide penalties that 
reflected the seriousness of the offence committed.
34
   
The SOA 2003 is the first legislation in England and Wales to provide a statutory definition 
of ‘consent’.
35
  Prior to the SOA 2003, the leading authority in relation to the definition of 
consent was the decision of the Court of Appeal in R v Olugboja.
36
  The Court in this case 
rejected submissions that consent in rape could be vitiated only by incapacity, physical force, 
threats of violence or fraud as to the nature of the act.  Instead, the Court held that where an 
issue of consent arose, the question for the jury was whether the complainant consented in the 
‘ordinary meaning’ of the word.
37
 ‘Consent’, according to the Court, ‘covers a wide range of 
states of mind in the context of intercourse between a man and a woman, ranging from actual 
desire on the one hand to reluctant acquiescence on the other’.
38
  Chapter three will illustrate 
that this definition has been criticised on the grounds that it can lead to inconsistencies.   
 
 
                                                 
31
 Home Office Protecting the Public (n25), para 0.7.   
32
 Came into force on the 1
st
 May 2004.  
33
 Card et al (n30), 2.   
34
 Home Office Protecting the Public (n25), para 5.  
35
 Sexual Offences Act 2003, s 74.   
36
 [1982] QB 320. This case will be discussed in more detail in chapter three.  
37
 Ibid, 333.  
38
 Ibid, 331.   
Page 22  
 
 
In relation to the offences of rape and sexual assault, the Home Office-led review stated that 
these are: 
[P]rimarily crimes against the sexual autonomy of others. Every adult has the right 
and the responsibility to make decisions about their sexual conduct and to respect 
the rights of others. No other approach is viable in a society that values equality and 
respect for the rights of each individual. We concluded consent was the essential 
issue in sexual offences, and that the offences of rape and sexual assault were 
essentially those of violating another person’s freedom to withhold sexual contact.
39
 
Under s 74 of the SOA 2003, consent is defined in these terms: 
A person consents if he agrees by choice, and has the freedom and capacity to make 
that choice. 
This definition is supplemented in certain circumstances by ‘evidential’ and ‘conclusive’ 
presumptions contained in ss 75 and 76 respectively.  Despite the laudable aims of the 
review, the SOA 2003 has not been without its critics.  Lacey argues that the remit of the 
review was too limited, while Spencer contends that the SOA 2003 has over-extended the 
reach of the criminal law.
40
  Rumney and Fenton write that: 
Since the introductions of the 2003 Act, there has emerged a scholarly consensus 
that has raised serious concerns regarding the current definition of consent and the 
lack of guidance given to rape jurors.
41
   
Elliot and de Than stated in 2007 that: ‘[g]iven the pivotal role it can play in determining the 
defendant’s guilt, there is remarkably little case law on the meaning of consent in sex 
offences’.
42
  This position has not changed since the above claim.   
 
                                                 
39
 Home Office Setting the Boundaries (n26), para 2.7.2. 
40
 J. R. Spencer, ‘Sexual Offences Act 2003 (2): Child Family Offences’ [2004] Crim LR 347. 
41
 P. Rumney and R. Fenton, ‘Intoxicated Consent in Rape: Bree and Juror Decision-Making’ (2008) 71 MLR 
279, 288.   
42
 C. Elliott and C. de Than, ‘The Case for a Rational Reconstruction of Consent in Criminal Law’ (2007) 70(2) 
MLR 225, 236.   
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Parameters of the research    
This thesis will examine Kant’s supreme principle of morality in order to argue that Kantian 
autonomy is an effective method for protecting sexual autonomy with regards to adults with 
mental capacity.  Kantian autonomy is concerned with rational adults forming decisions 
which can be universalised.  Consequently, cases involving an intoxicated complainant
43
 and 
sex offences relating to minors will not be pursued.  Therefore, an analysis of the law of non-
consensual sexual offences in sections 1-4 of the SOA 2003 will be carried out.  These 
offences deal with rape, assault by penetration, sexual assault and causing a person to engage 
in sexual activity without consent.  The cases which will be analysed are primarily concerned 




The questions which will be addressed concern whether a Kantian model is more effective in 
terms of protecting sexual autonomy than the previous model, and whether the current law of 
sexual offences is consistent with Kantian autonomy.  This thesis will also critically examine 
whether a Kantian interpretation of the current law of sexual offences can protect sexual 
autonomy in cases involving deception and non-violent coercion.  The thesis will address 
whether there are any barriers to the application of a Kantian model in a practical context.  
 
Methodology 
According to Banaker and Travers: 
[E]stablished disciplines use methodology to monitor and sustain the quality of the 
research conducted within their realms, but also to ‘discipline’ the new comers.  In 
other words, methodology, has two closely related functions: It, firstly, guarantees a 
degree of quality control and, secondly, it ensures the internalisation of standards 
                                                 
43
 E.g. R v Bree [2007] EWCA Crim 256. 
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Among the various accepted methodologies within the discipline of law are doctrinal studies, 
jurisprudence and socio-legal studies.  These three methodologies will be used in analysing 
the primary
45
 and secondary sources
46
 of law used in this thesis.  To distinguish between the 
different methodologies used in this thesis, Arthurs’ taxonomy of legal research styles serves 
as a useful illustration of the various categories of legal research.
47
  It is presented a matrix in 
Figure 1: 
    
 
 
                                                 
44
 R. Banaker and M. Travers, ‘Law, Sociology and Method’ in R. Banaker and M. Travers (eds) Theory and 
Method in Socio-Legal Research (Hart Publishing 2005), 4. 
45
 Case law and legislation. 
46
 Academic writings, policy papers and Parliamentary debates.  
47
 H. W. Arthurs, Law and Learning: Report to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of 
Canada by the Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law (Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council of Canada 1983), 63-71.   




                           Figure 1    
 
Doctrinal research 
The area designated by the upper right quadrant is considered the basis for most legal 
research projects.
48
  Chynoweth argues that ‘this form of scholarship has always been the 
dominant form of academic legal research and has an important role to play in the 
development of legal doctrines through the publication of conventional legal treaties, articles 
and textbooks’.
49
  He states that doctrinal research is ‘concerned with the discovery and 
development of legal doctrines’.
50
  In England and Wales, doctrinal study places importance 
on legislation and judicial precedents, while also recognising academic works. Doctrinal 
research can therefore be described as an exercise in ‘deductive logic’ based on the available 
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  Doctrinal research questions tend to take the form of asking ‘what is the 
law?’ in a particular context, by carrying out an interpretive and qualitative analysis.
52
   
Black-letter analysis assists in interpreting disputes in a strictly legalistic manner, from the 
perspective of lawyers within the legal process.
53
  Black-letter analysis usually employs a 
purely deductive form of legal reasoning from legal principles.
54
  The researcher is not 
expected to engage in fundamental criticisms of the nature and operation of social 
institutions.
55
  The purpose of black-letter analysis is to provide ‘a detailed and highly 
technical commentary’ upon the content of legal doctrine.
56
  The priority is to gather, 
organise and describe legal rules, and comment on the authoritative legal sources that contain 
these rules, namely case law.
57
  The current law, as well as the previous law, of non-
consensual sexual offences will be examined in order to determine its application in relation 
to the protection of sexual autonomy.   
This approach is not sufficient for the purposes of this thesis because it relies heavily on 
using court judgments and statutes to explain law.
58
  Black-letter analysis offers a limited 
mode of enquiry due to the particular standpoint which must be adopted.  The standpoint 
which must be adopted is that of a judge or barrister engaging in ‘conflicts of interpretation 
regarding the meaning and scope of points of law contained in reported cases, particularly 
those stemming from the senior courts’.
59
  Such analysis places heavy emphasis on the 
judgments of the appellate courts regarding the precise meaning and scope of the contested 
points of law.
60
  The restrictive nature of black-letter analysis is caused by its focus on court 
judgments and statutes to explain the law.     
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Cases, statutes and academic commentaries, which form the basis of the black-letter 
approach, can also be analysed with equal merit by alternative approaches.
61
  These 
alternative approaches include socio-legal studies, sociology of law and feminist critique.
62
  
Socio-legal methodology will be used to superimpose on the analysis of cases and statutes a 
Kantian perspective, in relation to the protection of sexual autonomy in a practical context.        
 
Socio-legal research    
This thesis adopts both doctrinal and socio-legal methodologies. This approach follows 
Chynoweth’s argument that: 
[I]t is probably incorrect to describe the process of legal analysis as being dictated 
by a ‘methodology’…The process involves an exercise in reasoning and a variety of 
techniques are used…with the aim of constructing an argument which is  
convincing according to accepted and instinctive conventions of discourse within 
the discipline.
63
        
A socio-legal approach will be deployed in order to investigate the impact of adopting a 
Kantian framework to the protection of sexual autonomy in a practical context.  The 
importance of employing this methodology is highlighted by Cotterell’s claim that: 
Socio-legal scholarship in the broadest sense is the most important scholarship 
presently being undertaken in the legal world.  Its importance is not only in what it 
has achieved, which is considerable, but also in what it promises.
64
 
Socio-legal methodology has been defined as ‘an interdisciplinary subject with particular ties 
with sociology’.
65
  An interdisciplinary approach will be employed in order to apply a 
Kantian critique to the law of non-consensual sexual offences.  The analysis will determine 
whether the current law of sexual offences protects autonomy within a Kantian framework.  
The analysis will also be used to explore the impact of adopting Kantian autonomy in a 
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practical context, with regards to protecting sexual autonomy in cases involving deception 
and non-violent coercion. Chapter six will critically analyse the impact of Kantian autonomy 
in a practical context.  Therefore, socio-legal analysis will be used to bridge the gap between 
‘law in action’ and ‘law in books’.
66
  Criticism of socio-legal approaches concern the fact that 
it is tied inextricably to specific and liberal approaches, and thereby predisposed towards a 
reform agenda.
67
  The aim of this thesis is to apply a Kantian analysis to the current law of 
non-consensual sexual offense in order to increase the protection of sexual autonomy in cases 
involving deception and non-violent coercion.  Kantian analysis will be applied in order to 
increase the protection of sexual autonomy, which involves suggesting reforms in relation to 
applying a more effective model for the protection of sexual autonomy in a practical context.  
The criticism levelled at this approach does not apply to this research, because socio-legal 
methodology is employed due to the fact that it will be used to suggest possible reforms for 
the protection of sexual autonomy.              
   
Jurisprudential analysis 
A jurisprudential analysis will also be carried out in this thesis which will involve an 
examination of the principles of natural law in order to determine whether Kantian 
philosophy can be applied in a practical context to the protection of sexual autonomy.  
Natural law is said to provide ‘a name for the point of intersection between law and 
morals’.
68
  The essence of natural law is said to lie in the claim that there are objective moral 
principles that depend on the nature of the universe, and these principles can be discovered by 
reason.
69
  One of the main obstacles which natural law must overcome is the tension between 
what ‘is’ and what ‘ought’ to be.
70
  Natural law must establish whether an ‘ought’ can be 
construed as an ‘is’.  One method by which natural law seeks to resolve this issue is by 
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arguing that ‘if it is a natural law for men to act in a particular way...then he ought morally to 
act in this way’.
71
 
Natural law can be distinguished from positivism, which was first used by Auguste Comte, 
who was of the opinion that sociology should model itself on the natural sciences, and aim to 
produce objective findings in relation to the structure of society.
72
  This thesis will not 
employ a positivistic paradigm because positivist research places an emphasis on the 




Natural law, on the other hand, is believed to be a rational foundation for moral judgment.
74
  
This thesis will examine whether the current law of non-consensual sexual offences is 
consistent with Kantian autonomy.  This will involve analysing whether Kantian autonomy 
can assist in determining the circumstances in which an individual’s autonomy is violated in 
cases involving deception and non-violent coercion.  Kant has been described as a ‘bridge 
thinker’ whose ideas were influenced by the philosophical opinions of the Greeks and 
Aquinas, and also impacted on contemporary critical thought.
75
  The importance of using 
Kantian autonomy, in this thesis, is due to Kant’s argument that freedom is equated with 
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Christman notes that: 
Whatever contemporary approach to the topic of autonomy one finds appealing, the 
debate over the concept will inevitably be framed by the baggage inherited from 
Kant's theory of autonomy.
76
  
A person is autonomous, in a Kantian sense, when they are in a position to subject one's will 
to self-imposed maxims which conform to the moral law.
77
 The main hypothesis in this thesis 
is that Kantian autonomy is an effective method for the protection of sexual autonomy.  
Therefore, it is important to distinguish Kantian autonomy from other definitions of 
autonomy.   
Although autonomy is a central value in Kantian ethics, it also occupies an important position 
in Mill's version of utilitarian liberalism,78 and while Rousseau did not use the term ‘autonomy’ 
in his writings, he defined moral freedom as ‘obedience to the law one has prescribed for 
himself’.79 It will be shown in chapter two that Rousseau’s concept of moral freedom as property 
of the will is similar to Kant’s notion of autonomy.  While Rousseau was concerned with the 
question of how moral freedom can be achieved and sustained by individuals given the presence 
of social dependency, Kant focused on the nature of morality and adhering to the supreme 
principle of morality. Kantian autonomy can also be distinguished from the conception of 
autonomy advanced by Mill in his work On Liberty.80 Mill’s work focuses on the significance of 
autonomy in relation to paternalism, while Kantian autonomy is used in this thesis with regards to 
its principle of universality.81 It will be argued that Kantian autonomy is more suited to the 
protection of sexual autonomy because individuals are prohibited from acting on principles which 
cannot be universalised without contradiction.  Any action which is at odds with the CI is morally 
wrong and lacks autonomy.  A person is only autonomous if they are free to act on laws which 
they have given themselves.  Consequently, an individual’s autonomy is said to be violated 
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within a Kantian framework where her decision to engage in sexual activity has been a result of 
coercive pressure applied by the defendant.    
According to Kant, individuals are autonomous when they are capable of acting according to 
law which they provide for themselves.  However, Kant was not the first philosopher to 
suggest that individuals are capable of reason.  Thomas Hobbes called reason the ‘scout’ for 
the desires,
82
 while David Hume called reason ‘slave of the passions’.
83
 While Hume is said 
to have reduced reason to nature, Kant aimed to divorce it from nature completely.
84
 Kant 
opted to transform reason into a judge, ‘who compels the witnesses to reply to those 
questions which he himself thinks fit to propose’.
85
 Kantian ethics requires that individuals 
treat each other with respect because they are human beings, capable of reason.
86
 
According to Hume, liberty can only mean: 
[A] power of acting or not acting, according to the determinations of the will; this 
is, if we choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may.
87
  
Kant, however, viewed all moral theories prior to his as failing to explain the categorical 
character of moral obligation.  According to Kant, previous moral theories did not recognise 
individuals as autonomous and capable of legislating laws for themselves.
88
 
Kantian autonomy differs from the philosophical writings of Hume and Hobbes in that Kant 
argues that morality cannot be based on purely empirical considerations, such as interests, 
desires and wants which individuals have at any given moment.  For Kant, these factors are 
contingent and variable, and, therefore, they cannot form the basis of morality.  According to 
the Kantian view, the utilitarian’s happiness principle: 
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[C]ontributes nothing whatever toward establishing morality, since making a man 
happy is different from making him good and making him prudent or astute in 
seeking his advantage quite different from making him various’
89
  
Basing morality on interests and preferences destroys its dignity and does not allow 
individuals to distinguish between right and wrong.
90
 It is important to determine the basis of 
morality in order to apply it to the protection of sexual autonomy.  Kant contends that 
individuals can arrive at the supreme principle of morality through ‘pure practical reason’. 
Thus, when individuals act on reason they are not motivated by the desire to seek pleasure 
and avoid pain.
91
 A Kantian framework underpins this thesis because the moral worth of an 
action stems from the intention from which the act is done.
92
  Thus, if reason determines an 
individual’s will, then the will becomes the power to choose independent of the dictates of 
inclinations.  It will be argued that Kant’s principle of universality is an effective method for 
the protection of sexual autonomy because it can be used as a test to determine when an 
individual places his interests above those of another.  Where a defendant procures sexual 
activity by acting on his own interests and desires which he places before those of the 
complainant, then he cannot be said to be acting autonomously within a Kantian framework.  
If his actions cannot be universalised then he may not be acting autonomously and the 
complainant’s autonomy may be violated as a result of the defendant’s actions.   
For the purposes of this thesis, Kantian autonomy is chosen over other forms of autonomy 
because it consists in the capacity of the will of a rational being which is able to formulate 
laws for itself, independent from the external influences and pressures. Kantian autonomy is 
an effective method for the protection of sexual autonomy because it involves: 
[N]ot only a capacity for choice that is motivationally independent, but a law giving 
capacity that is independent of determination by external influence and is guided by 
its own internal principle.
93
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Kantian autonomy imposes an obligation to treat individuals ‘never simply as a means, but 
always at the same time as an end in themselves’.
94
 Chapter two will develop the notion that 
Kantian autonomy places an emphasis on respecting the humanity of individuals and Kant’s 
supreme principle of morality prohibits individuals from placing their interests before those 
of others.  Kant wrote that ‘the dignity of man consists precisely of in his capacity to make 
universal law, although only on condition of himself also subject to the law he makes’.
95
 A 
defendant who procures sexual activity through deception or non-violent coercion places his 
own interests above those of the complaint and makes an exception for himself in that he is 
unlikely to agree to be the target of similar deception and coercive conduct.  In such a 
scenario, the defendant is said to have violated the complainant’s autonomy within a Kantian 
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Chapter synopsis  
Chapter two will outline the theory behind Kantian autonomy in order to apply this concept 
to both the previous as well as the current law of sexual offences.  This chapter will also 
highlight the importance of employing Kantian autonomy in relation to the protection of 
sexual autonomy.     
Chapter three will examine the law of sexual offences prior to the current law.  This chapter 
will determine whether the previous law of sexual offences adequately protected sexual 
autonomy.  The function of chapter four will be to provide an outline of the origins of the 
current law and to determine whether the current law is consistent with Kantian autonomy.   
Chapter five will discuss the application of Kantian autonomy in a practical context.  This 
will involve an analysis of the barriers to the application of Kantian autonomy in a practical 
context.  Chapter five will offer a re-interpretation of Kantian autonomy, which focuses on 
the essential elements of Kantian moral theory in relation to inclinations and respecting the 
dignity of others, with regards to the protection of sexual autonomy.  
Chapter six will conclude by arguing that Kantian autonomy is an effective method for 
protecting sexual autonomy.  This chapter will argue that a Kantian interpretation of the 
current law of sexual offences can provide more adequate protection in relation to sexual 
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Chapter Two: Kantian Autonomy 
Introduction 
This chapter will provide a critical analysis of the various conceptions of autonomy in order 
to show that, unlike other notions of autonomy, Kantian autonomy is the most effective form 
of autonomy in relation to the protection of sexual autonomy. At the heart of Kantian 
autonomy is the duty owed to others as well as the individual’s capacity to make decisions for 
oneself.  It will be shown that Kantian autonomy can play an important role in the protection 
of sexual autonomy because it focuses on freedom and universalization. An autonomous 
individual, within a Kantian framework, is one who is not subject to the will of another. This 
is an important element in the protection of sexual autonomy especially in non-violent 
coercive circumstances.  Kant’s supreme principle of morality will be examined in order to 
determine whether it is capable of being applied in a practical context.  The current law of 
sexual offences protects sexual autonomy by adopting a consent-centric model which consists 
of philosophical concepts such as ‘freedom’ and ‘capacity’, but fails to define them.     
 
Autonomy  
Individual autonomy is an idea that is generally understood to represent the capacity to be 
one’s own person and to lead a life according to reasons and motives that are taken as one’s 
own, and not the product of manipulative external forces.
96
  Autonomy is a central value in 
Kant’s moral philosophy and is represented by the five formulae of the Categorical 
Imperative (CI).
97
  Kantian autonomy focuses on the status of individuals as universal law 
givers rather than as universal law followers. To be autonomous for Kant is emphatically not 
to be able to do whatever an individual desires, but to have the capacity for rational self-
governance. To be autonomous is to be a member of a kingdom of similar autonomous 
individuals and to treat others ‘never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an 
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 This conceptualisation is said to be at odds with the way in which the language is 
currently used in law.
99
 Autonomy, nowadays, is associated with the satisfaction of individual 
desires and wishes.
100
  The principle of autonomy holds that each individual is to be treated 
as responsible for her own behaviour.
101
   
The reason why the thesis considers Kantian autonomy relevant to sexual offences is because 
it entails the unconditional capacity of rational individuals to control their will. Kantian 
autonomy is central to the concept of autonomy that occupies a prominent place in Western 
liberal thought.
102
  Kant’s conception of autonomy is said to have marked a crucial step in the 
development of freedom as the ‘central value of our culture’.
103
  The influence of Kantian 







   
For Kant, autonomy is the capacity to act on rational principles and to exercise moral 
reasoning through freedom of choice.
107
  Since the Sex Offences Review (SOR) 
recommended that the definition of consent should be defined in law as ‘free agreement’,
108
 
the thesis will examine whether the current law of sexual offences has achieved the aims of 
the SOR.  Anderson contends that sexual autonomy should be valued differently from other 
forms of freedom. He states that ‘a person’s sexuality almost always figures prominently as 
an aspect of his or her self-conception, status in society, and economic and social 
prospects’.
109
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Philosophical autonomy  
The etymological roots of ‘autonomy’ are found in the two Greek words ‘auto’, meaning self, 
and ‘nomos’, which means rule or law.
110
 The early modern ideology of political autonomy 
has been attributed to Machiavelli, who in the Discourses combined two senses of autonomy.  
The first is freedom from dependence, while the second concerns the power to self-
legislate.
111
 Therefore, for an agent to be autonomous, she must possess a developed self to 
which her actions can be ascribed. The other dimension of autonomy requires ‘freedom from 
external constraints’.
112
 This suggests that for an individual to be autonomous she must not be 
manipulated by others or forced to do their will.
113
 According to Lindley, ‘the underlying idea 
of the concept of autonomy is self-mastery’.
114
 This implies that an individual must have 
mastery over herself and she must not be subservient to others.
115
  The concept of autonomy 
is well expressed by Berlin in his essay Two Concepts of Liberty,
116
 where he makes a 
distinction between negative and positive liberty. Positive liberty deals with who or what 
controls an individual’s life.  Negative liberty, on the other hand, refers to non-interference 
by society in the life of the individual. According to Berlin:   
[T]hose who have ever valued liberty for its own sake believed that to be free to 
choose, and not to be chosen for, is an inalienable ingredient in what makes human 
beings human; and that this underlies both the positive demand to have a voice in 
the laws and practices of the society in which one lives, and to be accorded an area, 
artificially carved out, if need be, in which one is one’s own master, a ‘negative’ 
area in which a man is not obliged to account for his activities to any man so far as 
this is compatible with the existence of organised society.
117
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This freedom is said to include freedom from unwanted interference, even if the interference 
is for the benefit of the person who suffers it.
118
 Mill presented a similar argument to Berlin’s 
in relation to protecting an individual from paternalism. Mill wrote:  
[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of 
a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, 
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be 
compelled to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will 
make him happier, because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise, or 
even right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with 
him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting 
him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that, the conduct from which it 
is desired to deter him, must be calculated to produce evil to someone else. The 
only part of the conduct of any one, for which he is amenable to society, is that 
which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns himself, his independence 




Consequently, the only justification for coercively interfering with an individual is to prevent 
him from harming others.
120
 Feinberg defines harm as ‘those states of setback interests that 
are the consequence of wrongful acts or omissions of others’.
121
 Sheleff notes that the harm 
principle, as being an expression of a morality that flows from individual autonomy, is a 
technical means of ensuring the moral values of individual autonomy.
122
 Ashworth states that 
wrongfulness is an important element in relation to the harm principle. 
123
 He writes that: 
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It is not the causing of harm alone that justifies criminalization, but the wrongful 
causing of harm – wrongful in the sense of culpably assailing a person’s interests, 
or abusing them by using them as a means to another’s satisfaction.
124
    
Gardner and Shute, on the other hand, argue that committing a wrong against another is the 
essence of most serious crimes, without the need to establish harm.
125
 They believe that 
‘[f]ocusing on the harms tends to occlude the wrongfulness of the act itself’.
126
 They purport 
to establish what is wrongful about rape by focusing on a ‘pure’ case of rape, a case which is 
‘entirely stripped of distracting epiphenomena’.
127
 The authors use the example of a non-
consenting victim who is unconscious, who never discovers she was sexually penetrated, and 
experiences no (other) harm. They state that rape is wrong because a rapist ‘objectifies his 
victim by treating her as a mere repository ‘of use-value’.
128
 Gardener and Shute adopt a 
Kantian argument to support their claim that ‘rape, in the pure case, is the sheer use of a 
person’.
129
 Regarding sexual autonomy, Gardner and Shute state that:  
[S]ex industry workers typically are being objectified by their clients and 
consumers, and this is indeed an attack on their humanity. They are being used 
purely for sexual gratification.
130
  
They contend that allowing people to pursue various sexual options is, up to a point, 
rehumanizing because it credits them with moral agency, without which credit their 
dehumanization is only compounded.
131
  This rehumanizing value, combined with the general 
value of personal autonomy, gives rise to a right to sexual autonomy.
132
 Therefore, rape is a 
wrong because it is a violation of this right.
133
 In relation to autonomy, Feinberg states that:  
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[T]he most basic autonomy-right is the right to decide how to live one’s life, in 
particular how to make the critical life decisions – what course of study to take, 
what skills and virtues to cultivate, what career to enter, who or whether to marry, 
which church if any to join, whether to have children, and so on.
134
 
Therefore, an autonomous individual is said to be her own person, directed by considerations, 
desires, conditions, and characteristics that are not simply imposed externally upon her.
135
   
Raz argues that the autonomy-based doctrine of freedom consists of three main features:  
First, its primary concern is the promotion and protection of positive freedom which 
is understood as the capacity for autonomy, consisting of the availability of an 
adequate range of options, and of the mental abilities necessary for an autonomous 
life.  Second, the state has the duty not merely to prevent the denial of freedom, but 
also to promote it by creating the conditions of autonomy.  Third, it may not pursue 
any goal by means which infringe people’s autonomy unless such action is justified 
by the need to protect or promote the autonomy of those people or of others.
136
    
Feinberg claims that there are at least four different meanings of ‘autonomy’ in moral and 
political philosophy: the capacity to govern oneself; the actual condition of self-governance; 
an ideal of character; and the sovereign authority to govern oneself.  Central to all of these 
uses is a conception of the individual able to act, reflect, and choose on the basis of factors 
that are her own.
137
   
Wiberg argues that an autonomous agent is one that is ‘exempt from arbitrary control, un-
coerced and unrestricted’.
138
  He contends that autonomy does not require isolation from 
other individuals nor does it require that no external factors can have some sort of impact on 
the autonomous agent.
139
 Instead, he suggests that autonomy should refer to self-direction 
rather than to self-sufficiency.
140
 This argument follows a Kantian model of autonomy.  The 
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opposite of autonomy is heteronomy; an individual is said to be heteronomous if her beliefs 
or desires or actions are not autonomous. Lindley offers the following conception which 
characterises ways of failing to be heteronomous:  
An agent is cognitively heteronomous with respect to a particular belief or set of 
beliefs if either A holds that belief or set of beliefs on account of a failure of A’s 
passive or active theoretical rationality, or the belief or set of beliefs is false...A is 
cognitively heteronomous with respect to a particular action or set of actions if 
either A acts through domination by lower-order desires, or A acts through 
weakness of will.
141
                
Heteronomy, which can be either cognitive (belief) or conative (will),
142
 is interference with 
self-determination either by other individuals or by internal psychic barriers interfering so 
that an individual is unable to decide for herself. 
143
   
 
Personal autonomy  
Modern philosophers distinguish between personal autonomy and moral autonomy.
144
  
According to Raz the ideal of personal autonomy: 
[H]olds the free choice of goals and relations as an essential ingredient of individual 
well-being.  The ruling idea behind the ideal of personal autonomy is that people 
should make their own lives.  The autonomous person is (part) author of his own 
life. The ideal of personal autonomy is the vision of people controlling, to some 




This ideal of personal autonomy is associated with other virtues such as self-awareness and 
integrity.
146
 Both Feinberg’s and Raz’s concepts of autonomy are consistent with Kantian 
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autonomy thereby illustrating that Kantian autonomy is not only an accepted concept of 
autonomy but is the framework on which other concepts of autonomy are based.     
 
Moral autonomy  
Darwall distinguishes between personal autonomy and moral autonomy by stating that the 
former involves the individual ‘determining his conduct by his own most highly cherished 
values’,
147
 while the latter involves an agent choosing in accordance with her own moral 
convictions or principles.
148
  Waldron provides a similar definition of moral autonomy when 
he states that ‘moral autonomy...is associated specifically with the relation between one 
person’s pursuit of his own ends and others’ pursuit of theirs’.
149
  
This definition appears to be consistent with Kantian autonomy.  An individual is 
autonomous in the moral sense when she is not guided just by her own conception of 
happiness, but by a universalized concern for the ends of all rational individuals.
150
 Kant 
distinguishes autonomy from heteronomy by stating that moralities, whose imperative force 
does not stem from an individual’s own will but is obtained ‘beyond’ itself, are 
‘heteronomous’.
151
   
Autonomy has been described as a spacious word, capable of containing a variety of 
philosophical implications.
152
  This is demonstrated by the following philosophical 
definitions of autonomy:  
 I am autonomous if I rule me, and no one else rules I.153  
 To regard himself as autonomous...a person must see himself as sovereign 
in deciding to believe and in weighing competing reasons for action.
154
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 As Kant argued, moral autonomy is a combination of freedom and 
responsibility; it is a submission to laws that one has made for oneself. 




The common element among these definitions is the emphasis on freedom for the individual, 
a central concept in Kantian autonomy. The concept of freedom includes freedom from 
interference by others. Autonomy comprises of positive and negative aspects.
156
 The positive 
involves a person’s right to decide when and with whom to engage in sexual activity, while 
the negative aspect involves the right to refuse relations with others and have effect given to 
that refusal.   
Kantian autonomy is not only considered highly influential but has also generated endless 
commentary and critique.
157
 Young notes that philosophers have construed individual 
autonomy as ‘a character ideal or virtue’.
158
 He states that such a construction is clearly 
linked to the Kantian tradition in which regulating one’s own life is considered a virtue.
159
 
Within this Kantian approach reason is linked with autonomy as the most valuable means of 
controlling one’s surroundings.
160
 Advocates of this approach argue that being autonomous 
entails making choices based on critical reflection. Benn writes that an autonomous person 
must ‘be capable of second thoughts in the light of new reason’.
161
 Therefore, sexual 
autonomy within a Kantian framework occurs when a person can revise her choices when 
further evidence arises which suggest that her previous choices, regarding sexual activities, 
were poor. Beauchamp and Childress write that the traits of an autonomous person include 
‘capacities for self-governance such as understanding, reasoning, deliberating, managing, and 
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Legal autonomy   
Schulhofer argues that respect for sexual autonomy requires sexual privacy against abuse and 
overreaching.
164
 It also requires that the law protects the freedom of individuals to seek 
emotional intimacy and sexual fulfilment with willing partners.
165
 Interference with sexual 
autonomy should be considered unacceptable and illegal whether that interference takes the 
form of threats, abuse of trust or exploitation of authority.
166
 Hence, sexual autonomy is the 
right of an individual to freely choose the boundaries of her sexual life provided her choices 
do not interfere with the sexual autonomy of others. Schulhofer criticises reforms in sexual 
offences because: 
None of these approaches recognizes (except rhetorically) that the central value to 
be protected is sexual autonomy itself, the freedom of every person to decide 
whether and when to engage in sexual relations.
167
  
Sexual autonomy is limited by the rights of others and, as a result, it cannot entail the 
freedom to have sex whenever and with whomever an individual wants.   Schulhofer argues 
that sexual autonomy has two facets:  
The first is active – the right to decide on the kind of life one wishes to live and the 
kinds of activities one wishes to pursue, including activities with others who are 
willing. The other facet of sexual autonomy is the reverse – the right to safeguard 
and exclude, the freedom to refuse to have sex with any person at any time, for any 
reason or for no reason at all.
168
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It is argued that a Kantian model displays these facets. The above description of sexual 
autonomy echoes Dripp’s definition of what is meant by sexual autonomy, ‘the freedom to 
refuse to have sex with anyone for any reason’.
169
   
Kant argues that morality cannot be based on merely empirical
170
 considerations such as 
interests, wants and preferences people have at any given time.
171
 These factors are variable 
and contingent and therefore they cannot form the basis for universal moral principles.
172
  
Kant argues that ‘it is impossible to reach an agreement on feelings, because feeling is by no 
means uniform’.
173
  If desires were to be accepted as the determination of moral obligations, 
their contingent nature may cause variety in the rules.
174
  An individual is described by Kant 
as having:  
[T]wo points of view from which he can regard himself and from which he can 
know laws governing the employment of his powers and consequently governing all 
his actions. He can consider himself first – so far as he belongs to the sensible world 
– to be under laws of nature (heteronomy); and secondly – so far as he belongs to 
the intelligible world – to be under laws which being independent of nature, are not 
empirical but have their ground in reason alone.
175
     
According to Kant, there are two perspectives concerning human agency.  An individual who 
inhabits an intelligible world is independent of the laws of nature and as a result is capable of 
autonomy. She is capable of acting autonomously because she is competent to act according 
to a law she formulates for herself.
176
 Only from this intelligible world can an individual 
regard herself as free, ‘for to be independent of determination by causes in the sensible world 
(and this is what reason must always attribute to itself) is to be free’.
177
 Therefore, if an 
individual were only an empirical being, she would not be capable of freedom because every 
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exercise of her will would be conditioned by some interest or inclination.
178
  The choices she 
makes would be heteronomous choices governed by the pursuit of some end.  The idea that 
individuals can act freely and take moral responsibility for their actions requires that they 
view themselves from the standpoint of an agent, not merely an object. This standpoint also 
allows individuals to hold others morally responsible for their actions.
179
  However, Kant 
concedes that individuals do not only inhabit the intelligible world, but the sensible world as 
well.
180
 If individuals were rational beings, not subject to the laws and necessities of nature, 
then all their actions ‘would invariably accord with the autonomy of the will’.
181
 Categorical 
imperatives are possible because the idea of freedom makes an individual a member of the 
intelligible world.
182
 Kant contrasts hypothetical imperatives (HI), which are always 
conditional, with a type of imperative that is unconditional: a categorical imperative.  Kant 
writes: 
If the action would be good solely as a means to something else, the imperative is 
hypothetical. If the action is represented as good in itself, and therefore as necessary 
for a will which of itself accords with reason, then the imperative is categorical.
183
 
Because individuals, according to Kant, inhabit both standpoints,
184
 there is always 
potentially a gap between what individuals do and what they ought to do, between the way 




Kantian autonomy  
It has been shown in the previous sections that Kantian autonomy is not only a recognised 
concept but is a concept from which later definitions of autonomy are derived. It has also 
been shown that sexual autonomy is a concept that should be protected. An analysis of 
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Kantian autonomy will also determine to what extent the current law of sexual offences is 
consistent with Kantian autonomy.  
 
Kantian morality 
Kant is of the opinion that morality comprises a set of demands that are not only 
unconditionally valid but also valid for all rational beings.
186
 Kant argued that moral 
obligations are based on a standard of rationality, which he termed the CI.  It is an imperative 
because it is a command.
187
 Hypothetical Imperatives use instrumental reason in the sense 
that if a person wants X, then he must do Y.
188
  Kant states that:  
[A]n imperative is concerned with the choice of means to one’s own happiness – 
that is, a precept of prudence – still remains hypothetical: an action is commanded, 
not absolutely, but only as a means to a further purpose.
189
   
A CI on the other hand commands without reference to or dependence on any further 
purpose.  Kant asserts that a CI: 
[I]s concerned, not with the matter of the action and its presumed results, but with 
its form and with the principle from which it follows; and what is essentially good 




Accordingly, only a CI can qualify as an imperative of morality. Such an imperative is not 
concerned with the matter of the action nor its presumed results, but only with its form.
191
  He 
asserts that:  
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There is therefore only a single categorical imperative and it is this: ‘Act only on 
that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a 
universal law’.
192
   
According to Kant, ‘I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my 
maxim should become a universal law’.
193
  By a ‘maxim’ Kant means a normative principle, 
which an agent lays down for herself with the intention of acting according to it.
194
  In other 
words, it is a rule that gives reason to specific actions. Therefore, morality comprises a set of 
demands that are unconditional and valid for all rational beings.
195
  Kant thought that to 
support this understanding of moral principles, an individual must show that they originate in 
reason a priori,
196
 as opposed to originating in contingent facts concerning human 
psychology, or the circumstances of human life.
197
 Since the HI is the principle underlying 
the empirically conditioned use of reason, it follows that the moral law cannot be derived 
from any concept of empirical practical reason.
198
  
An imperative is expressed by an ‘ought'.
199
  However, there are ‘oughts’ other than moral 
duties which are distinguished from the moral ‘ought’ because they are based on hypothetical 
imperatives. A HI can be described as a conditional command, which is ‘good for some 
purpose or other’.
200
 An individual who engages in sexual activity due to heteronomous 
factors can be said to be acting contrary to Kantian autonomy.  A CI, on the other hand, is an 
unconditional command, which is ‘objectively necessary in itself without reference to some 
purpose’.
201
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The Supreme Principle of Morality  
Kant formulates the CI, the ‘supreme principle of morality’,
202
 as a test of the universality of 
the principles on which individuals act. He argues that morality cannot be based on merely 
empirical considerations, such as interests, wants and desires.
203
 These factors are variable 
and contingent and therefore are not capable of serving as the basis for universal moral 
principles.
204
 Basing moral principles on preferences and desires ‘contributes nothing 
whatever towards establishing morality’.
205
 As a result, individual wants and desires cannot 
form the basis of morality.  According to Kant:  
Everything in nature works in accordance with laws.  Only a rational being has the 
power to act in accordance with his ideas of laws – that is, in accordance with 
principles – and so has he a will. Since reason is required in order to derive actions 
from laws, the will is nothing but practical reason.
206
           
Therefore, the supreme principle of morality can be achieved through ‘pure practical 
reason’.
207
  An important aspect of Kant’s claim is that morality must rest on the principle of 
autonomy.
208
 The moral worth of an action consists in the intention from which the act is 
done and not in the consequences that stem from it.  Kant states that:  
A good will is not good because of what it effects or accomplishes – because of its 




In order for any action to be morally good, ‘it is not enough that it should conform to the 
moral law – it must also be done for the sake of the moral law’.
210
  Therefore, the motive for 
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carrying out an action should not be done for some ulterior motive, otherwise it would 
become a HI.
211
  Kant writes that: 
An action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the purpose to be attained by 
it, but in the maxim according with which it is decided upon; it depends therefore, 
not on the realisation of the object of the action, but solely on the principle of 
volition in accordance with which, irrespective of all objects of the faculty of desire, 
the action has been performed.
212
  
Individuals who act out of motives other than duty, such as self-interest, are at risk of 
depriving their actions of moral worth. This is true not only for self-interest but for any 
attempts to satisfy ‘our wants, desires, preferences, and appetites’.
213
 Kant insists that only 
actions carried out in response to the ‘motive of duty’ have moral worth.
214
 Allison notes that 
central to Kant’s account of moral worth is the contrast between duty and inclination as two 
competing sources of motivation.
215
 Kant defines ‘inclination’ as the ‘dependence of the 
power of appetite on sensation’ and thus ‘an inclination always indicates a need’.
216
  
Although Kant assumes a dualism of inclination and duty as the sources of motivation, 
‘inclination’ must be interpreted in a broad sense to refer to any stimulus to actions that 
originates from ‘our sensuous, as opposed to our rational, nature’.
217
 Inclinations include 
momentary desires, instincts, passions and fears, all of which pertain to sensuously affected 
beings.
218
 It is important to note that Kant never claims that a morally praiseworthy act loses 
its moral significance if an individual has an inclination to perform it.
219
 Kant claims that 
such an act lacks moral worth if the individual performs it only because of the inclination.
220
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Therefore, moral worth does not require the absence of inclination, provided an individual’s 
inclination was accompanied with the ‘motive of duty’.
221
     
Kant distinguishes between the motive for helping others – out of self-interest – and the 
motive of duty. Although the compassion of the altruist ‘deserves praise and encouragement’, 
its maxim lacks moral worth because the performance of such actions was carried out from 
inclination and not from duty.
222
 In the Preface to the Groundwork Kant states that its 
purpose is ‘nothing more than the search for the establishment of the supreme principle of 
morality’.
223
  Kant holds that moral questions are to be decided by reason, which seeks unity 
under principles.
224
 Kant does not consider reason to merely be the slave of the passions. If 
that were the case, individuals would be better served by relying on instinct.
225
 Pure practical 
reason ‘legislates a priori, regardless of all empirical ends’.
226
   
Wood states that the function of the supreme principle of morality is: 
[N]ot to tell us directly, from day to day and minute to minute, through some 
uniform canonical process of moral reasoning to be applied in exactly the same way 
to all situations, exactly what actions should (and should not) be performing and 
precisely how we should be spending our time.
227
          
The correct interpretation of Kant’s formulation of the supreme principle of morality should 
focus on identifying perspicuously the ultimate value on which moral rules and duties may be 
grounded.
228
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The first formula of the Categorical Imperative 
In his First formula, Kant writes that: 
The will is absolutely good if it cannot be evil – that is, if its maxim when made 
into universal law, can never be in conflict with itself. This principle is therefore 
also its supreme law: ‘Act always on that maxim whose universality as a law you 
can at the same time will’.
229
   
When individuals act from duty the only thing left that could motivate them is the purely 
rational appeal of a universally valid practical principle.
230
 This leads Kant to his first 
formulation of the CI.
231
 Kant’s theory assumes individuals to be self-directing in the sense 
that they possess the capacity to step back from their natural desires, reflect on them, consider 
whether and how they should satisfy them, and be moved by them only on the basis of such 
reflection.
232
  By acting on inclinations, on the other hand, individuals make a series of 
decisions and create a set of new desires whose source is not merely the original desire they 
sought to satisfy.
233
 Therefore, when an action would be good solely as a means to something 
else, it becomes a HI.
234
  Kant contends that if the good will that acts from duty has the 
characteristic that it follows a rational principle even when all empirical incentives oppose it, 
then such a will should be understood as following a CI.
235
 Only a CI can qualify as an 
imperative of morality.
236
 Consequently, if acting from duty is what is essential to morality, 
then the supreme principle of morality must be conceived as a CI. To be free, in the sense of 
Kantian autonomy, requires individuals to act out of a CI rather than a HI.
237
  Although Kant 
provides five formulations of the CI, he tends to speak as if there are only three.
238
  Kant’s 
first formulation of the principle of morality specifies the form of the moral law and consists 
of two variants:  
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Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should 
become a universal law.
239
 




The former is referred to as the Formula of the Universal Law (FUL), while the latter is 
called the Formula of the Law of Nature (FLN).
241
 When Kant speaks of ‘the categorical 
imperative’ and contends that there is only one, he has in mind the principle of all categorical 
imperatives.
242
 The CI, unlike the HI, must be applied independently of any particular desires 
for a particular end.
243
 Paton argues that on Kant’s view, to act on maxims that cannot be 
universalised is to act wrongly.
244
 Therefore, acquiring sexual intercourse through maxims 
that cannot be universalised risks undermining sexual autonomy within a Kantian framework.    
The FUL provides a test for permissibility of maxims by stating that it is permissible to act 
only on those maxims which can be willed to be universal laws. The term ‘universal law’ 
appears to be a normative force, in the sense that the question an individual asks about her 
maxim is whether she could will that everyone should be permitted to act on it. In relation to 
whether the maxim of making a false promise accords with duty, Kant’s answer begins by 
asking whether such a maxim is capable of being universalised: 
Should I really be content that my maxim (the maxim of getting out of a difficulty 
by a false promise) should hold as a universal law (one valid for myself and 
others)? And could I really say to myself that every one may make a false promise 
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He concludes that:  
I then become aware at once that I can indeed will to lie, but I can by no means will 
a universal law of lying: for by such a law there could properly be no promise at all, 
since it would be futile to profess a will for future action to others who would not 
believe my profession or who, if they did so over-hastily, would pay me back in like 
coin; and consequently my maxim, as soon as it was made a universal law, would 
be bound to annul itself.
246
  
The FUL allows individuals to consider which maxims they can will to be morally 
permissible for all while at the same time commanding them to restrict themselves only to 
those maxims which can be universalised. This can assist in identifying maxims which 
violate sexual autonomy.   
 
Deception  
In relation to procuring sexual activity through deception, Herring contends that the offence 
of rape should be extended to cover situations where the complainant is caused to consent to 
intercourse by the defendant’s deception.
247
 To support the claim that deceit negatives 
consent, Herring contends that deceit, like violence, manipulates people into acting against 
their will.
248
 Herring’s approach has been criticised on the basis that his argument merely 
represents a moral harm not serious enough to warrant criminalisation.
249
  The risk of over-
extending the scope of the criminal law is that adulterers and bigamists could face 
prosecution for rape.   
Kant provides a variation of the first formula whereby individuals ask themselves which 
maxims they can will to be actually followed as universal laws of nature rather than asking 
which maxims they can will to be universally permissible. This variant of the FUL is referred 
to as the FLN. It is used by Kant to illustrate his first formula of the CI with reference to four 
examples organised according to the taxonomy of duties, through which he structures his 
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 The FLN requires that an individual’s maxim must be examined in order to 
determine whether an individual is acting within a Kantian framework. Thus, A performs 
action B in circumstances C in order to bring about end D. The second step is to generalise 
the maxim so that it applies to all rational beings so that they perform action B in 
circumstances C to bring about end D.  The third step is to transform the generalised maxim 
into a law of nature so that everyone performs action B in circumstances C in order to bring 
about end D.  The final step is to place the hypothetical law of nature to the existing laws of 
nature in order to determine what the system of nature would be. The target maxim is only 
permissible when A can will the resulting system of nature. The intent of the FUL, in asking 
whether a maxim is one which a person can at the same time will as a universal law, should 




Kant’s example of using the FLN to illustrate that false promises are impermissible
252
 can be 
extended to determine whether the maxim of obtaining sexual intercourse by deception is 
permissible and whether it can be universalised.  Generalising the maxim so that it applies to 
all rational individuals will provide the following: A decides he is to have sexual intercourse 
and deceives another individual in order to procure sexual intercourse. It would not be 
possible to conjoin this hypothetical law of nature to the existing laws of nature. Kant argues 
a maxim involving deception is impermissible on the grounds that:  
[T]he universality of a law that everyone believing himself to be in need can make 
any promise he pleases with the intention not to keep it would make promising, and 
the very purpose of promising, itself impossible, since no one would believe he was 
being promised anything, but would laugh at utterances of this kind as empty 
shams.
253
   
Conjoining the hypothetical law with the existing laws of nature would result in promises not 
being believed. Individuals cannot coherently will that there should be such a system of 
nature, and therefore, the maxim of using deception to procure sexual intercourse is 
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impermissible.  A maxim that hinders the decision-making process of a complainant and 
manipulates her rational capacities, fails to respect the sovereignty of a complainant over her 
own decisions and choices.  
 
The second formula: humanity as an end in itself 
Kant’s second formula states:  
Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in 




By ‘humanity’, Kant means the power of free rational choice, for ‘the capacity to propose an 
end to oneself is the characteristic of humanity’.  The Formula of Humanity (FH) requires 
that we treat humanity as an end and never merely as a means in order to achieve respect for 
the dignity of humanity.  Kant describes an ‘end’ as an object of free choice.
255
 The words ‘at 
the same time’ and ‘simply’
256
 must not be overlooked when analysing the meaning of this 
formula. The FH does not forbid individuals from using others as a means.  For example, 
every time a person borrows a library book, he is using the librarian as a means, but he does 
not use the librarian simply as a means. What he expects from the librarian is in accordance 
with his duty and his own will. What is forbidden by the FH is failing to treat a person ‘at the 
same time as an end’. This implies that the injunction to treat individuals ‘never merely as a 
means’ is redundant. In order to comply with the FH, a person must treat others as ends. 
What Kant has in mind when he instructs that a person must never use herself or others 
‘simply as a means’, is that they must not be used as means to the attainment of ends based 
on inclinations or to the satisfaction of inclinations.
257
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Using another individual as a mere means requires an individual to act on a maxim that 
another cannot adopt.
258
  Kant states that:  
The will is thought of as a capacity to determine itself to acting in conformity with 
the representation of certain laws.  And such a capacity can be found only in 
rational beings.  Now what serves the will as the objective ground of its self-
determination is an end.
259
   
This suggests that individuals should have the capacity to select ends viewed as worthy of 
choice.
260
 Similar to the first and second formulae is a supreme practical principle from 
which all other laws of the will may be derived.
261
 This principle distinguishes between 
perfect and imperfect duties.
262
 This principle negatively prohibits a person from using 
rational beings simply as a means and thereby overriding the rational wills of moral agents in 
order to satisfy her own inclinations.
263
  This is the foundation of perfect duties and it forbids 
such wrongs as murder, violence, fraud and lying. It lies at the centre of Kant’s philosophy of 
legal obligation. The principle can also be taken positively in the sense that it instructs an 
individual to act on the maxim which involves furthering the ends of other rational agents.  
Applying Kant’s philosophy to the protection of sexual autonomy requires individuals to 
refrain from actions that violate another’s sexual autonomy by fraud, coercion and any other 
method which undermines a person’s capacity to decide on whether to agree to sexual 
activity. Individuals are also required to promote the ends of others and this includes 
refraining from actions which undermine sexual autonomy. 
Paton writes that the ‘setting of ends before oneself is the essential mark of freedom’.
264
  He 
further adds that:  
By force or threats I can be compelled to actions which are directed as means to 
certain ends; but I can never be compelled by others to make anything my end.
265
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Where an individual decides on an end, she can only do so of her own free will. In enjoining 
the pursuit of ends the second formula implicitly asserts the autonomy of the will in making 
the laws which it must obey.
266
  According to Kantian philosophy, there are two types of ends 
to be produced which the supreme principle of morality requires us to set: personal perfection 
and the happiness of others.
267
 Kant applies the FH to the hypothetical case of extracting 
money from others by false pretences.  The false promisor, Kant writes: 
[I]s intending to make use of another man merely as a means to an end he does not 
share. For the man whom I seek to use for my own purposes by such a promise 
cannot possibly agree with my way of behaving to him, and so cannot himself share 
the end of the action.
268
         
He states that this is more obvious in crimes of violence: 
This incompatibility with the principle of duty to others leaps to the eye more 
obviously when we bring in examples of attempts on the freedom and property of 
others.
269
       
Therefore, procuring sexual intercourse by coercion or fraud fails to respect the dignity of the 
complainant. It would fail as a universal law of nature because it cannot be willed that every 
individual can employ coercive methods in order to procure sexual intercourse. It would not 
be possible to will such a law unless every defendant was also willing to be coerced. The acts 
of coercion and manipulation require using an individual as a means to satisfy the defendant’s 
sexual inclinations. The defendant in such situations does not treat the complainant as an end 
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The third formula: autonomy and the kingdom of ends 
Kant writes that:  
[T]here now follows our third practical principle for the will – as the supreme 
condition of the will’s conformity with universal practical reason – namely, the Idea 
of the will of every rational being as a will which makes universal law.
270
 
The third formula has two variants: 
[T]he Idea of the will of every rational being as a will which makes universal 
law.
271
    




This formula is based on the principle that a rational will makes, or provides for itself, the 
laws which it obeys. This is the Kantian principle of autonomy, which is the source of the 
unconditional worth, which belongs to moral agents as making laws, not merely obeying 
them.
273
 According to Kant, the dignity of a person consists of his capacity to make universal 




Both variants can be treated as merely different ways of expressing ‘precisely the same 
law’.
275
 Kant proceeds by combining the two formulas to derive the Formula of Autonomy 
(FA).
276
 The third formula combines the conception of a universal law valid for all rational 
beings
277
 with the conception of every rational nature as having absolute worth to yield the 
idea of the will of every rational being as the legislator or source of a universally valid law.  
The FA directs individuals to positively follow those maxims which contain in themselves 
the volition that they should be universal laws.  
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Kant writes that the moral law is a law that the rational person legislates.
278
 This argument 
first appears with the introduction to the FA; the central idea is that of ‘the will of every 
rational being as a will which makes universal law’.
279
 All maxims according to the principle 
of humanity:  
[A]re repudiated which cannot accord with the will’s own enactment of universal 
law.  The will is therefore not merely subject to the law, but is so subject that it 
must be considered as also making for itself and precisely on this account at first of 
all subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the author).
280
        
Therefore, Kant refers to rational will as legislating laws for itself and as the ‘author’ of the 
laws to which it is subject and as bound only to its own legislation.
281
 Autonomy of the will is 
defined as ‘the property of the will has of being a law to itself (independently of every 
property belonging to the object of volition)’.
282
 Therefore, the law that the autonomous will 
provides for itself is the moral law.
283
     
Wood highlights the importance of the FA by arguing that:  
It is only the FA that Kant ever explicitly claims that it unites the other two in itself; 
no such claim is ever made about the FUL or FH.  Consequently, I think we should 
regard FA as having a special status among the three formulas: FA is the formula 
that unites and sums up the others.  It should be regarded as the definitive 
formulation of the principle of morality, in so far as there is one.
284   
    
Kant provides a link between autonomy, morality and practical reason by stating that:  
[T]he sole principle of morality consists in independence from all matter of the 
law…and at the same time in the determination of choice through the mere form of 
giving universal law that a maxim must be capable of. That independence, however, 
                                                 
278
 Reath,  Agency and Autonomy (n93), 92.   
279




 Reath,  Agency and Autonomy (n93), 92. 
282
 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (n4), 101. 
283
 Reath, Agency and Autonomy (n93), 92. 
284
 Wood (n227), 356.   
Page 61  
 
 
is freedom in the negative sense whereas this law-giving of its own on the part of 
pure and, as such, practical reason is freedom in the positive sense. Thus the moral 
law expresses nothing other than the autonomy of pure practical reason.
285
 
O’Neill claims that Kantian autonomy is not a matter of action that expresses individual 
decision. She argues that the basic idea, without which Kantian autonomy would collapse 
into heteronomy, is that autonomous principles are not derived elsewhere.
286
 This illustrates 
that an autonomous agent must not be affected by the actions of another.   
Kant provides a second variant of the FA which is the Formula of the Kingdom of Ends 
(FKE).
287
 In the FKE, Kant writes that these laws would be the laws of a merely possible 
kingdom of ends.  He defines a ‘kingdom’ as ‘a systematic union of different rational beings 
under common laws’.
288
 This definition makes explicit the social dimension of Kant’s 
conception of autonomy.
289
 Rational beings constitute a kingdom to the extent that their ends 
comprise a system. In order to conceive such a system, the ends of all rational beings must be 
mutually compatible and they must constitute a system of shared ends. These ends are not 
only rational agents as ends in themselves, but are also the personal or individual ends, which 
each person may set before herself.
290
 Individuals act as law-giving members of a kingdom of 
ends and the actions of the rational agents cannot be determined by personal differences or 
private ends as such. However, the kingdom of ends is concerned with private ends only so 
far as they are compatible with universal law.
291
 The FKE requires that individuals exclude 
ends that cannot be universalised, such as those that violate sexual autonomy. The effect of 
universal adherence to the laws of a kingdom of ends would result in advancing the ends of 
all rational beings in a single teleological system.
292
 The FKE expands on what is implicit in 
applying the FH. It requires that individuals exclude ends that could not be universalised or 
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shared between other rational beings (for example false promises) and that individuals further 
ends that unite rational beings (such as providing mutual aid).    
The FA focuses on individuals being the potential legislators of laws valid for all rational 
beings.  In legislating law, an individual is bound to it not because of any external incentives, 
but by the very reasons she recognised in legislating her law. It follows that, if no sanctions 
were imposed, she would still have reason to obey this law by virtue of her being the 
legislator.  According to Kant, autonomy is the ‘ground for the dignity of human nature and 
of every rational nature’.
293
 Thus, the FA makes it explicit; the value of humanity is its 
dignity.        
Kant claims that the three formulae, which represent the principle of morality, are 
‘formulations of precisely the same law’
 294
; they differ only in representing different aspects 
of the same principle.
295
 Kantian autonomy involves the capacity to reason and act 
independently of inclinations. It also requires freedom from subjection to external authority 




‘Capacity’ and ‘choice’ in Kantian autonomy  
Kant writes that ‘[o]nly a rational being has the capacity to act in accordance with the 
representation of laws, that is, in accordance with principles, or has a will’.
297
 He defines the 
will as ‘a capacity to choose only that which reason independently of inclination cognizes as 
practically necessary, that is, as good’.
298
 Therefore, a rational agent’s capacity must be free 
from heteronomous principles.  The heteronomous principles articulated by Kant stem from 
inclination rather than from reason and give rise to a HI.
299
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The term ‘humanity’ used in the second formula refers to the: 
[C]apacity for autonomous choice, and it includes the capacity to act from one’s 
own judgment of what one has reason to do, to set ends for oneself, and to guide 
one’s actions by values one finds it reasonable to accept.
300
   
Kantian autonomy has been described as a capacity for self-determination and self-
governance that includes the capacity to form judgments.
301
 Kant’s suggestion to treat others 
as ends and never merely as means, requires an individual to respect others as autonomous 
self-governing agents so they are able to act from principles that others can freely endorse, in 
their capacity as autonomous agents, and that justify an individual’s actions to them.
302
   
 
Importance of Kantian autonomy  
Reath argues that the requirement of justifiability to others as autonomous agents leads to 
requirements to avoid ‘gratuitous injury, coercion, deception and fraud, manipulation, 
exploitation and profiting from the weaker position of others, and so on’.
303
 If an employer 
decides to procure sexual intercourse from an employee through non-violent coercion, he can 
be said to be acting on inclinations and therefore acting out of self-interest, while at the same 
time he is using the employee merely as a means. As an autonomous individual, it is highly 
unlikely that she will endorse the employer’s actions because they hinder her capacity for 
self-determination and self-governance.  The employer’s actions would violate her sexual 
autonomy by infringing on her capacity for self-determination. The employer, by adopting 
the maxim of resorting to non-violent coercion to obtain sexual intercourse, is likely to make 
an exception for himself in the sense that he is not willing to have his sexual autonomy 
violated by non-coercive conduct.  Reath states that: 
[T]he ideal of justifiability to others grounds positive duties such as beneficence 
and mutual aid, gratitude, loyalty, special obligations between loved ones and 
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friends, and so on, because such principles are among the social and material 
conditions needed to support the exercise of rational agency in socially 
interdependent beings.
304
      
The requirement of treating individuals never simply as a means but always as an end allows 
for the respect for individuals as equal, autonomous agents and therefore can assist in 
determining when sexual autonomy has been violated.  
Kantian autonomy is ‘the ground of the dignity of human nature and of every rational 
nature’.
305
 The dignity of humanity consists of the capacity to legislate universal law on the 
condition that the individual is also subject to the law he legislates.
306
 Agents with capacity 
for self-legislation should be treated in ways that they can accept, while at the same time they 
can maintain their autonomy. Therefore, autonomous agents should be treated in such a way 
that they are free from subjection to any external authority that hinders their capacity to self-
legislate and their choices in relation to sexual activity. This illustrates the importance of 
using a Kantian model in relation to the protection of sexual autonomy.     
Kant highlights the relationship between the concept of freedom and the CI when he writes 
that:  
The proposition ‘Will is in all its actions a law to itself’ expresses, however, only 
the principle of acting on no maxim other than the one which can have for its object 
itself as at the same time a universal law. This is precisely the formula of the 
categorical imperative and the principle of morality. Thus, a free will and a will 
under the moral law are one and the same.
307
                   
According to Kant, the importance of the FUL lies in the fact that it is the principle of free 
will.
308
 Reath articulates the relationship between Kantian autonomy and freedom when he 
notes that it is ‘in virtue of possessing autonomy that a rational will has a causal capacity that 
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satisfies the concept of freedom’.
309
 A free will has the capacity to initiate its own actions, 
independently of external constraints; ‘it is in some fashion a self-originating cause of 
action’.
310
 Kant’s definition of freedom is ‘Will is a kind of causality belonging to living 
beings so far as they are rational’.
311
 This ‘freedom’ is then said to be ‘the property this 
causality has of being able to work independently of determination by alien causes’.
312
  This 
definition of freedom is ‘negative’ because it indicates the types of determinations that such a 
will is free from.
313
   
Kant provides a link between autonomy and freedom when he asks ‘What else then can 
freedom of will be but autonomy – that is, the property which will has of being a law to 
itself?’.
314
  Therefore, freedom of the will requires a capacity for choice that is motivationally 
independent and a law-giving capacity that is independent of determination by external 
influence. Freedom of the will also requires that it should be guided by its own internal 
principle. This principle is Kant’s FA, which is the principle of acting ‘from principles 
through whose adoption one can regard oneself as giving law’.
315
 Autonomy, as defined by 
Kant, involves independence in decision-making, requiring independence from heteronomous 
factors.
316
 Kant regards this as negative autonomy.
317
 Kantian autonomy in the positive sense 
is the capacity to self-legislate.
318
 While autonomy requires both positive and negative 
freedom, autonomy is essentially the freedom of the will.
319
  Therefore, individuals must be 
able to exercise their free will in relation to sexual activities.                    
Kantian autonomy requires individuals to respect the rights and obligations of others.  These 
obligations include respecting the dignity of others.  This can be seen in Kant’s illustrations 
found in the FH concerning the duty to further the ends of others in order to bring the 
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legislating individual’s actions into harmony with ‘humanity as an end in itself’.
320
  Acting 
morally requires acting out of duty for the sake of the moral law, which consists of the CI.   
 
Kantian Autonomy: A Feminist Critique  
This section will address feminist criticism relating to Kantian autonomy. It will be suggested 
that Kantian autonomy addresses the primary feminist concerns relating to autonomy, and is 
an effective framework for the protection of sexual autonomy.   
Kant uses prostitution and concubinage to illustrate the fact that sexual objectification has a 
negative impact on a person’s humanity. Shrage contends that some feminist philosophers 
argue that pornography violates the moral imperative to treat individuals as autonomous, 
rational subjects.
321
 According to Assiter, in pornography women ‘become objects for 
another’.
322
 To treat an individual simply as a means for another’s use, without respect for her 
humanity, is to treat someone as an object, resulting in a violation of her sexual autonomy.  
Sedgwick criticises Kant’s conception of autonomy on the basis that:  
Because moral agency on his view is a function of acting from reason rather than 
from feeling, it is said to reflect features more of male than of female identity. 
Autonomy on the Kantian model seems to be something achieved not in the course 
of cultivating our relationships, but rather in weakening their hold.
323
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Therefore, Kantian autonomy has become associated with a:  
[M]oral superstar alone on a rock of rational will power, removed from the 
individuals whose this will requires him (Kant’s hero is clearly conceived as male 
by Kant himself) to respect, relying on himself, with no “taint” of love or emotion 
spoiling his moral glory.
324
 
This criticism is aimed at Kant’s view that an individual should be able to stand alone and be 
independent of determination of ‘alien causes’ and possessing a will that is a ‘law to itself’.
325
  
Kant’s moral individual is said to be devoid of compassion but committed to principles and 
the duties that stem therefrom.
326
 This depiction of the autonomous individual is unappealing 
to feminists who see an important place for care and sympathy in the nature of moral 
character.
327
 Kantian autonomy is often viewed by feminists to be a thoroughly masculinist 
ideal on the basis that it is premised on an ‘abstract individualism that portrays the paradigm 
moral agent as isolated, nonsensical, and ahistorical’.
328
  Kneller suggests that:  
What is needed is an account of autonomy that is not predicated on an isolationist 
individualism, and that recognises the importance of the individual being situated 
within a community of others as an essential part of her autonomy.
329
  
However, Onara writes that Kant’s critics accuse him of identifying autonomy with self-
control and independence, with extremes of individualism. As a result, Kant is blamed for 
formulating the unconvincing conception of individual autonomy.
330
 According to Kant, 
‘[t]he autonomy of the will is the sole principle of all moral laws and of duties conforming to 
them’.
331
 He viewed autonomy as central to morality.
332
 It follows that criticism aimed at his 
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conception of individual autonomy is inaccurate because Kant’s conception of autonomy is 
‘not a conception of individual autonomy’.
333
  O’Neil argues that Kant:  
[N]ever speaks of an autonomous self or autonomous persons or autonomous 
individuals, but rather of the autonomy of reason, of the autonomy of ethics, of the 
autonomy of principles and of the autonomy of the willing.
334
           
Individual autonomy is depicted as a capacity that individuals may have to a greater or lesser 
degree, which they manifest by acting independently.
335
 Kant, however, does not view 
autonomy as something that some individuals have to a greater and others to a lesser degree.  
He does not equate it with any form of personal independence.  Instead, Kantian autonomy 
‘[I]s manifested in a life in which duties are met, in which there is respect for others and their 
rights, rather than in a life liberated from all bonds’.
336
  
Kant’s conception of autonomy is based on acting on certain principles, namely on principles 
of obligation. ‘Obligation’ implies ‘a constraint to an action, though this constraint is only 
that of reason and objective law’,
337
 and the objective necessity to act out of obligation is 
termed ‘duty’.
338
  Kant argues that the only motive that can give an action moral worth is 
reverence for the law.
339
 Neither fear nor inclination can be valid motives.
340
 This suggests 
that constraints, which affect an individual’s capacity to choose, may undermine her sexual 
autonomy.       
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Oshana articulates that the Kantian conception of the autonomous agent paints an image of 
the ‘austere, dispassionate moral saint’
341
 and this conception of autonomy ‘is a fiction’.
342
  
She argues that Kantian autonomy is unhelpful because:  
A theory of personal autonomy premised on a strict adherence to impartial and 
abstract principles, or a conception that discounts the roles that emotion and 
partiality play in our moral development and moral choices, is implausible and 
unnecessary.
343
    
It is implausible because focusing on reason will lead to a denial of certain obvious and 
desirable features of human beings. The moral norms individuals adhere to would be 
deprived of their motivational force if individuals were lacking attachments, shaped by 
friendship, compassion and partiality, that supply much of the subject matter for morality.
344
  
While she considers it unnecessary to regard autonomous agency as impervious to influences 
such as desire and emotional attachment, she concedes that autonomous persons in the 
phenomenal world are as affected by external stimuli as they are by their sentiments and 
desires.
345
 However, Kant’s assertion that ‘I ought never to act except in such a way that I can 
also will that my maxim should become a universal law’,
346
 suggests that it is permissible to 
include inclinations provided that the rational being is also able to will that her maxim should 
become universal law. This suggests that inclinations can form part of an individual’s 
decision-making process in relation to sexual activity with others provided such inclinations 
were not the only factors affecting her decision. If her decision was purely based on 
inclinations then she can be said to be acting heteronomously rather than as a sexually 
autonomous person.       
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O’Neill rebuts criticism of Kantian autonomy on the grounds that:  
His focus was not on any special sort of act of choice, by which each actually 
chooses laws or principles for everyone else, but on a distinctive constraint or 
requirement, a test that shows which principles of action could be chosen by all, 
that is to say which principles are universable, or fit to be universal laws.
347
            
The dignity of an individual consists of his capacity to make universal law, provided he is 
also subject to the law, which he formulates.
348
 Kantian autonomy allows individuals to 
choose to act on principles that meet or flout the constraints set by the principle of autonomy, 
but have reasons to act only on those principles that meet those constraints.
349
  The principle 
of autonomy is, ‘[n]ever to choose except in such a way that in the same volition the maxims 
of your choice are also present as universal law’.
350
 Therefore, principled autonomy relates to 
principles or ‘laws’ that can be adopted by any individual.
351
 Kant’s concern is not to a self,  
who can legislate for all, but principles that can be adopted as laws for all.
352
 This element of 
the CI is important in relation to sexual autonomy because it highlights the type of actions 
capable of violating sexual autonomy, namely those which are used to procure sexual 
intercourse but are not capable of being universalised. 
O’Neill argues that Kantian autonomy is not based in individual autonomy, rather it is 
concerned with description of ‘the autonomy of reason, of the autonomy of ethics, of the 
autonomy of principles and of the autonomy of willing’.
353
 She contends that Kantian 
autonomy is ‘manifested in a life in which duties are met, in which there is respect for other 
and their rights’, in other words, Kantian autonomy is not concerned with ‘a life liberated 
from all bonds’.
354
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Principled autonomy does not mean that, if it can be adopted by one individual, then it can be 
adopted universally.  By establishing that a range of fundamental principles cannot be willed 
as universal law,
356
 Kant is suggesting that those who adopt them will conclude that they 
cannot will that all others adopt the same principle.
357
 Thus, an individual who adopts a 
principle of coercion to obtain sexual intercourse must also employ effective methods of 
coercion.
358
 An individual who wills a principle of coercion as a universal law must also will 
that every individual employs some effective means of coercion. According to O’Neill, the 
outcome of anything resembling universalisation of coercion to obtain sexual intercourse:  
[W]ould ensure that there could not be universally available effective means to 
coercion: universal coercion is therefore an incoherent project. Coercion is 
necessarily a minority pastime, and universal coercion cannot be willed without 
internal contradiction.
359
      
The internal contradiction is a result of the fact that in a world where all individuals are 
committed to a principle of coercion, some individuals might be unable to exercise a 
principle of coercion because their capacities for action would be destroyed or bypassed by 
another’s coercive action.
360
 Similarly, fraud ‘can never rank as a universal law of nature and 
be self-consistent, but must necessarily contradict itself’.
361
 Therefore, procuring sexual 
activity, through coercion or deception, is inconsistent with the CI on the grounds that it 
could have harmful effects and consequences if it were adopted as a principle by all.  
Therefore, coercion and deception undermine sexual autonomy within a Kantian framework.  
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O’Neill states that the ‘rejection of principles that cannot be principles for all is, on Kant’s 
view, the basis of human duty.
362
  She highlights the importance of Kantian autonomy by 
stating that:  
Principled autonomy requires that we act only on principles that can be principles 
for all; it provides a basis for an account of the underlying principles of universal 
obligations and rights that can structure relationships.
363
 
A commitment to principled autonomy allows individuals to reject coercion and deception.  
O’Neill argues that one advantage of taking them seriously is that they provide the basis for 
an informed consent requirement:  
[A]ction that either coerces or deceives others stands in the way of free and 
informed consent; conversely where free and informed consent is given, agents will 
have a measure of protection against coercion and deception.
364
  
Protection from coercion and protection of autonomy are closely related but are sometimes 
difficult to distinguish.
365
 Physical coercion undermines autonomy, but much interference 
with autonomy does not involve any coercion at all.
366
  While individual autonomy is 
constantly at odds with relations of trust, Kantian (principled) autonomy provides a basis for 
relations of trust.
367
 The importance of rejecting coercion and deception is highlighted by 
Muehlenhard and Schrag, ‘[f]or women to be truly free and autonomous, we must be free of 
all forms of coercion’.
368
 The reason for this is that all coercive behaviour seeks to procure 
sexual contact which the other person would not otherwise choose.
369
 In other words, a 
person violates another’s sexual autonomy whenever he attempts to engage in sexual 
intercourse with consent that was obtained by coercion.
370
 This argument is consistent with 
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Kantian philosophy. According to Kant, deception and false promises are impermissible 
because they cannot be universalised and therefore violate sexual autonomy.      
The FUL
371
 points to a powerful moral claim: it is a way of confirming whether the action an 
individual is about to undertake places his interests above everyone else’s.
372
 Individuals, 
who violate the sexual autonomy of others, whether through violent conduct or non-violent 
coercive conduct, do not suppose that universalising such conduct would be coherent.  
Instead, as Kant argues, they make an exception for themselves:  
If we now attend to ourselves whenever we transgress a duty, we find that we in 
fact do not will that our maxim should become a universal law – since this is not 
impossible for us – but rather that its opposite should remain a law universally: we 
only take the liberty of making an exception to it for ourselves (or even just for this 
once) to the advantage of our inclination.
373
   
If individuals are committed to adopting principles that they could will others to adopt, such 
individuals will have reason to reject principles that undermine sexual autonomy, such as 
fraud and violence and non-violent coercion.  This line of reasoning is endorsed by the FH 
which states that:  
Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in 




When a person obtains sexual activity through fraud, violence or coercion, he is using the 
other person as a means to satisfy his inclinations, not treating her as an end worthy of 
respect.  Kant states that: 
[M]an, and in general every rational being, exists as an end in himself, not merely 
as a means for arbitrary use by this or that will: he must in all his actions, whether 
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they are directed to himself or to other rational beings, always be viewed at the 
same time as an end.
375
  
Therefore, self-respect and respect for other persons stem from one and the same principle.
376
  
The duty of respect is a duty which an individual owes to others as rational beings.  Any 
principle of action whose universal adoption is likely to destroy capacities for action for 




Feminist critique of the law of rape  
The following section will address the feminist critique of the law relating to sexual offences 
and the concept of autonomy. It has been stated that according to Kant ‘Autonomy of the will 
is the property the will has of being law unto itself (independently of every property 
belonging to the objects of volition)’.
378
  For Kant, an individual is autonomous only when 
they are able to formulate a categorical imperative untainted by external pressures.  
Chapter three will critique the previous law relating to sexual offences in order to show that 
the previous model did not adequately protect sexual autonomy. This thesis argues that a 
Kantian model is an effective method for the protection of a complainant’s sexual autonomy, 
irrespective of gender and sexuality.  It is important to note that females vastly outnumber 
males in terms of being victims of sex offences. According to the Ministry of Justice, 
between 2009 and 2012, there were an estimated of 69,000 female rape victims compared to 
9,000 male rape victims.
379
  Therefore, a model which incorporates Kantian autonomy must 
address the concerns of feminist writers in relation to both Kant and autonomy. Chapter three 
will provide a critical analysis of the fact that a model based on patriarchy will not protect 
sexual autonomy effectively.  
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In order to protect sexual autonomy effectively, the proposed Kantian model will address 
feminist concerns regarding coercion and pressures.  An effective model is one which is 
capable of protecting sexual autonomy in cases involving external pressures which impact on 
the complainant’s decision making process. Nessbaum uses the theory of ‘adaptive 
preference’ to describe the case of economically deprived working women in India who, 
despite being subjected to violence by their spouses, choose to remain in the marriage.
380
  
Adaptive preference is the unconscious altering of an individual’s preferences in light of the 
options that are available to her.
381
 Friedman contends that women who remain in abusive 
relationships may be autonomous because adapting to an abusive relationship is in principle 
compatible with the critical reflection necessary for autonomy.
382
 Friedman’s analysis fails to 
take into account that an individual who agrees to remain in an abusive relationship might be 
doing so because her decision making process is being undermined by the actions of the 
defendant. In such a case the complainant’s sexual autonomy is undermined by the actions of 
the defendant.   
Autonomy is also important to feminists in relation to cases which involve an individual 
adopting practices of oppression which severely restrict a complainant’s options.
383
 Oshana 
argues that severely limiting external factors undermine autonomy.  Meyers on the other hand 
writes that there are women who participate in the practice of female genital mutilation ‘who 
conclude that cultural traditions or cohesion or getting married and bearing children are more 
important than bodily integrity’.
384
 Thus feminist writers have different views on the impact 
of oppression on a woman’s autonomy.   
A Kantian framework takes into account the factors which are relevant to the individual 
complainant and whether the defendant’s actions placed his interests above those of the 
complainant.  A similar conception of autonomy can be seen in the work of Friedman and 
Meyers who assert that autonomy is a matter of degree.  According to Friedman, autonomy is 
identified in degrees because an individual’s capacity for critical reflection may operate at 
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different levels of sophistication, depending on the individual’s socialising and educational 
influences. Meyers
385
 is of the opinion that oppressive social factors undermine pragmatic 
autonomy
386
 but may not necessarily hinder local autonomy.
387
 This thesis will demonstrate 
that a Kantian model focuses on the individual complainant and does not rely on set 
categories which vitiate consent.  Friedman states that personal autonomy ‘involves acting 
and living according to ones’ own choices, values, and identity within the constraints of what 
one regards as morally permissible’.
388
  
Since females vastly outnumber males in terms of being victims of sexual offences, the 
Kantian model proposed in this thesis interprets Kantian autonomy in a manner which avoids 
stereotypical male traits, and incorporates traits which are popularly regarded as feminine 
such as social interactiveness.
389
 Kantian autonomy allows an individual to set her own 
standards with regards to agreeing to sexual activity. A further advantage of using Kantian 
autonomy over other conceptions of autonomy is that the principles which an individual 
selects for herself ‘will be ones that every autonomous person would accept’.
390
 In order to 
protect autonomy effectively, a Kantian model must be compatible with influences such as 
desires and emotional attachment. Oshana states that ‘a person can be self-governing even if 
her actions are prompted by desires, attachments, and values that are unique to her’.
391
 
Despite feminist reservations concerning the concept of autonomy,
392
 it has been 
acknowledged as a valuable conceptual element in feminist ideals, such as identification and 
elimination of social conditions that victimise women.
393
 Calhoun warns that: 
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[T]oo much talk about our similarities as moral selves, and too little talk about our 
differences has its moral dangers...unless we are quite knowledgeable about the 
substantial differences between person, particularly central differences due to 
gender, race, and class, we may be tempted to slide into supporting that our 
common humanity includes more substantive similarities than it does in fact.
394
  
Grimshaw argues that the issue regarding autonomy and identity in feminist thinking is not 
whether the focus should continue on concepts such as ‘identity’ or ‘autonomy’, or indeed a 
complete rejection of these concepts.  Instead, she proposes a solution which centres on the 
dialectic of autonomy, which involves a ‘constant (but never static or final) search for control 
and coherence which needs balancing against a realism and tolerance born out of efforts to 
understand ourselves (and others) better’.
395
 
The above criticism relate to the general definition of autonomy rather than the Kantian 
notion of autonomy. Assister states that according to the Kantian notion, ‘a person is 
autonomous if he or she subscribes to principles that have been formed by his or her own 
moral scrutiny’.
396
 An individual’s autonomy is violated when they are treated as a means to 
someone else’s end, and not as an end in themselves.
397
 Kantian autonomy provides an 
opportunity for a complainant to set her own standards in relation to sexual intercourse. Her 
autonomy is violated, within a Kantian framework, when she is denied the opportunity to 
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The impact of patriarchy on sex offences law 
Thorbon notes that ‘[i]n the beginning of our story all significant societies were clearly 
patriarchal’.
398
 Walby defines patriarchy as ‘a system of social structures and practices in 
which men dominate, oppress and exploit women’.
399
 This section will examine the extent to 
which patriarchy has influenced the evolution of the law relating to sexual offences.  It will 
also examine the concerns of feminist writers regarding the concept of patriarchy and its 
influence on the development of sexual offences law, in order to develop a Kantian model 
which adequately protects sexual autonomy.   
Brownmiller reports that: 
The earliest form of permanent, protective conjugal relationship, the 
accommodation called mating that we now know as marriage, appears to have been 
institutionalized by the male’s forcible abduction and rape of the female.
400
   
She further adds that: 
It seems eminently sensible to hypothesize that man’s violent capture and rape of 
the female led first to the establishment of a rudimentary mate-protectorate and then 
sometime later to the full blown male solidification of power, the patriarchy.
401
 
The law of sexual offences’ failure until 1994 to encompass any form of sexual assault other 
than vaginal may be due to the early origins of the offence.
402
 As stated above, historically, 
the objective of the law appears to have been concerned with theft of virginity, abduction, 
and forced marriage. In 1244, the court disallowed the complainant’s appeal of rape ‘because 
a woman can only appeal concerning rape of her virginity’.
403
 This preoccupation with the 
protection of virginity can be seen as late as 1841, where the courts were discussing whether, 
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in the case of a young female complainant, there was sufficient penetration to amount to rape 
where the hymen remained intact.
404
  
The impact of patriarchy on the law of sexual offences is also demonstrated by the marital 
rape exemption.
405
 The Police Advisory Committee did not consider marital rape as a serious 
social problem,
406
 despite the fact that a study, conducted in 1978, had shown that 14% of 
female householders had been the victims of rape or attempted rape by their husbands or ex-
husbands.
407
 The marital rape exemption has been attributed to Sir Matthew Hale, which he 
justified on the grounds that: 
The husband cannot be guilty of rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, 
for their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife has given up herself to 
this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract.
408
  
It is important to note that Hale’s contractual analysis was based on fiction because even if a 
wife had expressly agreed to sexual intercourse on demand, her promise would not have been 
binding under English law of contract.
409
  
Feminist writers were instrumental in drawing attention to the injustice of exempting 
husbands who forcibly obtained sexual intercourse with their wives.  Freeman states: 
If rape is the most underreported of crimes, then marital rape, which is not even 
considered a crime, must be the least complained about category of rape’.
410
  
Adamo writes that: 
Rape violates a woman’s bodily integrity, freedom, and self-determination; the 
harm is not mitigated because rape occurred in her marriage bed. Marital rape can 
be more traumatic and abusive than stranger rape.
411
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Thus, purely patriarchal attitudes lead to a period where a married woman’s sexual autonomy 
was not protected by the criminal law. It, therefore, is vital to take into account feminist 
theories in relation to the development of the law of sexual offences. According to Temkin, 
feminist writers have criticised the law of rape on the ground that:  
[I]t fails to protect women, is biased against them and rests on derogatory 
assumptions about them. There is a widespread belief that the treatment of rape 
victims by the legal process discourages them from reporting crimes and that the 
rules of evidence which apply in rape cases permit rapists to avoid conviction.
412
 
The above analysis reveals that a patriarchal society viewed women in terms of property. 
Thus, a woman’s sexuality is a thing to be stolen, sold or bartered.
413
 This thesis will argue 
that a Kantian framework is an effective method for protecting sexual autonomy. According 
to Edwards: 
It has been a major consideration of the critique of law by contemporary feminists 
to transform law in a way which embraces women’s experiences and is more 
consonant with their lives.
414
 
It will be argued that a Kantian model protects sexual autonomy more effectively than the 
previous models because it allows the complainant to set her own standards in terms of 
factors which are important to her decision making in regards to agreeing to sexual activity.  
It will shown in chapter two that the majority of the courts decided to focus on ‘without her 
consent’ rather than the issue of whether force used with regards to determining whether the 
defendant committed rape. Edwards states that ‘[t]he concen to shift the vortex of 
interpretation on rape as conduct ‘against her will’ to a matter of ‘does not consent’ has been 
central to feminist politics on rape’.
415
 Purely masculinist assumptions about how and when a 
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complainant’s lack of consent can be manifested, were responsible for shaping the law in 





MacKinnon states that:  
All women live in sexual objectification the way fish live in water. Given the 




In order to adequately protect sexual autonomy, it is important to determine whether the 
complainant’s sexual autonomy has been violated by the defendant’s actions. It is important 
‘to distinguish rape from sex in specific cases’
418
 such as non-violent coercion and 
deceptions.   
A woman is regarded as lacking autonomy if she is treated as a mere object under Kantian 
autonomy: 
Sexual love makes of the loved person an Object of appetite; as soon as that 
appetite has been stilled, the person is cast aside as one casts away a lemon which 
has been sucked dry as soon as a person becomes an Object of appetite for another, 
all motives of moral relationship cease to function, because as an Object of appetite 




The person is, thus, transformed into a ‘thing’. Papadaki states that:  
[O]bjectification, for Kant, involves the reduction of a person to the level of an 
object for use; a mere instrument. Objectification, therefore, constitutes the loss of 
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an individual’s humanity; she no longer has a dignity, an absolute value, but only a 
relative or instrumental value.
420
 
When a woman is reduced, by the actions of the defendant, to ‘an object of appetite’, she 
becomes a thing, and can be treated and used ‘as an instrument for the satisfaction of sexual 
inclination’.
421
 Under Kantian autonomy, a woman is objectified by another where he treats 
her as a means, and not at the same time as an end in herself. Addressing the issue of 
objectification within sexual offences is vital because:  
To be sexually objectified...threatens further degradation, such as rape, where the 
victim is treated as instrumental, fungible and sometimes owned, and experiences 
her autonomy and boundary integrity as violated.
422
  
Kant states that ‘as object of the other’s appetite, that person is in fact a thing, whereby the 
other’s appetite is sated’.
423
 Sexual objectification constitutes the loss of an individual’s 
humanity because she no longer possesses dignity, but only an instrumental value.
424
  
Objectification, for Kant, is the lowering of an individual to the status of an object.
425
 By 
lowering an individual to the status of an object, her autonomy is not respected. Kant’s 
description of objectification is adopted by feminists who view objectification to involve 
treating an individual in such a way that she is reduced to the status of an object for use.
426
  
Objectification, for Dworkin, occurs when a human being is made less than human by being 
turned into a commodity.
427
 She argues that individuals who can be used as if they are not 
fully human are no longer fully human in social terms because ‘their humanity is hurt by 
being diminished’.
428
 Mackinnon employs Kantian philosophy when she writes that:  
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A person, in one Kantian view, is a free and rational agent whose existence is an 
end in itself, as opposed to instrumental.  In pornography women exist to the end of 
male pleasure.
429
   
She argues that a ‘sex object is defined on the basis of its looks, in terms of its usability for 
sexual pleasure’.
430
 Mackinnon is essentially incorporating a Kantian framework into an anti-
pornography argument by suggesting that the expression and fulfilment of sexual desire 
involves men taking control of women’s bodies in such a way that they fail to respect women 
as individuals.
431
 In relation to the usability of an individual, Kant writes that as soon as a 
person is used for sexual purposes they are discarded ‘as one throws away a lemon after 
sucking the juice from it’.
432
 Mackinnon states that pornography turns a woman into an object 
for sexual use.
433
 She adopts a similar analogy when she compares women to cups ‘valued 
according to its looks and for how it can be used’.
434
 For Mackinnon, pornography involves 
men treating women as mere instruments in order to satisfy their sexual desires.  Treating an 
individual simply as a means can amount to a violation of their sexual autonomy. Nussbaum 
notes that: 
It would appear that Kant, Mackinnon, and Dworkin are correct in one central 
insight: that the instrumental treatment of human beings, the treatment of human 
beings as tools of the purposes of another, is always morally problematic’.
435
   
Sexual objectification as described by Kant, involving the treatment of a person as a mere 
sexual instrument, is acknowledged by feminist writers as a problematic phenomenon.
436
  
While Dworkin and Mackinnon contend that women are by definition the objectified, Kant 
did not take this to be a necessary fact.
437
 He did not exclude the possibility of a woman 
objectifying a man if she happens to be in a position of power within a certain relationship.
438
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Therefore, feminist commentators agree that objectification, as described by Kant, violates 
sexual autonomy.         
To fall within Kant’s definition of autonomy, individuals’ moral principles, which they select 
as appropriate guidelines for action, must be chosen by abstraction ‘from the personal 
differences between rational beings, and from all the content of their private ends’.
439
  This 
Kantian ideal suggests that moral principles are self-imposed only insofar as they stem from a 
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This chapter has highlighted that the concept of autonomy is capable of containing a variety 
of philosophical meanings. The common element contained in the various definitions of 
autonomy is the individual’s capacity for self-determination. Kantian autonomy, which is a 
form of moral autonomy distinct from personal autonomy, is concerned with an individual’s 
capacity to deliberate and to provide herself with the moral law, which is universal for all, 
rather than being influenced by external factors.  Personal autonomy, on the other hand, is the 
capacity of an individual to decide for herself and pursue a course of action, often not 
dependent on any moral content. The importance of using a Kantian framework for the 
protection of sexual autonomy, is highlighted by the fact that sexual objectification, within 
Kantian autonomy, has been acknowledged by feminist writers such as Papadaki
441
 as being 
problematic.  Moreover, Kantian autonomy allows for the fact that a woman can objectify a 
man. A Kantian model is, therefore, capable of protecting the sexual autonomy of both men 
and women.              
It has been shown that Kant’s supreme principle of morality, which can be represented in 
several other formulae, is the governing principle of any rational individual with autonomy of 
the will.  This chapter has identified Kant’s notion of autonomy in a theoretical context in 
order to show that it is an effective method for the protection of sexual autonomy. The 
analysis carried out in this chapter in relation to Kantian autonomy will be used to answer the 
central research questions, namely: is the current law relating to sexual offences consistent 
with Kantian autonomy and what are the practical limitations of applying a Kantian model to 
the protection of sexual autonomy? 
The analysis in relation to the CI will be used in this thesis to determine whether it can be 
applied to the protection of individuals in situations where sexual activities might be procured 
as a result of deception or non-violent coercion.    
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Chapter Three: An Analysis of the law of sexual offences prior 
to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will provide an analysis of whether the previous law of sexual offences gave rise 
to any inconsistencies in relation to the protection of sexual autonomy in a practical context. 
The overall aim of this chapter is to provide a critical analysis of whether the previous law of 
sexual offences provided a more effective method of protecting sexual autonomy than a 
Kantian model. This chapter will assess the development of the historical methods of 
protecting sexual autonomy in order to determine their effectiveness in protecting sexual 
autonomy in comparison to Kantian autonomy. It was stated in chapter two
442
 that to act 
autonomously within a Kantian model is to act in such a way that an individual treats 
humanity never simply as a means but always at the same time as an end.
443
 A defendant who 
has sexual intercourse with a complainant against her will is violating her sexual autonomy 
because he is using her to satisfy his sexual desires and is failing to treat her as a rational 
being worthy of respect. The complainant, on the other hand, is denied freedom by having her 
autonomy violated by the defendant because his actions are preventing her from self-
legislation. Korsgaard states that according to Kantian autonomy ‘you treat someone as a 
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Historical developments relating to the protection of sexual autonomy 
Prior to the Norman conquest of 1066, the offence of rape was primarily concerned with the 
protection of highborn, propertied virgins living under the protection of a lord.
445
 Since 
women during this period could only inherit property in the absence of extant male heirs, 
forcible abduction and marriage become a method of acquiring property.
446
 This suggests that 
the law at the time did not adequately protect sexual autonomy.   The defendant’s actions 
undermined a woman’s capacity to make choices as she is being used as a means to the 
attainment of ends based on his inclinations.  According to Paton, ‘setting of ends before 
oneself is the essential mark of freedom’.
447
  It follows that a woman is prevented from 
setting ends before herself and therefore her freedom is limited by the defendant’s actions. 
Procuring sexual intercourse by coercion fails to respect the dignity of the complainant. The 
defendant’s actions of employing coercive means to procure sexual intercourse fail the test of 
universality because it cannot be willed that every individual can use coercion to procure 
sexual intercourse. This method of protecting sexual autonomy is limited to protecting the 
sexual autonomy of highborn, propertied virgins living under the protection of a lord. A 
Kantian model, on the other hand, provides a more effective method of protecting sexual 
autonomy because it examines whether the complainant’s freedom is undermined by the 
actions of the defendant. In addition, Kantian autonomy applies equally to all rational 
individuals as opposed to having limited application to a certain class of individuals.   
By 1275, the first statute of Westminster had extended the offence of rape by including other 
categories of females. This was achieved by removing the distinction based on virginity.
448
 
This is a positive step in terms of increasing the protection of the class of individuals. 
However there were shortcomings in terms of effectively protecting sexual autonomy: the 
offence of rape could only be committed if it was against the complainant’s will. Force was a 
necessary requirement in order to establish that the offence had been committed.  Such a 
requirement ignores the fact that violation of sexual autonomy can be carried out by 
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employing non-violent methods such as coercion, deception or having sexual intercourse with 
a complainant who is unconscious. It is submitted that the first statute did not go far enough 
in terms of protecting sexual autonomy. Kantian autonomy provides a more effective method 
for protecting sexual autonomy because it focuses on whether the defendant is respecting the 
complainant’s humanity and whether he is treating her simply as a means.   
More satisfactory protection was provided in 1285 by the second statute of Westminster. This 
statute adopted a consent-centric model in relation to the protection of sexual autonomy.  
Thus, it was an offence ‘if a man so ravish a married woman, dame or damsel where she 
neither consented before or after’. While ‘consent’ was not defined in the second statute, it 
can be argued that the consent-centric definition of the offence of rape in the second statute is 
consistent with Kantian autonomy. In order for the complainant to consent to sexual activity, 
her consent must be free and unconstrained. Where a complainant does not consent to sexual 
activity, her capacity to self-legislate is undermined by the defendant’s actions. Since Kantian 
autonomy relates to the capacity to self-legislate and involves independence from 
heteronomous factors,
449
 it follows that a complainant who does not consent to sexual 
intercourse cannot be said to have the freedom and capacity to self-legislate because her 
autonomy is undermined.   
The period after the statutes of Westminster witnessed a dearth in writers on English law.  As 
a result, the development of the law can only be traced in the statutes and yearbooks.
450
  By 





 and against her will.
453
 The complainant’s consent had to be genuine in that it could 
not be obtained by fear of death or duress.
454
 Although this definition was an improvement on 
the definition of rape under the statutes of Westminster, in that it widened the class of 
individuals and an individual’s consent had to be genuine, it was not fully consistent with 
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Kantian autonomy.  Evidence of this can be seen in the fact that a complainant’s sexual 
autonomy is not protected where the defendant procures sexual activity by deception or 
coercion. As discussed in chapter two, procuring sexual activity through coercion or fraud 
results in a violation of the complainant’s sexual autonomy because she is being used merely 
as a means and not as an end. The complainant’s sexual autonomy is undermined because her 
actions are not the result of self-legislation and her decision to engage in sexual activity is 
influenced by the defendant’s actions.   
 
A Consent-centric model  
According to Koh, the different attitudes of the courts in relation to the effect of fraud in rape 
led to two judicial interpretations.
455
 The first view followed a narrow interpretation in that 
rape involved intercourse ‘against her will’.
456
 The complainant was required to provide 
evidence that she had resisted against force or violence. This interpretation is not consistent 
with a Kantian model of autonomy because the complainant’s sexual autonomy is not 
protected where the defendant employs fraud or coercion to procure sexual intercourse.  The 
complainant is prevented from choosing principles that can be adopted as laws by all.  The 
actions of a defendant who resorts to force in order to procure sexual intercourse cannot be 
universalised, because he makes an exception for himself to the advantage of his 
inclinations.
457
 This judicial view is not consistent with Kantian autonomy because it 
supports principles of action whose universal adoption is likely to destroy capacities for 
action for others and therefore cannot be willed as a universal law.
458
  
The second judicial view argued that ‘against her will’ was synonymous with ‘without her 
consent’.
459
 This view appears to be more consistent with the Kantian model of autonomy
460
, 
as it allows individuals to reject coercion and deception. Principled autonomy provides a 
basis for an account of the underlying principles of universal obligations that can form 
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 This view allowed a complainant to be free and autonomous from coercion 
and deception and not just from violence.  Kantian autonomy holds that deception is 
impermissible because it cannot be universalised.
462
 It follows that obtaining sexual 
intercourse by methods which cannot be universalised will result in violation of the 
complainant’s sexual autonomy. This judicial interpretation was first seen in the landmark 
case of R v Camplin,
463
 where the complainant was supplied with alcohol in order to ‘excite 
her consent’ to sexual intercourse.
464
  The defence argued that rape was ‘having unlawful and 
carnal knowledge of a woman by force and against her will’.
465
 Tadros notes that the problem 
confronted by the court was that, until then, the actus reus of the crime was only complete if 
force was used to overcome the will of the complainant.
466
 The court held that the defendant 
had procured sexual intercourse without consent and against her will.
467
  As a result of the 
decision in Camplin, it was no longer necessary for a prosecution to prove a positive dissent 
by the complainant; it was now sufficient to show that the complainant did not consent to 
sexual intercourse. A defendant who procured sexual intercourse without the complainant’s 
consent did not follow the Categorical Imperative (CI) which states that ‘I ought never to act 
except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law’.
468
 
The decision in Camplin protected an individual from another who engages in sexual 
intercourse as a result of heteronomous factors. A defendant who obtains sexual intercourse 
without consent is not acting according to the CI because he is not acting according to an 
unconditional command, ‘objectively necessary without reference to some purpose’.
469
 
The element of force in rape was also considered in R v Fletcher,
470
 where the defendant was 
convicted of raping a thirteen-year-old complainant.  The court rejected earlier authorities
471
 
which stated that force was an essential element of rape.  The court in Fletcher stated that: 
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The decision in [Camplin] rests upon the authority of an Act of Parliament. The 
statute of Westminster 2, c.34, defines the crime to be where ‘a man do ravish a 
woman, married, maid, or other, where she did not consent neither before or 
after’.
472
                    
The court followed the ‘without her consent’ approach on the basis that a ‘monstrous’ result 
would occur if rape was intercourse ‘against the will’ of the complainant.
473
 The shift towards 
a consent-centric model in relation to rape rendered the requirements of force and resistance 
redundant. However, despite this shift towards a more effective method for protecting sexual 
autonomy, Temkin notes that some judges appear to have been unaware of this shift in 
emphasis.
474
 In R v Dimes,
475
  Hamilton J stated that:  
The jury were directed by the judge that they should not convict of rape unless they 
were satisfied with the proof given that the appellant had acted violently and against 
the will of the prosecutrix, and he pointed out, in the appellant's favour, that no 
screams were heard by the woman in the yard (the prosecutrix did not even allege 
that she screamed), and no bruises were discovered on the thighs of the prosecutrix, 
and no other signs of a severe struggle.
476
 
Similarly, in R v Harling,
477
 the trial judge directed that to establish the crime of rape, the 
prosecution had to prove that sexual intercourse had taken place without the complainant’s 
consent and against her will.
478
  The defendant was convicted of rape upon a girl of thirteen 
years and appealed against his conviction.  On appeal, Humphreys J stated that ‘In every case 
of rape it is necessary that the prosecution should prove that the girl or woman did not 
consent and that the crime was committed against her will’.
479
 The courts continued to follow 
the view that force was a key element in the offence of rape as can be seen in the case of R v 
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 where Lord Parker LCJ,
 481
 in confirming the decision in Harling,
482
 stated that in 
cases of rape, other than where the complainant was a child, the prosecution was required to 
prove that the complainant had physically resisted.   
The approach taken by the courts in the above cases show that the courts’ decisions were not 
consistent with notions of Kantian autonomy. A non consent-centric model does not only 
deprive an individual of choices, such as when and with whom to engage in sexual activity, 
but it also fails to protect a complainant who is objectified and treated as a mere means for 
the satisfaction of the desires of another. The defendants in Dimes, Harling and Howard were 
acting wrongly, in a Kantian sense, because they were acting on maxims which cannot be 
universalised. A non consent-centric model does not adequately protect sexual autonomy 
because an individual is prevented by the  actions of another from acting and choosing freely. 
A maxim which prevents a complainant from choosing freely cannot be universalised without 
giving rise to a contradiction. The defendants in Dimes, Harling and Howard cannot be said 
to have assumed that their maxims would be universalised. Instead, they would have made 
exceptions for themselves to the advantage of their inclinations.  
In R v Linekar,
483
 the defendant had intercourse with the complainant, a prostitute, promising 
to pay her afterwards.  After sexual intercourse had taken place the defendant made off 
without paying.  He was convicted of rape and appealed. The Court of Appeal in allowing the 
appeal affirmed that an essential element of rape was proof that the complainant did not 
consent to the act of sexual intercourse with the defendant who penetrated her; that the only 
frauds which could vitiate consent is in a case of rape were frauds as to the nature of the act 
itself or as to the identity of the agent.
484
  Therefore, it was the absence of consent to sexual 
intercourse which constituted the offence of rape rather than the fraud. The Court of Appeal 
stated that the defendant would have been guilty of an offence under s 3 of the Sexual 
Offences Act 1956 (SOA 1956), but this was not offered as an alternative by the prosecution. 
Although the defendant’s deception was clearly intended to violate the complainant’s sexual 
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autonomy by depriving her of important information relevant to her decision-making process 
– whether or not to engage in sexual activity in exchange for money – the SOA 1956 was 
capable of protecting the complainant’s sexual autonomy in the form of s 3 and therefore it 
was consistent with Kantian autonomy.   
Therefore, the SOA 1956 Act did provide protection of sexual autonomy within a Kantian 
framework. With regards to the Court’s decision, Herring argues that the ‘error here is to see 
the only loss in Linekar as to the money she was not paid and to ignore the fact that here 
sexual autonomy had been infringed’.
485
  The harm in Linekar ‘was the interference of her 
right to choose with whom and under what conditions to have sexual intercourse and not just 
the loss of £25’.
486
 The defendant’s deception deprived the complainant of making a decision 
to engage in sexual intercourse based on free and informed consent. She was treated by the 
defendant as a mere instrument in order to satisfy his sexual desires, rather than an end in 
herself.  Therefore, her sexual autonomy was violated according to the Kantian model.   
 
Common law definition of consent 
Prior to the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (SOA 2003), the leading authority in relation to the 
issue of consent was the decision in R v Olugboja.
487
  The defendant in Olugboja informed 
the complainant, who had already been raped by a co-defendant, that he was going to have 
intercourse with her and asked her to remove her trousers.  It would seem that the 
complainant had, in effect, agreed to intercourse under pressure of a non-specific kind. The 
pressure was due to the fact that the defendant’s companion had already raped the 
complainant and the complainant’s friend.
488
  The contention of the defence was that an act 
can only be considered to have been committed without the complainant’s consent if her will 
was overborne by force, fear of violence or duress, or fraud.
489
  The Court of Appeal rejected 
this argument and held that the true meaning of consent under the Sexual Offences 
(Amendment) Act (SOAA 1976) was simply whether the complainant had consented in the 
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‘ordinary meaning’ of consent.
490
 The court did not leave it to the jury to recognise this 
ordinary meaning of consent unaided.  It stated that: 
There is a difference between consent and submission; every consent involves a 
submission, but it by no means follows that a mere submission involves consent.
491
  
It was the opinion of the Court that in the majority of cases, where the allegation was that the 
intercourse was obtained by force or the fear of force, the above direction, combined with 
specific references to the evidence relevant to the absence of real consent, was sufficient.
492
  
The court also stated that in the ‘less common type of cases’
493
 where sexual intercourse is 
procured after threats not involving violence or the fear of it, a fuller direction would have to 
be given to the jury.
494
 The court held that the jury:  
[S]hould be directed to concentrate on the state of mind of the victim immediately 
before the act of sexual intercourse, having regard to all the relevant circumstances; 
and in particular, the events leading up to the act and her reaction to them showing 
their impact on her mind.
495
  
The Court held that consent is a common word which covers a wide range of states of mind 
in the context of intercourse, ranging from ‘actual desire’
496
 to ‘reluctant acquiescence’.
497
 
This suggests that a person will be held to have consented to intercourse despite not agreeing 
out of ‘actual desire’.  The court observed that ‘real consent’
498
 is a different ‘state of mind’ 
from ‘mere submission’ and that the difference between the two is a matter of degree.
499
 
However, there comes a point when a complainant’s state of mind will be so different from 
‘actual desire’ that she can no longer be said to have given ‘real consent’, but must be 
described as giving ‘mere submission’.
500
 The Court of Appeal left the task of fixing this 
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point to the jury ‘applying their combined good sense, experience and knowledge of human 
behaviour to all the relevant facts of that case’.
501
  The Court held that the judge’s direction 
was close to this approach and therefore had been no misdirection.
502
                   
The decision in Olugboja is significant, in relation to this thesis, because it is consistent with 
Kantian autonomy and, therefore, is an effective method for protecting sexual autonomy. 
Individuals are free to set their own standards in relation to the types of factors which negate 
consent. This is achieved by giving consent its ordinary meaning rather than prescribing a set 
of circumstances whereby only certain forms of pressure qualify to vitiate consent. By stating 
that consent covers a wide range of states of mind ranging from ‘actual desire’ to ‘reluctant 
acquiescence’, it seems reasonable to assume from the court’s analysis of consent that some 
pressures will be compatible with consent. Gardner argues that a jury might decide that a 
complainant consents rather than submits if she has intercourse with her partner, despite her 
own lack of enthusiasm, in order to avoid another late-night discussion of the state of their 
relationship.
503
   
In relation to the protection of sexual autonomy and the decision in Olugboja, Gardner notes 
that:  
By rejecting the idea of a rule whereby some kinds of pressure do negative consent, 
and other kinds do not, as a matter of law, in favour of a position whereby 
everything depends on the victim’s own feelings, it thus treats sexual autonomy as a 
matter of personal choice, respecting individuals’ freedom to set their own limits to 
their consent, be these wide or narrow.
504
         
Olugboja provided an opportunity for the jury to decide upon the degree of pressure which 
vitiates consent. This leads to the conclusion that a threat which has a devastating effect on 
one complainant might appear trivial to another and if both engaged in sexual activity the 
latter might be held to have consented while the former did not.
505
 According to Gardner, it is 
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‘this solicitude for the individual in Olugboja that marks its commitment to protecting sexual 
autonomy’.
506
 Although Olugboja did not deal with cases involving fraud and mistake, 
Gardner argues that this ‘solicitude for the individual’ can be transferred to these types of 
cases.
507
  He contends that:  
[W]e should ask whether the matter about which the victim was mistaken is so 
important to her – whether or not to other people – that her agreement to intercourse 
cannot be rightly regarded as consent.
508
   
Allowing the complainant’s state of mind to play a part in the protection of her sexual 
autonomy avoids treating the factors that potentially influence all participants in sexual 
activities as influencing them according to a uniform pattern.
509
 Applying this analysis to the 
case of Linekar,
510
 the jury would be invited to consider whether the defendant’s intention to 
pay played a significant role in the complainant’s decision to engage in intercourse with him.  
Since the complainant was a prostitute, the jury would most likely have answered in the 
affirmative.   
Olugboja focuses on the complainant’s state of mind and allows her to set her own 
boundaries in relation to the issue of consent. This is in line with the FA, as it focuses on 
individuals being the potential legislators of laws that are valid for all rational beings. The 
defendant in Linekar clearly did not treat the complainant as an autonomous self-governing 
agent. Her sexual autonomy was violated because he treated her simply as a means and not as 
an end in herself. Moreover, his deception deprived her of exercising her free will.  
Therefore, his actions deprived her of exercising independence in relation to her decision to 
engage in intercourse. The complainant was deprived of the ability to self-legislate as a result 
of the defendant’s deception. Olugboja protects sexual autonomy by not prescribing set rules 
whereby an individual’s consent is said to be negated; instead, it allows individuals to set 
their own standards. It achieves this by examining the importance which the pressure or 
mistaken belief or fraud had for the individual complainant.   
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The Olugboja approach has been criticised on the basis that it does little to increase the 
protection of sexual autonomy.
 511
 According to Temkin, Olugboja allows for uncertainty 
because it transforms issues of law into issues of fact for the jury.
512
 Gardener defends the 
Olugboja approach by contending that its ‘resort to jury legislation is in fact bound up with 
its attentiveness to the individual victim’.
513
 He further argues that Olugboja’s approach 
attentiveness to the individual victim ‘renders it relatively acutely calculated to protect sexual 
autonomy’.
514
 The advantage of this approach is that it allows any pressure or mistake which 
is of sufficient significance to the individual complainant to vitiate consent. Consequently, 
other pressures or mistakes, which are of no significance to the complainant, will not vitiate 
consent. Olugboja allows for the fact that the complainant’s decision making process is 
significant in relation to whether she consented to sexual activity.  This approach is clearly 
consistent with Kantian autonomy in relation to the protection of sexual autonomy because a 
complainant’s consent is vitiated where her capacity for autonomous choice has been 
hindered by external factors such as pressures and deception. The complainant in Olugboja 
was deprived of the opportunity to act as an autonomous self-governing agent, and, therefore, 
her consent was vitiated by the defendant’s actions. It is submitted that the barrier to the 
application of Olugboja in a practical context is that it could lead to uncertainty as the issue 
of consent is left to the jury to determine.  According to Temkin: 
The decision, in transforming issues of law into issues of fact for the jury, makes for 
uncertainty.  There is no reason to welcome this.  There is no way of telling in 
advance of a court hearing whether in law consent is present or not.  In this way the 




Kantian autonomy addresses this concern regarding uncertainty because Kant’s Formula of 
Universal Law (FUL) enjoins individuals to act on maxims through which they can will at the 
same time that they should be universal law.  The CI, therefore, provides a method of testing 
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the moral acceptability of what an individual proposes to do with regards to obtaining sexual 
activity. 
A consent-centric model was finally given statutory effect by the SOAA 1976.  Section 1(1) 
of the SOAA 1976 expressly defined rape as sexual intercourse with a woman without her 
consent. Section 1(1) of the SOA 1956, as substituted by s 142 of the Criminal Justice and 
Public Order Act 1994 (CJPOA 1994), widened the previous statutory definition to include 
the protection of men as well. Section 1(2) of the SOA 1956 (which replaced the former 
definition in s 1 of the SOAA 1976), stated it was an offence for a man to rape a woman or 
another man, who at the time of the intercourse does not consent to it.  Section 1(2) of the 
SOA 1956, therefore, allowed for the protection of the sexual autonomy of males. This model 
allowed for sexual intercourse to become rape in the absence of consent. The crucial issue 
was whether the complainant consented to being penetrated
516
 by the other person’s penis. It 
no longer became a requirement that the complainant positively dissented. In relation to 
protecting sexual autonomy, there was no longer any requirement that the absence of consent 
had to be demonstrated or that it had to be communicated to the defendant for the actus reus 




Procuring sexual intercourse by deception 
This section will critically assess the factors undermining sexual autonomy and whether the 
historical methods provided a more adequate protection of sexual autonomy than Kantian 
autonomy. It will also illustrate that Kantian autonomy protects sexual autonomy in cases of 
deception more effectively than the historical models. The effect of fraud on the 
complainant’s consent was reviewed in R v Clarence,
518
 where the defendant had sexual 
intercourse with his wife knowing that he was suffering from venereal disease without 
informing her of this fact.  Stephen J stated:  
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It seems to me that the proposition that fraud vitiates consent in criminal matters is 
not true if taken to apply in the fullest sense of the word, and without qualification. 
It is too short to be true, as a mathematical formula is true. If we apply it in that 
sense to the present case, it is difficult to say that the prisoner was not guilty of 
rape, for the definition of rape is having connection with a woman without her 
consent; and if fraud vitiates consent, every case in which a man infects a woman or 
commits bigamy, the second wife being ignorant of the first marriage, is also a case 
of rape. Many seductions would be rapes, and so might acts of prostitution procured 
by fraud, as for instance by promises not intended to be fulfilled. These illustrations 
appear to shew clearly that the maxim that fraud vitiates consent is too general to be 
applied to these matters as if it were absolutely true.
519
  
He further added that:  
The only sorts of fraud which so far destroy the effect of a woman’s consent as to 
convert a connection consented to in fact into a rape are frauds as to the nature of 
the act itself, or as to the identity of the person who does the act.
520
  
The court in Clarence held that consent to the sexual intercourse meant that there could be no 
assault upon which to base liability for a s 20 offence under the Offences Against the Person 
Act 1861.
521
 The complainant’s sexual autonomy was not protected under this model due to 
the marital rape exemption. The defendant, in concealing the fact that he had contracted a 
sexually transmitted disease, clearly did so because he was aware that his wife would not 
consent to sexual intercourse. It would appear that the defendant deceived the complainant in 
order to procure sexual intercourse. Under Kantian autonomy, his actions do not contribute to 
the Kingdom of Ends because he cannot be said to be engaged ‘in the harmonious and 
cooperative pursuit of the good’.
522
 He did not treat his wife as an end; instead, he treated her 
simply as a means for the purpose of only sexual gratification. By using the complainant 
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simply as a means in order to satisfy his sexual desires, the defendant prevented her will from 
making laws which can be universalised.  Korsgaard writes that:  
Since we would will a world in which the assistance of others and the resources of 
human talents were available for use as the means of actions, we would will that 
each person contributes something to the obligatory ends.  The laws we would 
choose to be under, if it were ours to choose, would be moral laws.  When we do 
obey moral laws, then, we are autonomous and free.
523
      
It was argued in chapter one that autonomy is based on the principle that a rational will 
makes the laws which it obeys, and is the source of the unconditional worth which belongs to 
moral agents as making laws.
524
  Therefore, the defendant in Clarence
525
 violated her sexual 
autonomy because she was denied the opportunity to act freely due to his fraud.  She was 
prevented from legislating universal law because her decision to engage in sexual intercourse 
with a defendant, who had contracted a sexually transmitted disease, cannot be applied 
universally.      
 
Fraud as to the nature of the act 
This refers to cases where the complainant has been deceived into believing that it is not a 
sexual activity she has agreed to.  This type of fraud is best illustrated by ‘medical’ cases 
where sexual activity is obtained under the pretence that medical treatment is being 
performed.  
In R v Stanton
526
 the defendant informed the complainant that he was giving her an injection 
but proceeded to have intercourse with her instead. The court insisted on the element of force 
in rape and directed the jury that, since the defendant had not intended to procure sexual 
intercourse with the complainant by force, they should acquit him on a charge of assault with 
intent to commit rape. The decision in Stanton is not consistent with Kantian autonomy 
because, according to Kant, a person is treated as mere means whenever they are treated in a 
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way to which she could not possibly consent.
527
  Korsgaard argues that ‘if an action depends 
upon force or deception or coercion, it is impossible for me to consent to it’.
528
  The 
defendant in Stanton violated the complainant’s sexual autonomy because he did not treat her 
humanity as an end, which in turn resulted in him not respecting her right to use her own 
reason to determine whether to engage in sexual intercourse.  
A different approach was adopted in R v Case,
529
 where the defendant engaged in sexual 
intercourse with a 14-year old complainant on the pretext that he was curing her suppressed 
menstruation. The complainant, believing that she was submitting to medical treatment, 
offered no resistance. Wilde CJ concluding that there was no consent, drawing the distinction 
between submission to sexual intercourse and submission to medical treatment. He states 
that: 
[S]he submits under a misrepresentation that it was some act necessary and proper 
for her cure; she made no resistance to an act which she supposed to be quite 
different from that which was done, and therefore, that which was done was done 
without her consent.
530
         
The decision in Case is not consistent with a Kantian approach to the protection of sexual 
autonomy in that sexual intercourse becomes rape where the complainant does not consent.  
Since the Formula of Autonomy (FA) focuses on individuals being the potential legislators of 
laws valid for all rational beings, the complainant in Case was deprived of deciding for 
herself because her consent was based on the defendant’s fraud.  Moreover, her capacity for 
self-legislation did not include the capacity to form judgments.  The defendant in Case, by 
resorting to fraud in order to procure sexual intercourse, did not respect her as an autonomous 
self-governing agent. 
It is not clear from the evidence in Case whether the complainant was aware of the physical 
nature of the ‘medical treatment’.  This question was addressed in R v Flattery,
531
 where the 
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complainant submitted to intercourse believing that the defendant was treating her medically.  
The defendant had obtained the complainant’s submission fraudulently.  Kelly CB rejected 
the argument that the onus was on the prosecution to prove that the complainant did not know 
the nature of the sexual act when submitting to medical treatment.  He states: 
I know no ground in law for such a proposition. And, even if she had such 
knowledge, she might suppose that penetration was being effected with the hand or 
with an instrument. The case is therefore not within the authority of those cases 
which have decided, decisions which I regret, that where a man by fraud induces a 
woman to submit to sexual intercourse, is not rape.
532
  
On the facts, it was established that the complainant was under the impression that the 
defendant was performing a surgical operation by ‘the hand or with an instrument’.
533
  
However, Kelly CB indicated that it would have made no difference had she known that an 
act of sexual intercourse was taking place.  According to Field J, ‘[t]he question is one of 




Flattery appears to be consistent with Kantian autonomy in that it extends the protection of 
sexual autonomy to cases where the complainant only agreed to sexual intercourse because of 
deception on the part of the defendant. The defendant’s maxims cannot be universalised 
without contradiction. He did not respect the complainant as an equal autonomous agent. The 
complainant was deprived of the opportunity to exercise her free will, which has the capacity 
to initiate its own actions. In order for a complainant to have freedom of the will, she must 
have a capacity for choice, which is independent of external influences such as deception by 
the defendant. 
Williams contends that there is a ‘great factual difference between the violently resisting or 
the terrified complainant ‘in the ordinary case of rape’
535
, and the woman who happily 
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submits because she has been deceived’.
536
 It is argued that Williams’ reasoning does not 
accord with Kantian autonomy in relation to the protection of sexual autonomy. According to 
Williams, only fundamental errors as to the nature of the act are capable of vitiating 
consent.
537
 This opinion can be contrasted with the view advanced by Gardener and Shute in 
which they assert that rape is wrong because the rapist objectifies his victims. In their 
example, discussed in chapter two, Gardener and Shute adopt a Kantian view to support their 
claim that ‘rape is the sheer use of another person’.
538
 Williams’ strict interpretation of the 
‘nature of the act’ approach can be seen in his opinion of the Court of Appeal’s decision in R 
v Williams,
539
 where the defendant had sexual intercourse with the complainant under the 
pretence that her breathing was not quite right, and that he had to perform an operation to 
enable her to improve her voice. The complainant submitted to what was done under the 
belief, wilfully and fraudulently induced by the appellant, that she was being medically and 
surgically treated by the appellant, and not with any intention that he should have sexual 
intercourse with her.  Williams argues that if the complainant:  
[K]new of the facts of life and was willing to be persuaded that one of the benefits 
of the act of sex was an improvement in breathing, then she did not mistake the 
nature of the act, even though in her innocence she may not have realised that the 
man’s motives had nothing to do with singing.
540
  
A Kantian model of autonomy provides a more effective method of protection in cases such 
as Williams, because it disregards whether the complainant was aware of the nature of the act.  
A Kantian model focuses on whether the complainant is being used as a mere means and also 
whether her capacity to self-legislate has been undermined by the defendant’s fraud.  
However, the 1956 legislation did not take this approach.  For example, s 3(1), SOA 1956, 
dealing with an offence similar to rape, provided that:  
It is an offence for a person to procure a woman, by false pretences or false 
representations, to have unlawful sexual intercourse in any part of the world.  
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This provision was passed to combat the ‘white slave trade’.
541
 Although this statutory 
offence overlaps with rape, pretences may be committed by words or conduct but they are not 
limited to pretences as to the nature of the act or the identity of the person.
542
 Williams argues 
that that an omission to disclose facts under s 3, however important, should not be classed as 
fraud.
543
  He justifies his criticism of s 3 on the basis that:  
It can hardly be supposed that any boastful lie told by a man (even if told expressly) 
makes him guilty of the offence if the lie procures the woman’s consent to 




Misleading a complainant in relation to an issue which affects her decision-making process 
with regards to whether to engage in a sexual activity or not, may amount to a violation of the 
complainant’s sexual autonomy within a Kantian framework.  Therefore, the issue which 
needs to be examined is how the complainant understood the act that she was consenting 
to.
545
  As Herring notes, ‘deceit, as much as force and threats, can negate consent’
546
 because 
deceit, in a similar way to violence, ‘manipulates people into acting against their will’.
547
 
Restricting the information on which a complainant makes a choice regarding sexual activity 
with another inhibits her free choice.  Herring states that: 
In sexual relations, people are entitled to expect their partners not to consider solely 
their own interests but rather engage in a cooperative and mutually beneficial 
relationship. We are therefore entitled to expect sexual partners to owe each other 
heightened standards of obligation of a fiduciary nature.
548
   
Herring’s approach is consistent with Kantian autonomy. Deception is considered 
impermissible within a Kantian framework, because it hinders the decision-making process of 
a complainant and manipulates her rational capacities; it manipulates people into acting 
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 In other words, it restricts the options available to the complainant and 
thereby limits her choices and denies her the freedom to self-legislate. In relation to decision-
making, Herring argues that:  
In order for a decision to carry the weight we expect of autonomy we need to ensure 
that the decisionmaker [sic]is aware of the key facts involved in making the 
decision; that the decisionmaker [sic] is able to make a choice; and the decision-
maker is free from illegitimate pressure.
550
         
A complainant who is not free from illegitimate pressure because her will is subject to 
another is heteronomous.  As stated in chapter two, Kant contrasted a heteronomous being 
with the autonomous individual whose actions are self-willed through the power of reason.   
 
Fraud as to the identity of the person 
Prior to the SOA 2003, the law of sexual offences faced a recurring problem as to whether 
fraud as to the identity of the person performing sexual intercourse vitiated consent. In a 
series of cases starting with R v Jackson,
551
 and culminating in R v Barrow,
552
 it was held that 
obtaining sexual intercourse by impersonation of a woman’s husband was not rape. The 
Barrow line of decisions was reversed by s 4 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885.  
This was also declared to be the position by s 1(2), SOA 1956, which stated that ‘a man who 
induces a married woman to have sexual intercourse with him by impersonating commits 
rape’.  This provision was limited to impersonating the complainant’s husband.  It did not go 
far enough in terms of protecting sexual autonomy because it failed protect the unmarried 
complainant.  The advantage of implementing a Kantian model to protect sexual autonomy in 
such cases is that it does not distinguish between married and unmarried complainants as it is 
concerned with treating a person not merely as a means but an end in themselves. 
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However, in R v Elbekkay,
553
 the Court of Appeal recognised for the first time that a mistaken 
belief as to the identity of the defendant included partners other than a spouse.
554
  In this case 
the complainant was awakened by someone whom she assumed was her boyfriend coming 
into her bed. Without opening her eyes she proceeded to have sexual intercourse with the 
defendant and after 20 minutes she opened her eyes and saw that it was not her boyfriend.  
The Court of Appeal decided it was very unlikely that Parliament was deliberately and 
consciously deciding that it was rape to impersonate a husband but not, for example, a man 
who had been living with the complainant for many years. The Court of Appeal further held 
that the situation had been affected by s 1 of the SOAA 1976, whereby a man commits rape 
where he has unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman who, at the time of the intercourse, 
does not consent to it. This statutory provision is consistent with Kantian autonomy because 
it focuses on respecting the humanity of others.  Therefore, the issue was whether the 
complainant consented. The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that it would be 
extraordinary to conclude that it is rape to impersonate a husband but not a ‘partner’ of the 
complainant concerned.  This decision is consistent with Kantian autonomy because it 
focuses on whether the defendant’s actions limit the complainant’s choices in relation to 
deciding whether to agree to sexual intercourse. A Kantian model views impersonation as 
another form of deception and, therefore, impersonations would be considered a violation of 
Kantian autonomy.  
The decision in Elbekkay appears to have followed the 1984 recommendations of the 
Criminal Law Revision Committee (CLRC); namely that consent obtained by impersonating 
another man should be included amongst the cases where consent obtained by fraud amounts 
to rape.
555
  Unfortunately, Parliament did not take the opportunity (when amending the 
definition of rape in 1994) to widen the husband-impersonation rule so that it extends to all 
cases. Section 142 of the CJPOA 1994
556
  amended the definition of rape (which was 
previously contained in s 1(1) of the SOA 1956) so that it became an offence for a man to 
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rape a woman or another man.  Therefore, protection of sexual autonomy was made available 
to a wider class of complainants. Moreover, the definition of rape in the CJPOA 1994 omitted 
the word ‘unlawful’, which appears in the former definition of rape contained in s 1 of the 
SOAA 1976 and in the common law definition of the offence. Thus, at common law, rape 
could not be committed by a husband against his wife as she was presumed to have consented 
to all acts of intercourse upon marriage. This exemption did not protect a married 
complainant’s sexual autonomy because she is denied the freedom and choice to decide for 
herself whether to engage in a sexual act.  In relation to husband-impersonation, s 1(2) of the 
SOA 1956 was reproduced in s 1(3) of the 1956 Act, when the definition of rape was 
amended by s 142(3) of the CJPOA 1994.  According to s 1(3), ‘a man also commits rape if 
he induces a married woman to have sexual intercourse with him by impersonating her 
husband’. The 1994 Act may have implicitly overruled Elbbekay by excluding from the new 
s 1(3) of the SOA 1956 any reference to impersonations other than a husband and thereby 
providing limited protection of sexual autonomy.  This was an unfortunate development 
because it is not consistent with a Kantian notion of autonomy because it fails to respect the 
dignity of the individual.   
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined whether the previous law relating to sexual offences adequately 
protected sexual autonomy. The purpose of this analysis was to determine whether the 
previous law protected sexual autonomy more effectively than a Kantian model. It has been 
shown that the previous law underwent various developments to protect sexual autonomy.  
The main development, in terms of protecting sexual autonomy, occurred in the case of 
Camplin,
557
 where the court moved towards a consent-centric model in relation to the 
protection of sexual autonomy.  This focus afforded more protection due to the fact that the 
prosecution was not required to prove that sexual activity occurred ‘against her will’. This 
approach fails to adequately protect sexual autonomy because it does not allow for the fact 
that violation of sexual autonomy can be carried out by means other than force, such as fraud, 
non-violent coercion and where the complainant is asleep.  However, the decision in Camplin 
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  The courts in these cases held that it was for the prosecution to 
prove that sexual intercourse took place against the complainant’s will.  This approach clearly 
failed to adequately protect sexual autonomy. A non-consent centric model fails to 
adequately protect sexual autonomy because it does not take into account that sexual 
autonomy can be violated by means other than force.     
The sexual offences law prior to the SOA 2003 failed to provide a statutory definition for the 
meaning of consent.  Consequently, it was left to the courts to provide a definition in relation 
to consent.  The defendant in Olugboja was convicted of rape and appealed on the basis that 
rape required that the submission of the complainant be induced by force or the threat of 
force.   
Dunn LJ’s dictum in Olugboja is problematic because if ‘every consent involves a 
submission’, it can hardly be said that a person who voluntarily agrees to sexual activity with 
her sexual partner is surrendering to her partner, when she is in fact agreeing to something 
which she desires.  Submission, on the other hand, suggests that there is an external constraint 
affecting her decision.  It appears incorrect to suggest that every consent involves a 
submission.   
The old law focused on whether the complainant had resisted, rather than the actions of the 
defendant, and as a result did not adequately protect sexual autonomy.  The decisions in 
Camplin and Olugboja focused on the state of mind of the complaint and as a result provided 
more adequate protection. However, the lack of an accepted definition of the meaning of 
‘consent’ may result in uncertainty as a result of the jury’s interpretation of the meaning of 
consent.   
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This chapter will critically examine the current law of sexual offences to determine whether it 
is consistent with Kantian autonomy.  In 1999, the law of sexual offences underwent a 
comprehensive review, which resulted in significant reforms brought in by the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003 (SOA 2003).  As stated in chapter three, prior to the SOA 2003, the law 
relating to sexual offences was primarily located in the Sexual Offences Act 1956 (SOA 
1956).  Many of the provisions within this Act dated back as far as the nineteenth century and 
consequently were in need of modernisation. The SOA 2003 was the product of two reviews 
in the area of sexual offences. The first involved a review of sexual offences by the Home 
Office which led to the publication of a report entitled Setting the Boundaries.
561
  The second 
review focused on the Sex Offenders Act 1997.  The main recommendations of both reviews 
were taken forward to a White Paper entitled Protecting the Public, which described the law 




A Consent-centric model 
In considering the rights and responsibilities of individuals to make their own decisions about 
consensual sexual behaviour, the Sex Offences Review (SOR) noted that ‘the law should not 
intrude on consensual sexual behaviour between those over the age of consent without good 
cause’.
563
 According to the SOR:  
Consent is the crucial issue for these offences
564
 because the lack of consent is the 
essence of the criminal behaviour.  It is one individual forcing another to undergo 
an experience against their will. It is a violation of the victim’s autonomy and 
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freedom to decide how and with whom she (or he) would want to share any kind of 
sexual experience.
565
    
The SOR recommended that ‘consent’ should be defined as ‘free agreement’
566
 and also 
recommended that the law set out a non-exhaustive list of circumstances where consent was 
absent.
567
  These recommendations were incorporated into the SOA 2003.    
Chapter three documented that, prior to the SOA 2003, ‘consent’ in the context of sexual 
offences was not defined by statute. Instead, the courts gave the word consent its ordinary 
meaning, which was a matter for the jury to determine. It has been shown that the Court of 
Appeal in R v Olugboja
568
 held that it was up to the jury to decide in each individual case 
whether the complainant had consented to sexual intercourse. According to the Court, the 
material question was whether the complainant consented in the ‘ordinary meaning’
569
 of 
consent and ‘every consent involves a submission, but it by no means follows that a mere 
submission involves consent’.
570
   However, the decision in Olugboja was considered 
problematic as it did ‘little to increase the protection of sexual autonomy’.
571
  By virtue of s 
74 of the SOA 2003, a person consents ‘if he agrees by choice, and has the freedom and 
capacity to make that choice’.  It is implicit in this definition that consent can only be given 
by the person in question and not by a third party on her behalf.
572
  Section 74 which is 





has been criticised because:  
“[F]reedom” and “choice” are ideas which raise philosophical issues of such 
complexity as to be ill-suited to the needs of criminal justice – clearly those words 
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do not refer to total freedom of choice, so all the questions about how much liberty 
of actions satisfies the “definition” remains at large.
575
    
Tadros also raises concerns regarding s 74 by arguing that:  
On the one hand, the definition supposes that it is possible for a person to agree by 
choice whilst lacking capacity or freedom. Otherwise the second part of the 
definition would appear to be redundant. It would only be necessary to define 
consent as an agreement made by choice with capacity and freedom if there was the 
possibility that an agreement might be made by choice without the capacity and 
freedom. But, on the other hand, the definition suggests that if one lacks capacity 
and freedom one cannot agree by choice at all. For the definition suggests that one 
must have the capacity and freedom to make that choice.
576
  
Tadros suggests that the definition implies that: 
The complainant might have agreed by choice and yet lacked the capacity and 
freedom to make that choice, which is paradoxical. Are the jury to determine 
whether the complainant agreed by choice first, and then determine whether she had 
the relevant capacity and freedom? Or are they to address the question of capacity 
and freedom first and, if either capacity or freedom are lacking, conclude that she 
did not agree by choice?
577
  
The above criticism highlights that ‘agreement’, ‘choice’ and ‘freedom’ are complex 
philosophical concepts and they are not easily defined. However, Tadros’ criticism does not 
take into account the fact that, in order to agree by choice, the complainant must have the 
freedom and capacity to make that particular choice. Where the complainant lacks either 
freedom or choice, then her agreement will not be valid and she cannot be said to have 
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consented under s 74. The definition in s 74 is more comprehensive than the SOR’s 
recommendation which was that consent should be defined as ‘free agreement’.
578
 
Chapter two established that the Categorical Imperative (CI) requires a person to act in a 
manner which respects other individuals’ existence as ends in themselves, rather than simply 
as means to an end.
579
  Kantian autonomy is based on the freedom of the will to choose. It is 
the capacity to act on rational principles and ‘freely to exercise the moral reasoning will, 
through the freedom of choice’.
580
 It is submitted that the definition of consent in s 74 is 
consistent with Kantian autonomy, but it does not provide definitions of philosophical 
concepts such as ‘freedom’ and ‘choice’.  The absence of definitions regarding these complex 
philosophical concepts may result in uncertainty when s 74 is applied in a practical context.   
Elliot and de Than argue that the core value which consent should protect in a society which 
respects Western liberal ideals is personal autonomy.
581
  The authors write that:  
Autonomy has both positive and negative aspects, the positive being represented in 
freedom to seek out and engage in relations with other individuals, and the negative 
in the right to refuse relations with others and have effect given to that refusal.
582
    
While the above refers to the concept of autonomy in general, it can also be extended to 
sexual autonomy.  In order to be consistent with Kantian autonomy the two aspects of sexual 
autonomy must also include the caveat that a person must never treat herself and others 
simply as a means but always as an end.
583
    
 
Agreement by choice 
Section 74 follows the recommendation of the SOR which stated that ‘any free agreement 
would necessarily be voluntary and genuine’.
584
 The SOR felt that ‘free agreement’ to define 
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consent would assist in clarifying the issue that the absence of protest, resistance or injury 
would not necessarily mean that the complainant consented to sexual activity. It also serves 
to highlight the fact that a complainant who utters no protest and offers no physical resistance 
may not have consented.
585
 The SOR noted that the Oxford dictionary defined the verb ‘to 
consent’ as ‘to acquiesce, or agree’ and the noun ‘consent’ as ‘voluntary agreement, 
compliance or permission’.
586
  It concluded that:  
These definitions cover a range of behaviour from whole-hearted enthusiastic 
agreement to reluctant acquiescence. In this context the core element is that there is 
an agreement between two people to engage in sex. People have devised a complex 
set of messages to convey agreement and lack of it – agreement is not necessarily 
verbal, but it must be understood by both parties. Each must respect the right of the 
other to say “no” – and mean it.
587
   
The SOR’s recommendation of ‘free agreement’ was based on the argument that it not only 
allowed for simplicity and clarity but also included all the necessary ingredients.
588
 The 
complainant’s agreement can be expressed or implied, and may be evidenced by words or 
conduct, past or present.
589
 This also applies to the complainant’s refusal to consent to sexual 
activity.  Evidence of this is found in R v Malone,
590
 later confirmed by the Court of Appeal 
in R v Hysa,
591
 where it was stated that ‘there is no requirement that the absence of consent 
has to be demonstrated or that it has to be communicated to the defendant for the actus reus 
of rape to exist’.
592
  The court in Malone stated that:    
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It is not the law that the prosecution in order to obtain a conviction for rape have to 
show that the complainant was either incapable of saying no or putting up some 
physical resistance, or did say no or put up some physical resistance.
593
 
There is no requirement to prove that the complainant said ‘no’ to the defendant, or that the 
complainant had not said ‘yes’. The analysis carried out by the courts under the previous 
law
594
 will still be required when determining whether the complainant had consented under s 
74.
595
 Thus, Brooke LJ’s statement, in R v McAllister,
596
 that the focus of the inquiry should 
be based on the sexual autonomy of the complainant also applies to the SOA 2003.  However, 
the SOA 2003 does not shed light on situations involving a complainant whose agreement to 
sexual activity is based on promises of benefit, made by the defendant, which appeal to her 
particular tastes or weaknesses.
597
  The SOA 2003 is silent on whether a complainant who 
agrees to sexual activity in order to satisfy her ambition, such as improving her financial 
situation is consenting under s 74.  Although the concept of agreement is not used in Kant’s 
writing in relation to autonomy, Kantian autonomy involves independence from 
heteronomous factors.  Lindley maintains that according to the Kantian view:  
[T]o be fully autonomous is equivalent to being a fully rational agent. To be a fully 
rational agent is to be motivated by purely rational principles, which are untainted 
by particular inclinations or interests. Such purity requires that one act only on 
principles one is prepared to universalise in a strong sense. This in turn requires that 
one treat all human beings never simply as means to ends, but as ends in themselves 
(because it is impossible for a creature with a will to regard itself simply as a means 
to an end).
598
                
With regards to personal inclinations, Kant argues that they are caused by events in the 
world.
599
  Actions performed through the pursuit of inclinations are heteronomous, whereas 
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an individual can only be autonomous if her practical judgment has been untainted by 
inclinations.
600
  Kant places the nominal
601
 self outside of time and thereby freeing it from 
causal determination.
602
 To be autonomous is to act on self-chosen principles, which are 
capable of being universalised without giving rise to contradictions. A complainant who 
engages in sexual activity in order to improve her prospects is not acting autonomously and 
therefore cannot be said to be agreeing to sexual autonomy under Kant’s model of autonomy.  
Such a complainant would be using herself and the defendant simply as a means and not as 
an end.  In such a case the Kantian model can be used to protect the complainant’s sexual 
autonomy from being violated. The use of the word ‘agreement’ in s 74 is intended to 
emphasise that the absence of the complainant’s resistance or injury does not necessarily 
signify her consent. However, there is ambiguity surrounding situations where the 
complainant, faced with a non-violent coercive threat to withhold some benefit she is not 
entitled to, submits to sexual intercourse.
603
      
In order to protect sexual autonomy within a Kantian framework, the dynamics of the 
relationship between the parties would need to be examined.  An individual’s choice to 
engage in sexual activity must be free and unconstrained. Concealment of matters relevant to 
her choice, deception or coercion will have an impact on the authenticity of her agreement to 
consent to sexual activity. It has been suggested that ‘choice’ presupposes that the 
complainant has options to choose from, which in turn presupposes that the complainant is 
possessed of adequate information about each, in order to agree on a particular choice.
604
  
The concept of choice is unhelpful, and as argued by Elliot and de Than, ‘unnecessarily 
complicates matters’.
605
 Elliot and de Than write that the real issue is whether a person has 
the freedom and capacity to agree because ‘when a person is consenting to something they 
are effectively agreeing to it’.
606
 This argument is in line with the assumption that under s 74 
there can be no valid ‘agreement by choice’ in the absence of freedom and capacity to make 
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  Therefore, the word ‘choice’ is at best superfluous.
608
  Temkin and Ashworth 
provide a hypothetical example in which a defendant deceives the complainant about his HIV 
status.  The authors assert that  ‘if C gives her agreement in ignorance of a key fact, and if D 
knows of that ignorance and takes advantage of it, it may be concluded that C did not agree 
by choice’.
609
   However, R v B
610
 established that, whilst the transmission of a disease is not 
consented to, the complainant’s consent to sexual intercourse is not vitiated.  This decision 
ignores the possibility of Temkin and Ashworth’s hypothetical scenario.
611
  According to 
Latham LJ in R v B:  
Where one party to sexual activity has a sexually transmissible disease which is not 
disclosed to the other party any consent that may have been given to that activity by 
the other party is not thereby vitiated. The act remains a consensual act. However, 
the party suffering from the sexually transmissible disease will not have any 
defence to any charge which may result from harm created by that sexual activity, 
merely by virtue of that consent, because such consent did not include consent to 
infection by the disease.
612
 
No rape charge will occur where a defendant conceals his HIV status. Sexual autonomy is not 
protected in such instances. The defendant in Temkin and Ashworth’s example is not acting 
in accordance with the CI because he cannot at the same time will, without contradiction, that 
his maxim should become universal law. The defendant in such a case fails to respect the 
complainant’s humanity by using her merely as a means. The reason for this is that maxims 
based on deceptions are impermissible according to Kantian autonomy.
613
 The complainant’s 
sexual autonomy is being violated because her agreement is obtained by deception. She is not 
fully able to self-legislate because her decision-making is influenced by external factors, 
namely the defendant’s deception.  Moreover, in order to comply with the formula of 
                                                 
607
 Card et al (n30), para 3.16. 
608
 Elliott and de Than (n42), 239. 
609
 Temkin and Ashworth (n575), 344.  The facts of Dica and Konzani mirror the hypothetical example provided 
by Temkin and Ashworth.      
610
 [2007] 1WLR 1567.  
611
 L. Cherkassky, ‘Being Informed:  The Complexities of Knowledge, Deception and Consent when 
Transmitting HIV’ (2010) 74(3) J Crim L 242, 250.  
612
 [2007] 1WLR 1567, 1571.  
613
 Kant Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (n4), 85. 
Page 117  
 
 
autonomy, the defendant must also be subject to the law which he legislates.
614
 Korsgaard 
writes that:  
A person, an end in itself, is a free cause, which is to say a first cause.  By contrast, 
a thing, a means, is a merely mediate cause, a link in the chain.  A first cause is, 
obviously, the initiator of a causal chain, hence a real determiner of what will 
happen.  The idea of deciding for yourself whether you will contribute to a given 
end can be represented as a decision whether to initiate that causal chain which 
constitutes your contribution. Any action which prevents or diverts you from 
making this initiating decision is one that treats you as a mediate rather than a first 
cause; hence a mere means, a thing, a tool. Coercion and deception both do this.
615
      
The defendant, when deceiving the complainant, manipulates her reason and prevents her 
from formulating a decision which is free from external constraints.  His deception treats her 
reason as an object.  The Formula of Humanity’s (FH) prohibition against any form of lying 
can be applied to deceptions.
616
 Kantian autonomy can be applied to support Herring’s 
argument
617
 regarding deception and rape.
618
  Herring’s argument will be explored in more 
detail in chapter four.  Kant uses humanity to refer to the capacity to determine ends through 
rational choice.
619
  In relation to this capacity, Korsgaard writes that:  
Imperfect duties arise from the obligation to make the exercise, preservation, and 
development of this capacity itself an end. The perfect duties – that is, the duties to 
justice, and, in the realm of ethics, the duties of respect – arise from the obligation 
to make each human being’s capacity for autonomous choice the condition of the 
value of every other end.
620
     
In relation to deception, Kant writes:  
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[T]he man who has a mind to make a false promise to others will see at once that he 
is intending to make use of another man merely as a means to an end he does not 
share. For the man whom I seek to use for my own purposes by such a promise 
cannot possibly agree with my way of behaving to him, and so cannot himself share 
the end of the action.
621
       
Individuals cannot assent to a way of acting when they are given no chance to do so.
622
  In 
cases of deception and coercion, the complainant cannot agree to sexual activity because the 
defendant’s actions are preventing her from choosing for herself. Therefore, the issue of 
whether a complainant can assent to the defendant’s way of acting can serve as a criterion for 
judging whether the defendant is treating the complainant as a mere means.
623
 Knowledge of 
the events and some power over the proceedings are the conditions of possible assent; 
without these, the concept of assent does not apply.
624
     
According to the FH, coercion and deception are the most fundamental forms of wrongdoing 
to others.
625
  They violate the conditions of possible assent because they prevent others from 
choosing to agree. The concept of agreement in s 74 is consistent with a Kantian notion of 
autonomy. The following section will critically analyse the concepts of freedom and capacity 
in order to determine to what extent they are consistent with Kantian autonomy and also 
whether there are any barriers to their practical application.          
 
Freedom and capacity  
In Kant’s work, autonomy is treated as pivotal for human freedom and morality.
626
  Kant 
views autonomy, or self-governance by universal law, as the condition that is necessary to 
achieve and maintain freedom. This involves the independence of the choices and actions of 
an individual not only from influence by others but also from domination by her own 
inclinations.  Guyer claims that autonomy cannot merely be equated with freedom of the will.  
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He argues that autonomy ‘must be understood as the aim that a person with free will must 
adopt in an ordinary sense, which is something such an agent ought to do, and can do, but 
does not necessarily do’.
627
 Therefore, it is necessary to examine Kant’s interpretation of 
freedom in relation to his conception of autonomy in order to determine whether ‘freedom’ in 
s 74 is consistent with Kantian autonomy.   
Kantian notion of freedom 
In his lectures on moral philosophy, Kant defines freedom as ‘the capacity which confers 
unlimited usefulness on all others’.
628
 He is noted to have stated that freedom involves 
employing the power an individual has ‘to rule over his strong inclinations’.
629
  Kant does not 
mean that inclinations should be abolished, merely that they should be regulated.
630
  He states 
that freedom ‘consists in this, that everyone can act according to his own will, without being 
necessitated to act according to the will of another’.
631
  Thus, Kant suggests a bipartite 
account of freedom in choice and action.
632
  The principle of autonomy can be used to 
regulate an individual’s pursuit of the satisfaction of inclinations.
633
  This principle of 
autonomy considers ‘every human will is a will which by all its maxims enacts universal 
law’.
634
 Thus, all of an individual’s maxims must be part of a system of universal law.
635
  
This argument connects the two parts of Kant’s bipartite conceptualisation of freedom by 
highlighting that the avoidance of domination by the individual’s inclinations and the 
avoidance of domination by others are not independent goals.
636
   
For Kant, autonomy is an ideal in which ‘its exercise is towards realisation’.
637
 This exercise 
derives from the primary unconditionality of the capacity which is universally held.
638
  The 
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essence of autonomy ‘is the unconditional capacity that allows its exercise’.
639
  Choice which 
can be determined by pure reason is called ‘free choice’.
640
  ‘Human choice’
641
 is 
distinguished from ‘animal choice’
642
 in that the latter requires a ‘capacity for choice than can 
indeed be affected but not determined by impulses’.
643
  Kant states that freedom of choice:  
[I]s this independence from being determined by sensible impulses; this is the 
negative concept of freedom. The positive concept of freedom is that of the capacity 
of pure reason to be of itself practical.  But this is not possible except by the 
subjection of the maxim of every action to the condition of its qualifying as 
universal law.
644
              
Therefore, the negative concept of the freedom of Wilkur is independence from determination 
by sensuous impulses whereas the positive concept is defined as ‘the capacity of pure reason 
to be of itself practical’.
645
 Kant draws a similar contrast in the Groundwork, where the 
positive concept of freedom is identified with autonomy.
646
 While Wilkur is negative 
freedom, Wille is freedom of the will in the positive sense.
647
  Treiger-Bar-Am writes that:  
Wilkur is freedom from external, heteronomous constraints; Wille is freedom to 
self-legislate.  Choice by Wilkur is directed by the rational will, the Wille.  The 
Wilkur is the executive function of the will and the Wille is the legislative 
functions.
648
      
Wille involves the capacity to self-legislate while Wilkur is the capacity to choose good or 
evil.
649
  With regards to the relationship between freedom and autonomy, Kant asks ‘[w]hat 
else then can freedom of will be but autonomy – that is, the property which will has of being 
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a law to itself’.
650
 Guyer suggests that Kant’s intended answer to this question is clearly that 
the freedom of the will cannot be anything other than autonomy.
651
  However, Kant came to 
retract this thesis that freedom of the will entails autonomy.
652
  This retraction was made in 
The Critique of Practical Reason where he writes that:  
Since the mere form of a law can be thought only by reason and is consequently not 
an object of the senses and therefore does not belong among appearances, the 
conception of this form as the determining ground of the will is distinct from all 
determining grounds of events in nature according to the law of causality, for these 
grounds must themselves be appearances. Now, as no determining ground of the 
will except the universal legislative form [of its maxim] can serve as a law for it, 
such a will must be conceived as wholly independent of the natural law of 
appearances in their natural relations, i.e. the law of causality. Such independence is 
called freedom in the strictest, i.e., transcendental, sense. Therefore, a will to which 
only the law-giving form of the maxim can serve as a law is a free will.
653
 
Guyer argues that this clearly implies that freedom of the will is a necessary condition for 
autonomy, ‘but not that it is a sufficient condition for autonomy or that it necessarily entails 
it’.
654
  Guyer argues that Kantian autonomy must be viewed: 
[A]s a condition of mastery over our inclinations in our choice of ends and actions.  
Only an individual’s self-regulation of inclinations in accordance with the Kantian 
autonomy, which requires freedom from domination by her own inclinations and by 
others.
655
   
Although freedom and autonomy appear closely connected, freedom appears more closely 
connected with not being constrained by internal and external conditions. Kantian autonomy, 
on the other hand, relates to self-legislation and independence from heteronomous factors.
656
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However, this is only the negative definition of autonomy, as negative freedom.
657
  Kantian 
autonomy as positive freedom is the capacity to self-legislate.
658
  This suggests that Kant’s 
conception of freedom not only relates to an individual’s freedom from something but also 
freedom to act on maxims which accord with the CI.  As previously noted, a free will is a will 
under moral law because according to Kant the principle ‘to act on no other maxim than that 
which can also have as object itself as a universal law’.
659
 This, Kant asserts, is the formula of 
the CI and the principle of morality.
660
 It follows that Kantian autonomy is the capacity to act 
on rational principles and to exercise moral reasoning through freedom of choice.
661
 A free 
will and a will subject to moral law are one and the same, according to Kant.
662
  Sandel 
argues that ‘[a]cting freely, that is autonomously, and acting morally, according to the 
categorical imperative, are one and the same’.
663
   
In Protecting the Public, the Government stated that it intended to create a statutory provision 
in relation to consent that is ‘clear and unambiguous’.
664
 Critics of s 74 argue that broad 
notions of ‘choice’ and ‘freedom’ leave a ‘good many questions unanswered about the kinds 
of non-violent threats or other pressures that might invalidate an apparent consent’.
665
 While s 
74 provides juries with more guidance than the Olugboja direction, they will still have to 
assess a wide range of factors when the complainant’s freedom is uninhibited by non-violent 
factors such as threats to terminate her employment.
666
 The definition of consent does not 
provide any guidance to juries in relation to a complainant who submits in order to advance 
her career or reputation.
667
 Similarly, Rook and Ward state that the ‘concept of “free 
agreement” is capable of a wide interpretation and ultimately it would be for the juries to 
decide its boundaries’.
668
 The Judicial Studies Board has published Illustrations to assist 
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juries regarding the meaning of consent. However, these do little more than reiterate the 
definition in s 74:  
Consent has a particular legal meaning. A person consents only if she (he) agrees by 
choice, and she (he), at the relevant time, has the freedom and capacity to make that 
choice. To prove that the complainant did not consent, the prosecution must make 
you sure on all the evidence that the complainant did not give her consent by an 
exercise of free choice. Submission of her free choice to a demand expressed 
physically or in words is not the same as consent. On the other hand, an exercise of 
free choice can lead to reluctant agreement and that is not the same as submission. 
You will need to consider the evidence with care before you decide whether the 
prosecution has proved that the complainant did not consent to sexual 
intercourse.
669
          
This direction leaves it to the jury to decide the degree of coercion, abuse of position or 
authority which needs to be exercised upon a complainant’s mind.  Therefore, it remains a 
matter for the jury to decide whether an employee, who is suffering from financial hardships, 
and submits to sexual activity because her employer has threatened to terminate her 
employment did in fact freely agree.
670
  According to Rook and Ward, the availability of an 





 in return for intercourse would not vitiate consent because the complainant 
would still be freely agreeing to sexual relations.
673
   
According to Kantian autonomy, the availability of alternatives does not take away from the 
fact that an individual is relying on coercive conduct in order to procure sexual activity. A 
defendant who uses coercion or fraud to procure sexual activity is violating the complainant’s 
sexual autonomy because he is using her merely as a means and not as an end.  Moreover, his 
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coercive or fraudulent conduct would be considered impermissible because his maxim cannot 
be universalised without contradiction.
674
  It has been suggested that consent can be vitiated 
by duress or coercion.
675
 Therefore, unlike the Kantian notion of freedom, the complainant’s 
inclinations will not undermine her autonomy. Despite these criticisms, free agreement by 
choice emphasises the focus upon the complainant’s autonomy and adopts a Kantian model 
regarding the fact that the complainant’s freedom must be unhindered by external influences.  
 
Evidential presumptions as to consent  
The SOA 2003 creates rebuttable evidential presumptions (s 75) and conclusive presumptions 
as to the complainant’s lack of consent (s 76). The use or threat of violence is covered by the 
evidential presumption of absence of consent in s 75.
676
 The SOR thought that in addition to 
defining what consent was, it should also determine how it should be applied. It decided that 
the arguments for defining and explaining consent in statute were overwhelming. The SOR 
thought that the approach adopted in a number of Australian states and the US Model Code 
setting out a list of examples of circumstances where consent was not present was helpful to 
all concerned.  The list would be a set of examples; it would not be complete, nor would it 
cover each and every circumstance where consent is not present.
677
                    
The SOR’s suggested list was in fact significantly wider than the circumstances enacted in s 
75(2), and included the case where a complainant ‘submits or is unable to resist because of 
threats or fear of serious harm or serious detriment of any type to themselves or another 
person’.
678
 The SOR stated that that this would cover situations such as losing a job, and it 
would be for the court to consider in each case the nature of threat and whether the 
complainant would think that she would suffer serious harm.
679
 Therefore, this wording 
would have allowed the courts to determine whether the defendant’s actions impacted on the 
complainant’s decision-making process and whether his actions influenced her decision to 
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freely agree to sexual activity. The SOR’s wording had the potential to incorporate Kant’s CI 
in relation to the protection of sexual autonomy. A defendant who threatens an employee 
with dismissal unless she submits to his sexual demands is clearly using her merely as a 
means and not as an end; his actions affect her capacity to self-legislate.  Moreover, his 
maxim cannot be universalised because coercion and fraud are impermissible and would give 
rise to a contradiction.  O’Neill argues that the maxim of coercion is not capable of 
universalisation because it would contradict itself: 
The maxim of coercing another has as its universalized counterpart the maxim that 
all coerce others; but if all coerce others, including those who are coercing them, 
then each parties both complies with others’ wills (being coerced) and 
simultaneously does not comply with others but rather (as coercer) exacts their 
compliance. A maxim of coercion cannot coherently be universalized and reveals 
moral unworthiness.
680
   
The SOR drew a distinction between threats and inducements, stating that promising rewards 
for sex did not prevent free agreement being given and was unlikely to be a coercive 
situation.
681
 While such a situation may not amount to coercion under Kantian autonomy, the 
complainant can be said to lack autonomy because she is acting on inclinations and is using 
both herself and the defendant merely as a means and not as an end.  She is acting 
heteronomously rather than autonomously.    
An example of a Hypothetical Imperative (HI) would be ‘whenever someone needs a 
promotion at work, she can offer herself in exchange for this benefit’. If she attempted to 
universalise this maxim and at the same time act on it, she may discover a contradiction; if 
every individual exchanged sexual activity in return for a promotion, such a maxim would 
undermine the value of competitiveness in the work place and employees would no longer 
feel they were being considered on their qualifications and experience. Her actions would fail 
the Formula of Universal Law (FUL) test because the action she is about to undertake 
(exchanging sexual activity in return for a benefit) places her interests and circumstances 
                                                 
680
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ahead of everyone else’s. She is not only failing to respect her humanity but also the 
humanity of the defendant because she is using him only as a means and not at the same time 
as an end. In addition, the defendant who promises rewards for sex would be undermining the 
complainant’s humanity and using her simply as a means and not as an end.  He is acting 
contrary to the FH and, therefore, violating the CI. Since neither the complainant nor the 
defendant are acting freely, they can be said to be acting heteronomously and in accordance 
with the HI. It is only when an individual acts according to the CI that they can be said to be 
acting freely. Both individuals’ actions are dictated by external influences and inclinations. 
However, they can escape the dictates of nature and circumstances by acting 
autonomously.
682
  Kantian autonomy can be achieved by legislating law for themselves, 
unconditioned by their particular wants and desires.   
The Government decided against a provision which contained a non-exhaustive list,
683
 and 
instead opted for a list which is exhaustive, in the sense that circumstances outside those that 
fall within s 75(2)(a)-(f) will fail to raise the presumption. The Government’s decision has 
been criticised on the grounds that it does not allow for further situations to be added through 
the common law.
684
 A further criticism concerns the brevity of the list, which might be 
thought to undermine the statutory definition of consent, especially with regards to the 
omission of non-violent threats.
685
 Incorporating a non-exhaustive list of circumstances 
would have allowed for the possibility to incorporate situations in which a complainant’s 
autonomy, within the Kantian model, was violated, such as where economic threats are made.   
 
Conclusive presumptions as to consent under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 
Unlike s 75, which a defendant may challenge if there is sufficient evidence, s 76 creates 
conclusive presumptions. Thus, if any one of the circumstances specified in s 76(2) exist, it is 
to be presumed conclusively that the complainant did not consent. The circumstances giving 
rise to a conclusive presumption are: 
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[T]he defendant intentionally deceived the complainant as to the nature or purpose 
of the relevant act;  
[T]he defendant intentionally induced the complainant to consent to the relevant act 
by impersonating a person known personally to the complainant. 
Section 76, like s 75, applies only to the offences contained in ss 1-4. Both limbs of s 76(2) 
go further than the common law. Other forms of deception are not addressed, and this may 
prove problematic. The extent to which s 76(2) protects sexual autonomy within a Kantian 
framework will be examined below.     
 
Deception as to the nature or purpose of the act 
Nature of the act 
Section 76(2)(a) follows the common law established in the case of R v Williams,
686
 the 
complainant in Williams was persuaded to consent because she thought it was a surgical 
operation and not sexual intercourse.  The Court of Appeal held that:  
Where [a complainant] is persuaded that what is being done to her is not the 
ordinary act of sexual intercourse but is some medical or surgical operation in order 
to give her relief from some disability from which she is suffering, then that is rape 
although the actual thing that was done was done with her consent, because she 
never consented to the act of sexual intercourse.
687
    
The complainant was deceived as to the very nature of the act, believing it was surgery rather 
than sexual intercourse. ‘Nature’ of the act refers to the physical mechanics of what the 
defendant did to the complainant.
688
 This is consistent with Kant’s notion of autonomy 
because her autonomy will be vitiated where the defendant’s deception as to the nature of the 
act deprives her of the capacity to self-legislate. Her decision to engage in sexual activity is 
influenced by the defendant’s deception. The defendant’s deception undermines both her 
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 Kantian autonomy as positive freedom relates to an individual’s 
capacity for self-legislation.
691
 Moreover, the defendant’s actions are clearly designed to use 




In Williams, the complainant had not consented to the defendant’s true intention, namely to 
have sexual intercourse with her. However, a fraudulent misrepresentation that the defendant 
is free from HIV or other sexually transmitted diseases does not nullify consent, because 
there is no deception as to the nature of the act. Herring criticises the law of sexual offences 
by contending that:  
For A to engage in sexual activities with B knowing that B would not be consenting 






 established that failing to disclose one’s HIV positive status is irrelevant to the issue 
of consent under s 74.  Latham LJ stated that: 
[A]s a matter of law, the fact that the defendant may not have disclosed his HIV 
status is not a matter which could in any way be relevant to the issue of consent 
under Section 74 in relation to the sexual activity in this case.
695
 
The Court of Appeal’s decision is consistent with Rook and Ward’s conclusion; a fraudulent 
misrepresentation that a defendant has been found not to be free from HIV or any other 
sexually transmitted diseases will not negative consent. The authors argue that in such cases 
there is no deception as to the nature of the act.
696
 Rook and Ward’s conclusion is not 
consistent with a Kantian framework in relation to the protection of sexual autonomy in cases 
where the issue of the defendant’s HIV status is relevant to the complainant’s consent.  
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Focusing on the nature of the act detracts from the fact that the defendant has deliberately 
deceived the complainant in order to procure sexual activity. This approach is not consistent 
with Kantian autonomy.  Abolition of ‘nature and purpose of the act’ as a sub-category, may 
result in the current law of sexual offences becoming more consistent with Kantian 
autonomy.  The focus will be on whether the defendant’s actions negatively affected the 
complainant’s decision-making process.    
It is submitted that in cases where the defendant is aware that, but for his deception as to his 
HIV status, the complainant would not have agreed to sexual activity, the defendant is clearly 
using the complainant merely as a means and not at the same time as an end. However, it is 
not the complainant as a human being which the defendant must respect rather her humanity, 
which he must treat as an end in itself and these include ‘capacities to engage in self-directed 




In R v Dica,
698
 the defendant, knowing that he was HIV positive, engaged in consensual 
unprotected sexual intercourse with two complainants, which resulted in them becoming 
infected with HIV.  He was convicted of inflicting grievous bodily harm, contrary to s 20 of 
the Offences Against the Person Act 1861.  The defendant appealed and a retrial was ordered.  
In relation to the issue of consent regarding sexual intercourse, the Court of Appeal held that: 
The only frauds that would vitiate consent are as to the identity of the perpetrator or 
the nature of the act. The fact of a person's HIV or other sexually transmitted 
disease status cannot vitiate consent. Consent to sexual intercourse includes consent 




Under a Kantian notion of autonomy, the concealment of a sexually transmitted disease may 
give rise to a violation of sexual autonomy because a person would be treating another simply 
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as a means and not at the same time as an end.  Consequently, a Kantian interpretation of s 76 
is capable of extending the meaning of ‘nature’ to cover situations where a defendant 
conceals his status in relation to sexually transmitted diseases.  An alternative method of 
protecting sexual autonomy is such cases, under the SOA 2003, would be for the jury to 
examine whether such a factor was relevant when considering the issue of consent under s 74.      
In relation to whether the current law provides adequate protection in cases involving 
deception, Herring argues that ‘agreement obtained by deception is woefully insufficient. 
Informed and free consent, at least, is required’.
700
 This view seems to be consistent with the 
decision in Konzani, where the Court of Appeal recognised the principle of personal 
autonomy.  According to Judge LCJ, concealment of HIV status by an individual:  
[A]lmost inevitably means that she is deceived. Her consent is not properly 
informed, and she cannot give an informed consent to something of which she is 
ignorant. Equally, her personal autonomy is not normally protected by allowing a 
defendant who knows that he is suffering from the HIV virus which he deliberately 
conceals, to assert an honest belief in his partner's informed consent to the risk of 
the transmission of the HIV virus.
701
 
Applying this reasoning to sexual autonomy, a defendant who deceives a complainant 
regarding his HIV status in order to procure sexual intercourse should be liable for 
committing a sexual offence.   
The Court of Appeal in Konzani also stated that: 
If an individual who knows that he is suffering from the HIV virus conceals this 
stark fact from his sexual partner, the principle of her personal autonomy is not 
enhanced if he is exculpated when he recklessly transmits the HIV virus to her 
through consensual sexual intercourse. On any view, the concealment of this fact 
from her almost inevitably means that she is deceived. Her consent is not properly 
informed, and she cannot give an informed consent to something of which she is 
ignorant. Equally, her personal autonomy is not normally protected by allowing a 
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defendant who knows that he is suffering from the HIV virus which he deliberately 
conceals, to assert an honest belief in his partner's informed consent to the risk of 
the transmission of the HIV virus. Silence in these circumstances is incongruous 
with honesty, or with a genuine belief that there is an informed consent.
702
     
The above judgment suggests that the current law of sexual offences is capable of protecting 
sexual autonomy within a Kantian framework.  
Leigh argues that:   
It is difficult to see how a person can be said to agree by choice when a matter 
relevant to choice (as will certainly be the case where the victim has raised the issue 
of HIV status with the actor) is misrepresented to her.
703
      
Leigh’s argument is further authority that deception by a defendant in relation to his HIV 
status negatives consent. Unfortunately, the courts have been reluctant to extend the remit of 
s 74 to cover cases where the defendant obtains consent by deception.   
In R v B, the Court of Appeal held that: 
Where one party to sexual activity has a sexually transmissible disease which is not 
disclosed to the other party any consent that may have been given to that activity by 
the other party is not thereby vitiated. The act remains a consensual act.
704
  
The Court further stated that evidence of the defendant’s sexual diseases was inadmissible 
when considering s 74.  This decision fails to protect sexual autonomy within a Kantian 
framework, similar to Dica.  R v B is clearly not consistent with Kantian autonomy because it 
fails to recognise that the defendant’s deception  falls outside the scope of the CI. A different 
view was suggested in the minority judgment of McLachlin J (Gonthier J concurring) in the 
Canadian case of R v Cuerrier.
705
 Although McLachlin J’s judgment is in relation to the 
offence of sexual assault, it can be applied to the protection of sexual autonomy in cases 
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involving sexually transmitted diseases.  McLachlin J advocates a return to pre-Clarence
706
 
decisions which recognised that a deception involving a sexually transmitted disease vitiated 
consent in relation to the assault group of offences.
707
 According to Leigh, deception as to the 
HIV status of the defendant ‘goes to the nature of the sexual act, changing it from an act that 
has certain natural consequences (whether pleasure, pain or pregnancy), to a potential 
sentence of disease or death’.
708
   
Leigh contends that it is possible for an English court to adopt similar reasoning and to 
conclude that a person cannot agree by choice to sexual intercourse where she has been 
misled or is unaware of the fact that her partner suffers from a sexually transmitted disease.  
His reasoning is not based on the fact that such sexual activity amounts to an assault, but 
rather on the consideration that the deception goes to the very nature of the sexual activity.
709
  
Leigh’s recommendation follows the reasoning provided by McLachlin J in Currier. This 
approach would allow the current law to protect sexual autonomy more effectively. This 
recommendation is also consistent with Kantian autonomy because it protects individuals 
from deception. 
Herring contends that the SOA 2003 abolished s3 of the SOA 1956 without replacing it.
710
        
The Criminal Law Revision Committee (CLRC) recommended that sections 2 and 3 of the 
SOA 1956 should continue in their present terms.
711
  This recommendation may have ensured 
that acts which do not fall under the definition of rape could fall under one of the lesser 
offences.  Implementing the CLRC’s recommendations would have incorporated a Kantian 
model within the SOA 2003 in relation to the protection of sexual autonomy in cases 
involving deception.   
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In the recent case of Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority,
712
 which concerned the 
extradition of Julian Assange to Sweden. It was alleged that he consummated unprotected 
sexual intercourse without the complainant’s knowledge , when it was her express wish that a 
condom be used. It was held that this amounted to rape under s 74 because his deception had 
undermined the complainant’s agreement.
713
  The court stated that his deception was not 
contrary to s 76 because it was not a deception as to the nature or quality of the act.
714
  This 
decision protects sexual autonomy only under s 74.  A Kantian interpretation, on the other 
hand, would protect sexual autonomy under both sections 74 and 76 because it examines 
whether the defendant had used the complainant simply as a means and not at the same time 
as an end.     
     
Purpose of the act 
The presumption would apply in cases such as R v Green,
715
 where a doctor had carried out 
bogus medical examinations. The men understood the nature of the acts they were performing 
but they were deceived as to the purpose of doing so. The complainants were deceived into 
believing that the act of masturbation was for medical reasons.  The Court of Appeal held that 
there was clearly a deception as to the ‘purpose’ of the physical act.   This decision is 
consistent with Kantian autonomy. The case of R v Piper,
716
 provides another illustration in 
which the Court’s decision appears to be consistent with Kantian autonomy. In Piper, the 
Court held that the defendant’s touching amounted to a sexual assault given that he had 
invited the complainant on the basis that he was running a modelling agency. The true 
purpose of the touching was for sexual gratification.     
Since s 76 appears to be consistent with Kantian autonomy, the next issue which requires 
addressing is whether this provision is capable of protecting sexual autonomy within a 
Kantian framework in cases such as R v Linekar.
717
  In R v Linekar, which was discussed in 
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chapter three, the defendant deceived the complainant into believing that he would pay a 
prostitute for her services when in fact he had no intention of paying the complainant. The 
Court of Appeal quashed his conviction on the grounds that his deception was not in relation 
to the nature of the act but only to the payment. It is argued that s 76(2)(a) is capable of 
protecting sexual autonomy within a Kantian framework because failure to pay alters the 
‘purpose’ of the act. The defendant’s actions in Linekar amounted to a violation of the 
complainant’s sexual autonomy.  The defendant’s deception resulted in a breach of the FUL 
because he has treated the complainant merely as a means. The complainant who is deceived 
cannot possibly agree with the defendant’s way of behaving towards her, and so cannot 
herself share the end of the action.
718
  The complainant in Linekar was used merely as a 
means to satisfy the defendant’s sexual pleasure.  Mappes suggests that the morally 
significant sense of using another person is best understood by reference to the notion of 
‘voluntarily informed consent’.
719
  He states that:  
A immorally uses B if and only if A intentionally acts in a way that violates the 
requirement that B’s involvement with A’s ends be based on B’s voluntary 
informed consent.
720
        
The deception of the defendant in Linekar not only violates the complainant’s sexual 
autonomy but also undermines the informed character of voluntary consent. Similarly, a 
deception on the defendant’s part that he and the complainant are married
721
 will not vitiate 
consent under the SOA 2003. While it cannot be said that such a deception involves the 
nature or purpose of the act, it does, however, fail to protect sexual autonomy within a 
Kantian model.  The Formula of the Law of Nature (FLN) instructs individuals to ‘act as if 
the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature’.
722
 In 
order to determine whether a defendant’s proposed maxim, in the above scenario, could be 
willed to be a universal law of nature two questions must be answered. The first concerns 
whether it would be logically possible for a defendant to will the universalisation of his 
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maxim if every individual was also to do so. Secondly, even if it would be logically possible 
for the defendant to will the universalisation of his maxim, whether that is something he 
could rationally will without contradiction.
723
 Therefore, if every individual were to resort to 
deception to procure sexual intercourse, the very practice of telling the truth would collapse 
because individuals would disbelieve truthful statements.     
While the SOA 2003 appears to be consistent with Kantian autonomy, the courts have shown 
a reluctance to over extend the scope of s 76. In R v Jheeta,
724
 the complainant had been 
deceived as to the nature or purpose of the act. The defendant deceived her into having 
intercourse with him to avoid being fined by the police and also to avoid his committing 
suicide. The Court of Appeal held s 76 had no application as to the nature or purpose of the 
act.  According to the Court of Appeal: 
[T]he ambit of section 76 is limited to the “act” to which it is said to apply. In rape 
cases the “act” is vaginal, anal or oral intercourse. Provided this consideration is 
constantly borne in mind, it will be seen that section 76(2)(a) is relevant only to the 
comparatively rare cases where the defendant deliberately deceives the complainant 
about the nature or purpose of one or other form of intercourse. No conclusive 
presumptions arise merely because the complainant was deceived in some way or 
other by disingenuous blandishments of or common or garden lies by the defendant. 
These may well be deceptive and persuasive, but they will rarely go to the nature or 
purpose of intercourse. Beyond this limited type of case, and assuming that, as here, 




Kantian autonomy regards all deceptions as being inconsistent with the CI. Therefore, the 
Court’s application of s 76 is not consistent with Kantian autonomy. The defendant was, 
however, convicted of rape because, by his own admission, on some occasions that 
intercourse had taken place the complainant was not truly consenting.  
                                                 
723
 Ibid, 87. 
724
 [2007] EWCA Crim 1699.   
725
 Ibid, para 24. 
Page 136  
 
 
The advantage of following a Kantian framework is that inconsistencies may be avoided. In R 
v Devonald,
726
 the defendant sought to humiliate his daughter’s ex-boyfriend. Using a fake 
email account, the defendant pretended to be a young woman and persuaded the complainant 
to masturbate in front of a webcam. The trial judge ruled that s 76(2) (a) applied. The Court 
of Appeal dismissed an application for leave to appeal, holding that it was open for the jury to 
conclude that the complainant had been deceived as to the purpose of the act. The Court 
stated that: 
[I]t is difficult to see how the jury could have concluded otherwise that the 
complainant was deceived into believing that he was indulging in sexual acts with, 
and for the sexual gratification of, a 20-year-old girl with whom he was having an 
on line relationship.
727
    
The defendant’s purpose in causing the complainant to engage in sexual activity was not to 
secure sexual gratification. His purpose was to cause the complainant to engage in a sexual 
act for the purpose of embarrassing him. Although this decision is out of step with Jheeta, it 
is consistent with Kantian autonomy. The defendant in Devonald was clearly using the 
complainant only as a means and not at the same time as an end.
728
   
 
Impersonating a person known personally to the complainant 
Section 76(2)(b) relates to inducement of the complainant to consent to sexual activity by 
impersonating  ‘a person known personally to the complainant’. It has been suggested that 
this provision embraces a wide spectrum of defendants, from those the complainant has never 
met but has heard of to those whom the complainant has met.
729
 However, for s 76(2)(b) to 
apply:  
[I]t is not necessary for the person impersonated to be someone who has previously 
engaged in sexual activity with the complainant. For example, a man could 
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impersonate his twin brother in order to engage in sexual activity with a woman 
whom he knows would be willing to engage in sexual activity with his brother.
730
 
Rook and Ward argue that as a bare minimum, the person impersonated should be someone 
the complainant has met.
731
 This provision is too narrow, within a Kantian framework, 
because it prevents the presumption arising when a defendant claims to be a celebrity whom 
the complainant has not met. In such scenarios s 76(2)(b) is not consistent with Kantian 
autonomy.     
The SOA 2003 also fails to protect the sexual autonomy of complainants who are deceived 
into agreeing to sexual activity as a result of fraud as to the defendant’s attributes or 
qualifications. By way of example, the defendant in R v Richardson
732
 had continued to 
practice as a dentist despite being suspended. Patients claimed that they would not have 
allowed her to treat them if they had known of her suspension. The prosecution argued that 
the complainants had been deceived into consenting to treatment by the defendant’s 
representation that she was a qualified and practicing dentist. The prosecution contended that 
the concept of identity should be extended to include the qualifications or attributes of the 
dentist, on the basis that the complainants had only consented to treatment by a qualified 
practitioner who was not suspended. The defendant pleaded guilty to assault after the trial 
judge ruled that her deception had vitiated the complainants’ consent. The judge rejected the 
defence submission that the complainants had consented to treatment despite their ignorance 
of her suspension. The Court of Appeal quashed the defendant’s conviction. The court did not 
accept the prosecution’s argument that the concept of identity of a person extended to cover 
the qualifications or attributes of the dentist on the grounds that:  
In all charges brought against the [defendant] the complainants were fully aware of 
the identity of the appellant. To accede to the submission would be to strain or 
distort the every day [sic] meaning of the word identity, the dictionary definition of 
which is “the condition of being the same”.
733
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The court quoted Professor John Smith, who stated that ‘[f]raud does not necessarily negative 
consent.  It does so only if it deceives P as to the identity of the person or the nature of the 
act’.
734
 It can therefore be surmised that s 76(2)(b) does not fully protect sexual autonomy 
within a Kantian model. If an impersonator lies or withholds information from the 
complainant, his actions amount to deception. In such cases, the complainant’s consent is 
obtained by the defendant’s deception because she is prevented from legislating laws for 
herself which are free from external influences. The defendant’s actions are not in accordance 
with the CI because he has acted on his inclinations, and his actions undermine the 
complainant’s sexual autonomy because his maxim cannot be willed as a universal law 
without giving rise to a contradiction. Moreover, the FH prohibits individuals from using 
rational beings simply as a means. The defendant’s actions undermine the rational will of the 
complainant. The complainant’s capacity to choose whether to engage in sexual intercourse is 
undermined by the defendant’s deception. Her autonomy is violated because she no longer 
becomes the legislator of laws valid for all rational beings, because her decision was 
influenced by the defendant’s deception. Her decision to agree to sexual activity lacks both 
independence in decision-making and the capacity to self-legislate.     
 
Limitations of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 
In R v Tabassum,
735
 the defendant, who was not medically qualified, persuaded several 
complainants to measure their breasts by representing that he was conducting a survey for 
medical purposes.  His convictions for indecent assault were upheld, notwithstanding that the 
complainants were fully aware of the nature of the acts.  Following Tabassum, a person’s 
sexual autonomy is protected in cases where she was mistaken as to the quality of the act, 
despite the fact that she was aware of the nature of the act.
736
  The concept of ‘quality’ has 
not been incorporated into the SOA 2003.  However, the inclusion of ‘purpose’ in s 76(2)(a) 
may allow for an extension of the law.  Moreover, evidence of a defendant’s deception as to 
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the quality of the act should be made available to the jury when considering whether consent 
was present under s 74.
737
     
The current law of sexual offences does not contain provisions for the protection of sexual 
autonomy in relation to mistakes induced by the defendant such as mistakes concerning his 
marital status or wealth.  Thus, peripheral issues which do not relate to the nature or purpose 
of the act will not vitiate consent under the present law.  The law is also silent in relation to 
abuse of power, authority or position of trust.  An employee might submit to sexual activities 
because she fears that she will be dismissed if she does not comply.  Kantian autonomy 
would afford protection in such circumstances because it focuses on whether the defendant 
has respected the complainant’s humanity and whether he has treated her simply as a means.  
As stated in chapter one deceptions and coercive conduct violate Kantian autonomy because 
the defendant’s actions are not in accordance with the CI.   
Temkin and Ashworth state that s 74 of the SOA ‘positively sprouts uncertainties’,
738
 while 
Card et al acknowledge that the terms ‘freedom’, ‘choice’ and ‘agreement’ are ‘complex and 
ambiguous concepts, which defy precise definition’.
739
  Consequently, the previous problems 
of interpretation and clarity do not seem to have been resolved by s 74. The issue of clarity is 
linked to whether s 74 adequately protects sexual autonomy. Although s 74 is consistent with 
Kantian autonomy and, as an essential element of sexual offences, is now defined by statute, 
it suffers from the same criticisms as the Oluboja direction in relation to clarity and certainty.   
Kantian autonomy can be used to protect sexual autonomy in circumstances where a person 
procures sexual activities by using non-violent pressures, such as threatening an employee 
with dismissal if she does not submit to his sexual demands. The SOR recommended that a 
person should be deemed not to consent: 
Where a person submits or is unable to resist because of threats of fear of serious 
harm or serious detriment of any type to themselves or another person.
740
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This would have covered situations where other threats were made such as losing a job. This 
recommendation, however, was not incorporated into the SOA 2003.  Sexual autonomy 
would have been protected within a Kantian framework if the above recommendation had 
been incorporated into the SOA 2003. Alternatively, a replacement of s 2 of the SOA 1956
741
 
would have achieved the same result. However, s 74 of the SOA 2003, is capable of 
protecting sexual autonomy within a Kantian framework, where the non-violent threat is 
aimed at using another simply as a means and the person making such threats is acting only 
on his inclinations. This Kantian approach might protect sexual autonomy in cases where, by 
way of example, a coercive offer is made where an employee is denied a rise unless she 
submits to sexual activities with the employer, regardless of whether she had earned a rise or 
not.  
Similarly, by adopting a Kantian approach, the SOA 2003 would be capable of protecting 
sexual autonomy in situations involving deceptions in peripheral circumstances that do not 
relate to the nature or purpose of the act. An alternative solution to over-extending the scope 
of s 76 would be to re-enact s 3 of the SOA 1956 and criminalise procuring sexual activity by 
false pretences. 
A further limitation of the SOA 2003 concerns its failure to protect sexual autonomy where a 
complainant provides apparent consent to sexual activity due to a mistake. Herring puts 
forward the argument that any such mistake can vitiate consent. Herring formulates a legal 
rule in the following form: 
If at the time of the sexual activity a person: 
is mistaken as to a fact; and  
had s/he known the truth about that fact would not have consented to it 
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Included in the word ‘fact’, in this test, would be the state of mind of the defendant.  
The mistake need not be to an issue which would be regarded as material to the 
reasonable person, if it was a pre-requisite to consent for the particular victim.
742
 
He also argues that it is immaterial whether the defendant had caused the complainant’s 
mistake.
743
 Herring’s reasoning is consistent with Kantian autonomy. A person is using 
another simply as a means if he engages in sexual activities knowing that his sexual partner 
would not be consenting if he revealed facts about himself.  Such use of another person 
amounts to ‘a fundamental lack of respect for B’s sexual autonomy’.
744
   
The main issue facing the application of Kantian autonomy in a practical context is the fact 
that Kant does not distinguish between genuine needs and mere wants. This lack of 
distinction results in individuals who act on needs or wants, obeying the HI rather than the 
CI.  This obstacle can be overcome by focusing on the fact that Kantian autonomy allows for 
inclinations to be part of a decision-maker’s process, provided he also adheres to the CI.  
According to Allison: 
[A]lthough self-interest cannot ground a categorical imperative, self-interested 
action is morally permissible, subject to the limiting condition that it does not 
conflict with universal interests.
745
             
Kantian autonomy is not violated if an agent has an inclination to perform an otherwise 
morally praiseworthy act. Kant states that an act will lack moral worth if the individual 
performing it only does so because of an inclination.
746
   
‘Choice’, ‘freedom’ and ‘capacity’ are concepts to be found in Kantian autonomy. Kantian 
Autonomy is the capacity to act on rational principles and to exercise moral reasoning 
through freedom of choice.
747
 Beyond freedom from physical pressure, the current law of 
sexual offences does not make clear the degree of freedom required to validate consent. 
                                                 
742




 Ibid.   
745
 Allison (n215), 105.   
746
 Kant, Critique of Practical Reason (n285), 122.   
747
 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (n4), 101. 
Page 142  
 
 
Kantian autonomy requires that individuals act according to the moral law in order to attain 
freedom from inclinations. By acting contrary to the moral law, a person can be said to be 
acting according to a HI. A person’s heteronomous actions in relation to using another for 
sexual gratification may amount to a violation of sexual autonomy within a Kantian 
framework because he is using another simply as a means and not at the same time as an end.   
 
Conclusion  
The central aim of this chapter is to determine whether the current law of sexual offences is 
consistent with Kantian autonomy. Starting with the concept of consent, as defined by s 74 of 
the SOA 2003, it is concluded that this definition is consistent with Kantian autonomy 
because it focuses on the individual’s freedom to choose whether or not to engage in sexual 
activity. This is in line with a Kantian framework that is based on the capacity to act on 
rational principles as well as being able to freely ‘exercise the moral reasoning will, through 
the freedom of choice’.
748
  The complex philosophical concepts used to define consent, such 
as ‘freedom’ and ‘choice’, have been left to the courts to interpret. Key terms such as 
‘freedom’ and ‘choice’ being left to the courts does not take away from the fact that a 
statutory definition of consent is more effective at protecting sexual autonomy than the 
previous definition provided in Olugboja because it provides an opportunity for the courts to 
interpret s 74 in cases not covered under ss 75 and 76.     
It has been shown that adopting a Kantian model in relation to the interpretation of the 
provisions relating to consent with the SOA will allow for the current law to become 
consistent with Kantian autonomy.  Adopting a Kantian interpretation would protect sexual 
autonomy in cases where a defendant has withheld information regarding the fact that he 
suffers from a sexually transmitted disease or deceiving the complainant in relation to his 
marital status.   
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Chapter Five: Practical Limitations to Kantian autonomy 
Introduction  
This chapter will examine the barriers to Kantian autonomy in relation to protecting a 
person’s sexual autonomy in a practical context. This analysis will demonstrate that Kantian 
autonomy is capable of being applied in a practical context in relation to the protection of 
sexual autonomy. Since autonomy of the will is the property that the will has of being a law 
to itself, the will is a kind of causality belonging to individuals in so far as they are rational. 
While freedom is the property of such causality that it be independent of foreign causes 




Kantian autonomy refers to self-determination rather than freedom from the governance of 
others. Kant’s theory of autonomy suggests that inclinations can form part of an individual’s 
decision-making process in relation to sexual activity with others provided such inclinations 
were not the only factors affecting her decision. If her decision was purely based on 
inclinations, then she can be said to be acting heteronomously rather than as a sexually 
autonomous person. Young states that ‘individual autonomy...has been construed by 
philosophers as a character ideal or virtue.  Such a construction is clearly associated with the 
Kantian tradition’.
750
 Kantian autonomy links reason with autonomy as the most valuable 
means by which an individual can control her actions.
751
 Thus, an autonomous individual is 
one who is able to make choices based on critical reflection, as opposed to being merely a 
chooser. It has been stated that to be autonomous within a Kantian model is emphatically not 
to be able to do whatever an individual desires, but to have the capacity for rational self-
governance.
752
 However, this does not mean that such an individual should be continuously 
engaged in a process of criticism and self-evaluation. Therefore, it does not appear that the 
individual’s choice be rational, only that the person in question be prepared to revise false 
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beliefs or poor choices when further evidence arises which implies that such beliefs are false 
or the choices poor’.
753
  Benn continues by stating that:  
[T]he principles by which the autonomous man governs his life make his decisions 
consistent and intelligible to him as his own; for they constitute the personality he 
recognizes as the one he has made his own. His actions, in instantiating his 
principles, thus express his own moral nature.
754
                    
A heteronomous person, on the other hand, is one whose nomoi
755
 that govern him affect his 
decision as alien restraining causes.
756
 According to Feinberg, constraints can be external 
positive constraints, external negative constraints, internal positive constraints and internal 
negative ones.
757
 External positive constraints encompass physical barriers and coercive 
threats. External negative constraints on the other hand consist of inadequate resources.  
Headaches, obsessive habits and neuroses are classed as internal positive constraints, whilst 
lack of skill or ability and similar failings fall under the category of internal negative 
constraints.
 758
 Feinberg’s classification of the various constraints will be used because it 
provides a useful framework for determining to what extent Kantian autonomy can be applied 
in a practical context.  His classification also provides a useful framework for considering the 
various methods in which barriers to an individual’s sexual autonomy may arise. An 
understanding of these constraints will assist in determining the elements which undermine 
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External obstacles   
An unambiguous example of an external obstacle is the threat of immediate violence. Thus, 
the coercive behaviour of a pimp or a violent spouse can undermine a person’s capacity to 
decide on whether to agree to sexual activity. A pimp or a violent spouse who uses violent 
coercion to obtain sexual intercourse is clearly not furthering the ends of other rational 
agents. This will result in a violation of the complainant’s sexual autonomy. However, 
matters can get complicated where the complainant decides to forsake her aspirations. In such 
cases it may be assumed that the person has been manipulated into a servile role.
759
   
Procuring sexual intercourse by coercion or fraud fails to respect the dignity of the 
complainant because it would fail as a universal law of nature.
760
 It cannot be willed that 
every individual can employ coercive methods in order to procure sexual intercourse. It 
would not be possible to will such a law unless every defendant was also willing to be 
coerced. The acts of coercion and manipulation require using an individual as a means to 
satisfy the defendant’s sexual inclinations. The defendant in such situations does not treat the 
complainant as an end and he fails to respect her humanity as an end in itself. It is argued that 
in order to demonstrate the application of Kantian autonomy to practical situations involving 
coercion, it is important to distinguish between coercive conduct and circumstances where 
the complainant is under the powerful influence of another. 
According to Schulhofer, ‘threats represent a clear cut interference with autonomy. They are 
inherently coercive and illegitimate. Offers may have severe coercive effects, or they may be 
considered illegitimate for other reasons’.
761
  Similarly, Wertheimer states that: 
Perhaps the key to coercion is not in the choice situation itself, but in its genesis, the 
sorts of proposals that create B’s choice conditions. The dominant philosophical 
view about coercion is to be found along those lines. That view maintains that 
threats coerce whereas offers do not.
762
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However, it remains the case that the distinction between submission and legitimate 
acquiescence amounting to consent in English law is unclear.
763
  Prior to the Sexual Offences 
Act (SOA 2003), the clearest statement of the law in this area was found in the judgment 
provided by the Court of Appeal in R v Olugboja,
764
 which held that the jury should be 
directed that consent is to be given its ordinary meaning, and that there is a difference 
between consent and submission.
765
 
The Court went on to state that ‘the dividing line in such circumstances between real consent 
on the one hand and mere submission on the other may not be easy to draw’. The jury should 
also ‘be directed to concentrate on the state of mind of the victim immediately before the act 
of sexual intercourse’.
766
 As discussed in chapter four, the SOA 2003 defines consent as 
agreeing by choice and having the freedom and capacity to make that choice.
767
 The SOA 
2003 also provides that there will be a presumption that consent was absent where violence is 
used or threatened towards the victim or another person.
768
 Although under the SOA 2003 
many non-immediate threats would vitiate consent,
769
 there appears to be little scope for the 
law in England to protect the sexual autonomy of complainants from coercive behaviour 
which falls below the high threshold under the SOA 2003. Given that sexual autonomy 
‘embraces the mental, intellectual and physical aspects of being’,
770
 it is disappointing that 
the existing law dealing with sexual offences allows for a defendant to employ coercive 
pressure to compel a complainant to engage in sexual activity. The current law does little to 
protect sexual autonomy within a Kantian framework in cases involving sexual abuse by a 
defendant in a position of power.
771
 In cases involving an adult complainant with mental 
capacity her sexual autonomy may only be protected under s 74 of the SOA 2003. However, 
as stated in chapter four, s 74 does not adequately protect sexual autonomy within a Kantian 
framework.   
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In order to determine whether A’s conduct vitiates B’s consent under s 74 it is helpful to 
examine the distinction between threats and offers.  Wertheimer writes:  
The crux of the distinction between threats and offers is quite simple: A threatens B 
by proposing to make B worse off relative to some baseline; A makes an offer to B 
by proposing to make B better off relative to some baseline. More precisely, A 
makes a threat when, if B does not accept A’s proposal, B will be worse off than in 
the relevant baseline position.  A makes an offer when, if B does not accept A’s 
proposal, he will be no worse off than in the relevant baseline position.
772
   
Therefore, offers enhance the freedom of the complainant by increasing the choices available 
to her, whereas coercive proposals limit her choices. The question of where to draw the line 
regarding the permissibility of threats has also been discussed in detail by Schulhofer who 
reaches a similar conclusion to Wertheimer. Both agree that conduct which forces the 
complainant to choose between her autonomy and a legally protected right should be 
considered to vitiate consent.
773
  According to Schulhofer: 
When one person holds power over another, the offer to provide a benefit may mask 
an intent to inflict harm if the offer is refused. When this concern is present, the 
illegitimate offer closely approximates a threat in the classic sense.
774
 
The current law of sexual offences should criminalise offers which conceal an intention to 
treat the complainant simply as a means. In such cases the Kantian model is a better tool for 
the protection of sexual autonomy than the existing law, because it focuses on whether the 
complainant’s offer is aimed at treating the complainant’s humanity simply as a means. If she 
is treated simply as a means and not as an end and his actions are based on satisfying his 
sexual urges, then it cannot be said that her humanity is being respected. The defendant 
would be acting contrary to the Formula of Humanity (FH) because he is not promoting her 
end; instead he is violating her sexual autonomy by undermining her capacity to decide on 
whether to agree to sexual activity. 
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Examples such as the ‘aspiring actress’,
775
  which involve non-corrupt offers because they are 
not intended to inflict harm, can be classed as ‘a trade of sexual services for benefits’.
776
  This 
can be distinguished from cases involving ‘dispositional coercion’.
777
  In dispositional 
coercion the emphasis is not on physical force but on the threat of harm. Harm in this context 
is not limited to physical harm, it can extend to coercion involving threatening to damage the 
complainant’s reputation unless she engages in sexual activity.
778
     
In order to analyse the barriers to Kantian autonomy, an example provided by Wertheimer  
will be examined in the context of Kantian autonomy: 
A, a professor, says “Have sexual relations with me and I will give you a grade two 
grades higher than you deserve. Otherwise you’ll get just what you deserve”.
779
 
In the above example, A is using B simply as a means and not as an end and therefore he can 
be said to be violating her sexual autonomy within a Kantian framework. However, in a 
practical context he is not attempting to coerce consent. Instead, he is making an offer by 
attempting to gain compliance to sexual activity. Such a defendant is said to be inducing 
consent rather than coercing.
780
 While it may appear that in such cases sexual autonomy 
within a Kantian framework is violated, cases involving the exchange of sexual activity in 
exchange for a benefit can adhere to Kantian autonomy provided the complainant’s humanity 
is respected. However, the above scenario might conceal an attempt by A to sexually use B 
on the grounds that B might feel threatened by A’s offer. In the Higher Grade scenario there 
is a risk that if she spurns him he will lower her grade or make it harder for her to succeed 
academically.   
It is argued that such a person is not above abusing his institutional authority to achieve his 
ends on the grounds that he is willing to assign a grade higher than the student deserves.
781
  In 
such a case, the person in a position of authority has violated the student’s sexual autonomy 
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within a Kantian framework. This is because he is using her only as a means to satisfy his 
sexual desires. Two further hypothetical scenarios will be examined in order to critically 
examine the barriers to Kantian autonomy in a practical context: 
The Aspiring Model: C is a highly successful and wealthy model but has ambitions 
of becoming a famous actress. A is a film producer who is taken with B’s beauty. 
He invited her for a screen test and informs her that he is prepared to make her a 
star on the condition that she agrees to sexual involvement with him. B finds A 
unattractive and with great reluctance she agrees to his proposal.  
The Aspiring Actress:
782
 D is a poverty stricken actress whose only ambition is to 
become a famous actress. A is a film producer who is taken with D’s beauty. He 
invited her for a screen test and informs her that he is prepared to make her a star on 
the condition that she agrees to sexual involvement with him. B finds A unattractive 
and with great reluctance she agrees to his proposal.                  
In relation to C, the producer has made her an offer which she has accepted albeit reluctantly. 
However, there is an argument that his offer, which confronts D with an overwhelming 
inducement, is in fact a ‘coercive offer’.
783
  Held is a proponent of this view.  In considering 
the distinction between rape and seduction she argues that: 
In one case constraint and threat are operative, in the other inducement and offer.  If 
the degree of inducement is set high enough in the case of seduction, there may be 
little difference in the extent of coercion involved.  In both cases, persons may act 
against their own will.
784
 
Held’s analysis is consistent with Kantian autonomy in relation to seduction on the grounds 
that the complainant is acting heteronomously with regards to the inducement. Kantian 
autonomy does not make a distinction between genuine needs and mere wants.
785
 In a 
practical context there is a difference between an actress who genuinely needs to become a 
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successful actress in order to feed her children and pay her rent and a wealthy model who 
merely wants to become a successful actress. The producer who makes an offer to an actress 
facing financial difficulties is clearly attempting to sexually use her. He is violating her 
autonomy within a Kantian framework.  Both the model and the actress reluctantly consented 
to sexual activity. However, the model had a choice which was not available to the aspiring 
actress.
786
 From a Kantian viewpoint both the model and the actress are acting 
heteronomously. As stated in chapter two, Kantian autonomy involves independence in 
decision-making, which requires independence from heteronomous factors.
787
 Kant’s 
Categorical Imperative (CI) assumes individuals to be self-directing in the sense that they 
possess the capacity to step back from their natural desires, reflect on them, consider whether 
and how they should satisfy them and be moved by them only on the basis of such 
reflection.
788
 According to Kant, ‘for the natural use that one sex makes of the other’s sexual 
organs is enjoyment, for which one gives oneself up to the other’.
789
 The women in the 
scenarios relating to the aspiring model and actress are not autonomous in the moral sense 
because not guided only by their own conception of happiness rather than by a universalized 
concern for the ends of all rational individuals.
790
     
The difficulty in protecting Kantian autonomy in a practical context is that individuals would 
be criminalised on the grounds of making an offer to an individual who agreed to sexual 
activity because she was acting heteronomously. While it can be argued that the producer 
who offers to make the aspiring actress a star is taking advantage of her pre-existing factors, 
such as poverty, and that she is coerced into accepting his offer due to her financial condition, 
his actions are not coercive. The aspiring actress will not be worse off if she refuses his offer.   
In relation to the Formula of Autonomy (FA), Soble contends that: 
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A person providing free and informed consent to an action or to interactions with 
another person is, in general for Kant, a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
satisfying the Second Formulation.
791
 
In addition, Kantian autonomy requires that treating someone as a person involves taking on 
the other’s ends as if they were his own ends.
792
 As stated previously, Kant contends that:  
[T]he man who has in mind to make a false promise to others will see at once that 
he is intending to make use of another man merely as a means to an end he does not 
share. For the man whom I seek to use for my own purposes by such a promise 
cannot himself agree with my way of behaving to him, and so cannot himself share 
the end of the action.
793
   
Thus, in order to adhere to the CI within a sexual context an individual must take on the end 
of others for their own sake, not because that is an effective method of advancing his own 
goals in using others. It is important to note that the FA emphasises that individuals must also 
treat humanity ‘never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end’. According 
to Soble, ‘this weaker variation of how to satisfy the Second Formulation may be important 
in Kant’s account of the morality of work-for-hire and of sexual relations’.
794
     
There is a real danger that the benefits of protecting sexual autonomy within a Kantian 
framework are lost if it is accepted that sexual activity is only permissible within the confines 
of marriage. Kant suggests that it is permissible in some contexts to use another person as a 
means or treat the other as an object, merely with the other’s free and informed consent, 
provided an individual respects the humanity of the other.
795
 This is especially relevant in 
scenarios involving an imbalance of power such as the doctor-patient relationship.   
A complainant who engages in sexual activity in exchange for a benefit is consenting under 
the SOA 2003.  However, according to Kant:    
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[T]o allow one’s person for profit to be used by another for the satisfaction of 
sexual desire, to make of oneself an Object of demand, is to dispose over oneself as 
over a thing and to make of oneself a thing on which another satisfies his appetite, 
just as he satisfies his hunger upon a steak. But since the inclination is directed 
towards one’s sex and not towards one’s humanity, it is clear that one thus partially 
sacrifices one’s humanity and thereby runs a moral risk. Human beings are, 
therefore, not entitled to offer themselves, for profit, as things for the use of others 
in the satisfaction of their sexual propensities.
796
         
Therefore, there appears to be a conflict between Kantian autonomy and the Sexual Offences 
Act 2003 (SOA 2003).  In his critique of the Kantian concept of ‘using another person’, 
Mappes suggests that it is best understood by reference to the notion of ‘voluntary informed 
consent’.
797
  He writes that:  
A immorally uses B if and only if A intentionally acts in a way that violates the 
requirement that B’s involvement with A’s ends be based on B’s voluntary 
informed consent.
 798
   
He further argues that using another person can occur in at least two ways ‘via coercion, 
which is antithetical to voluntary consent; and via deception, which undermines the informed 
character of voluntary consent’.
799
 Thus, lying or withholding relevant information from the 
complainant, undermines her rational decision making and violates her sexual autonomy 
within a Kantian framework. Obtaining ‘consent’ under such circumstances could result in 
the complaint’s sexual autonomy being undermined.  Since there are a host of cases in which 
a defendant sexually uses another because he has employed deception in a way that 
undermines the informed character of the complainant’s consent to sexual interaction, the 
question that should be asked is did the complainant understand the act that she was 
consenting to?
800
 In Setting the Boundaries, the Home Office recommended that ‘it is 
important for society as a whole for sexual relationships to be based on mutual respect and 
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  Herring’s approach is also consistent with Kantian autonomy when he 
writes that ‘in sexual relations, people are entitled to expect their partners not to consider 




Deceit, in a similar manner to force and coercion, can vitiate consent because it manipulates a 
complainant into acting against her will.
803
  According to Herring:  
[D]eception can be regarded as worse than a threat in that the deception uses the 
victim’s own decision-making powers against herself: rendering her an instrument 
of harm against herself.
804
             
Herring gives the example of Ted, who deceives Mary into believing that he loves her. As a 
result she buys him gifts and they engage in a sexual relationship. Ted has intentionally 
deceived Mary, and therefore under s 76 it must be conclusively presumed that Mary did not 
consent and that Ted did not reasonably believe that she consented to the relevant act.
805
 This 
argument is based on the fact that Mary’s consent was conditional upon Ted loving her. 
Therefore, the jury should consider what the parties understood the sexual act to be about.
806
 
Applying Kantian notions of autonomy to Herring’s example, it can be seen that Ted’s 
deception was employed in order to procure sexual activity with Mary. The use of deception 
by Ted allowed him to sexually use Mary simply as a means. It is submitted that withholding 
information, which the defendant knows will affect her decision, from the complainant will 
also result in violating her sexual autonomy.   
Herring’s proposal is that the defendant knew, or ought to have known, that the complainant 
was mistaken about something that would make a difference to her decision for which he is 
criminally liable since there was not valid consent to the sexual activity.
807
  In R v Konzani,
808
 
the defendant withheld information about his HIV status from the complainants.  It is argued 
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that in such a case, a defendant who withholds the disclosure of such information in order to 
increase the possibility of gaining the complainant’s consent, and if the complainant does 
consent, the defendant has used the complainant for his own gratification.  His deception has 
violated her sexual autonomy within a Kantian framework. 
 
Internal obstacles  
According to Feinberg:  
There are internal positive constraints such as headaches, obsessive thoughts, and 
compulsive desires; internal negative constraints such as ignorance, weakness, and 
deficiencies in talent or skill.
809
 
Kant viewed human freedom as the ground of both morality and dignity.
810
 Rationality 
requires an individual to act on her own law. Therefore, to what extent is an individual, who 
is hindered by internal constraints, free in Kantian terms? According to Kant, freedom is the 
ability to make laws for oneself. Self-determination is essential to the protection of sexual 
autonomy within a Kantian model because it allows for the fact that an individual who is free 
from external constraints may still be affected by desires and principles which are shaped by 
her environment. Therefore, by acknowledging internal constraints may impact on sexual 
autonomy suggests that there may be internal obstacles to the application of Kantian theory.         
The difficulty in applying Kantian theory to the protection of sexual autonomy in a practical 
context is that Kant excluded desires from the realm of moral motivation. Thus, an individual 
must be free from empirical determination in order to justify his sense of moral obligation 
and responsibility.
811
 Although individuals participate in the empirical world where causality 
determined interactions occur,
812
 Kant’s free agent is described by Oritz-Millan as a 
‘transcendent being, beyond the realm of natural causality’.
813
 Since heteronomy is dependent 
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on external factors, it follows that an individual who acts on his own desires cannot be free 
and autonomous.  Kant states that: 
Inclination is blind and servile, whether it is kindly or not; and when morality is in 
question, reason must not play the part of mere guardian to inclination but, 




Therefore, in order for an individual to attain freedom, he must be outside the realm of 
empirical causality and must disregard inclinations and desires. According to Kant, the will’s 
independence from inclination is an essential prerequisite of the autonomy of the will.
815
 In 
relation to feelings, Kant states that: ‘it is impossible to reach a common agreement on 
feelings, because feeling is by no means uniform’.
816
  Oritz-Millan argues that Kant’s opinion 
on feelings can be extended to desires.
817
 Thus, desires are also not uniform and vary from 
one person to another.  
The CI requires individuals to act only on maxims through which they can at the same time 
will that such maxims become universal law. Feelings, desires and empirical inclinations are 
contingent and do not provide an objective basis for grounding moral obligations. They are 
described as contingent and subjective and therefore they cannot create moral obligations 
binding everyone.  Feelings and desires cannot serve as the basis for moral principles because 
they are defined in terms of self-interest.
818
 Kant viewed morality and self-interest as opposite 
concepts.
819
 An individual acting out of self-interest would not be able to attain a kingdom of 
ends in which he treats others always as ends and never as means, since acting out of self-
interest implies the pursuit of his own interest over the interests of others.  However, as stated 
previously, a defendant will not violate another’s sexual autonomy provided he does not treat 
a complainant simply as a means but always at the same time as an end by respecting her 
humanity.   
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To circumvent the concerns regarding feelings and desires relating to Kantian autonomy in a 
practical context, it is important to allow for the inclusion of desires and feelings in Kantian 
autonomy in order to give rise to a more realistic picture of moral psychology.
820
  Oritz-
Millan argues that: 
Kant’s fear of including desires in his picture of moral motivation on the grounds of 
their being linked to pleasure and self-interest responds to a misconception.  Desires 
are not necessarily linked to pleasure and self-interest…desires are bound to reason, 
to rational principles and to cognitive states, thus, allowing a shared backgrounds 
that makes possible their deliberation, a reasonable resolution of divergences, and 
makes them susceptible to following moral principles.
821
     
However, Oritz-Millan concedes that placing desires within the bounds of space of reasons 
does not render them a good and objective enough basis for moral obligations.
822
 If moral 
obligations were dependent on desires they would turn an individual’s CI into a Hypothetical 
Imperative (HI).
823
  Oritz-Millan contends that desires and feelings can be introduced to the 
realm of moral motivations without the fear that they are contrary to Kantian theory.
824
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This chapter has examined the barriers to using Kantian autonomy as a method of protecting 
sexual autonomy in a practical context by adopting Feinberg’s classification of external and 
internal constraints.     
Kantian autonomy involves having the capacity for rational self-governance. Kantian 
autonomy does not involve individuals having the freedom to do whatever they desire. To be 
autonomous, within a Kantian framework, is to be a member of a kingdom of similar 
autonomous individuals who are ends in themselves. Kantian autonomy is, therefore, not 
associated with the satisfaction of individual desires. Instead, Kantian autonomy is the 
capacity to act on rational principles and to exercise moral reasoning through freedom of 
choice. Self-governance ensures that an individual’s decisions are not influenced by the 
actions of others. Autonomy is protected within a Kantian framework when an individual has 
the opportunity to revise her choices when further evidence arises, suggesting that her 
previous choices were poor.   
Morality, according to Kant, comprises a set of demands that are not only valid for the 
individual but are valid for all rational beings. Kantian autonomy requires that every person is 
worthy of respect because individuals are rational beings, capable of reason. Reason can 
command the will in two different kinds of imperative. One kind is the HI which uses 
instrumental reason. Kant contrasts the HI, which is always conditional, with an 
unconditional imperative known as the CI. According to Kant, the CI commands without 
reference to or dependence on any further purpose. This is particularly important in relation 
to the protection of sexual autonomy because a person who uses another purely for their own 
sexual gratification may be obeying the HI rather than the CI.  Kant offers several formulae 
of the CI which, it was argued in chapter two, all amount to the same formula.  
The difficulty with applying Kantian autonomy in a practical context is that Kant does not 
seem to distinguish between genuine needs and mere wants. The difficulty with this lack of 
distinction is that an individual lacks autonomy, within a Kantian framework, whether she is 
acting according to her inclinations or whether her choices are limited due to coercive 
pressures. It is submitted that in the example used in this chapter, the model has far greater 
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choice than the struggling actress and therefore it cannot be said that both lack autonomy. An 
interpretation of Kantian autonomy, which focuses on the essential elements of Kantian 
theory, can facilitate the protection of sexual autonomy in a practical context. This would 
require examining whether an individual was used by another simply as a means. It would 
also involve examining whether an individual’s actions can be universalised. This follows 
Kant’s argument that ‘the idea of the will of every rational being as universally legislating 
will’.
825
 This can be taken to mean that every rational individual must occupy the position of 
universal legislator for their actions and their actions, in turn, must be capable of being 
applied universally. An individual who is constrained by the actions of another cannot be said 
to be self-governing. The Formula of Universal Law (FUL) requires an individual’s actions to 
be capable of being universalised. Kant’s idea that ‘the will of every rational being as 
universally legislating will’ can be associated with allowing individuals to limit their 
tendencies and taking the concerns of others into account.
826
 This argument is supported by 
the FH, which requires that individuals are treated never simply as a means, but always at the 
same time as ends.  Failure to comply with the FH, suggests that an individual may be 
violating another’s sexual autonomy.   
In order for Kantian autonomy to be applied in a practical context, the relationship between 
the parties should be taken into account. Deception, coercion and threats to obtain sexual 
activity violate sexual autonomy within a practical context because they are not in accordance 
with the FH. The difficultly with applying Kantian autonomy in a practical context is that 
inducements can be taken to amount to coercive conduct. A free individual within a Kantian 
model is one who is free from inclinations and desires. It is submitted that Kantian autonomy 
can be applied in a practical context in situations involving inducements that may appear to 
be coercive conduct. This can be achieved by focusing on two elements of Kantian 
autonomy: first, individuals should only act on maxims through which they can at the same 
time will that such maxims become universalised; second, the FH which requires that 
individuals are treated never simply as a means, but always at the same time as ends.  Kantian 
autonomy involves the capacity to reason and to act independently of inclinations.  As stated 
previously, inclinations can form a part of a person’s decision-making process provided 
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actions are directed towards the motive of duty. A person is not acting according to the CI if 
he acts solely to satisfy his preferences.  
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
This thesis has established that Kantian autonomy differs from other notions of autonomy 
because it is concerned with the status of individuals as universal law givers, rather than 
merely universal law followers.  In order to be autonomous within a Kantian framework, 
individuals are required to be members of the Kingdom of Ends (KE), whereby individuals 
are members of a kingdom of similar autonomous individuals to respect the humanity of 
others.  Kantian autonomy, therefore, requires individuals to never simply use another as a 
means, but always at the same time as an end.  It was shown in chapter one that Kantian 
autonomy does not prohibit individuals from using others as means, what is forbidden is 
failing to treat another person at the same time as an individual capable of free choice.  This 
is an important proviso because it facilitates the practical application of Kantian autonomy.  
Accordingly, an individual must never use herself or others simply as means to the attainment 
of results founded on inclinations. 
It has been shown that removing the focus from the requirement of force to a consent-centric 
model increases the protection of sexual autonomy by widening the scope of situations 
whereby the complainant’s consent is said to be absent.  A consent-centric model under the 
current law provides more adequate protection of sexual autonomy than the previous law.  
The current law fails to adequately protect sexual autonomy in cases involving deception as 
to the defendant’s HIV status,
 827
 wealth and religion.  Deceptions as to gender, on the other 
hand, may be capable of vitiating consent.
828
   
In order to determine whether an individual is free, she must be able to set her own ends.  An 
individual who has been deceived into consenting to sexual intercourse cannot be said to be 
consenting because, according to Kantian autonomy, she is being used simply as a means.  
The defendant in such a case is using deception as a means to procure sexual activity, 
therefore, his actions are heteronomous.  The Formula of Autonomy (FA) is based on the 
principle that an individual formulates for herself the decisions which she acts upon.  In order 
                                                 
827
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to be autonomous, an individual must not be affected by the actions of others.  In a practical 
context, this means that an individual must not be deceived or mistaken with regards to her 
decision to engage in sexual activity.  A person who decides to employ deception in order to 
procure sexual activity is using another for the fulfilment of his own desires.  It follows that 
he is using her simply as a means and not at the same time as an end.  Moreover, his actions 
cannot be universalised, because not only are his actions incompatible with the Categorical 
Imperative (CI), but his actions also fail to further her ends.  Kantian autonomy is, therefore, 
a principle whereby an autonomous agent is one who is capable of making decisions which 
can be acted on by other individuals.  The value of adopting Kantian autonomy in the 
protection of sexual autonomy is that it emphasises the ‘humanity’ of individuals, which is 
the individual’s capacity for autonomous choice.  ‘Humanity’ includes the capacity to act on 
one’s own judgement.  Deception, mistakes induced by the defendant and coercive conduct, 
adversely affect the capacity of an individual to formulate decisions for herself.  Her actions 
are affected by the actions of another and, therefore, she lacks autonomy according to a 
Kantian framework.   
One of the difficulties of adopting Kantian autonomy is determining to what extent it is 
possible to conclude that an autonomous agent is free from external authority which hinders 
her capacity to form decisions. An autonomous individual, within a Kantian sense, is one 
who has the capacity to initiate her own actions, independently of external constraints.  Kant 
does not define external constraints, however, chapter five applied Feinberg’s classification 
of external constraints to Kantian autonomy in a practical context.  Feinberg argues that 
external constraints can be both negative (barred window or threat of violence) and positive 
(lack of money or lack of transportation).   
Threat of immediate violence is a form of an external negative constraint on a person’s 
decision-making process.  The person threatening violence in order to procure sexual activity 
is clearly not treating her as an autonomous individual.  He is treating her simply as a means 
and not at the same time as an end.  In such a scenario, the complainant has suffered a 
violation of her sexual autonomy within a Kantian framework.  Difficulties arise in 
determining whether a violation of sexual autonomy has occurred in situations involving 
external positive constraints, such as lack of money.  The reason for this difficulty is that 
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Kant does not distinguish between wants and needs.  According to Kant, if an individual is 
acting purely on inclinations from external influences, her will is said to be determined 
heteronomously.  An individual who is acting heteronomously is acting according to the 
Hypothetical Imperative (HI) and, therefore, lacking autonomy.  This outcome gives rise to 
the question: are not all actions motivated by certain desires or inclinations that are 
determined by external influences?  Kant asserts that ‘everything in nature works in 
accordance with laws’.
829
 However, individuals cannot obey only the laws of physics, 
otherwise there would be little difference between an individual and an inanimate object.   
According to Kant, rational agents are capable of freedom if they can act according to laws 
which they provide for themselves, and which are also capable of universalisation. The will is 
the power to choose independent commands or inclinations. Kant defines reason as, ‘pure 
practical reason, which legislates a priori,
830
 regardless of all empirical ends’.
831
 With regards 
to the protection of sexual autonomy in a practical context, Kant’s interpretation of reason 
requires an individual, who aims to procure sexual activity, to act on decisions that are made 
independently of particular experiences,
832
 to act according to the CI,
833
 and to ensure that the 
autonomy of others is respected in that their freedom of the will is exercised in accordance 
with a self-given law. 
To analyse the application of Kantian autonomy in cases which involve non-violent coercion, 
the first step is to examine the distinction between threats and offers.  Secondly, consideration 
must be given to whether the offer can be considered impermissible within a Kantian context.  
Generally, offers enhance an individual’s opportunities, while threats impair autonomy and 
limit freedom.  An employer who threatens to dismiss an employee unless she submits to 
sexual activity is violating her autonomy within a Kantian framework.  His actions are 
impermissible according to the moral law because he is acting heteronomously.  Moreover, 
he is treating the individual simply as a means in order to satisfy his aim of procuring sexual 
activity.  An employer who informs his employee ‘you will lose your job unless you submit 
                                                 
829
 Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (n4), 76.  
830
 Known or formed independently of particular experience.  
831
 I. Kant, ‘On the Common Saying, This May be True in Theory, But it Does not Apply in Practice’ in R. Hans 
(ed) and H. B. Nisbet, (trans), Kant’s Political Writings (CUP 1970), 73.   
832
 A priori. 
833
 The moral law.  
Page 163  
 
 
to sexual intercourse’, is clearly violating her sexual autonomy because he is making a threat.  
The employee’s freedom is being limited because she has to choose between submitting to 
sexual activity or losing her job.  The threat of losing her job amounts to depriving her of a 
benefit to which she is entitled.         
An employee who faces dismissal as a result of gross misconduct in the work place, and is 
informed by her employer ‘you can keep your job if you have sexual intercourse with me’, is 
provided with an opportunity to maintain her employment.  In this scenario, the employee is 
not entitled to her job, and therefore, the employer’s proposal is an offer.  According to 
Kantian autonomy, the employer is violating her sexual autonomy because not only is the 
employer acting contrary to the Formula of Autonomy (FA), but the employee’s actions are 
based on her desire to maintain her employment, and therefore, she is acting heronomously.  
In a practical context, it might be unjust to criminalise the actions of an individual who takes 
advantage of another’s social or economic conditions.
834
  Schulhofer argues that: 
Even when background conditions severely limit a woman’s options, it may make 
sense to honor [sic] the choices she makes.  Due respect for her autonomy may even 
require us to do so.  And we can condemn the social constraints as unjustified, 
without being logically compelled to condemn her male partner’s behavior [sic] as 




Applying Kantian autonomy, in a practical context, will require distinguishing between the 
wrongfulness of external constraints and the wrongfulness of the defendant’s conduct.  In 
order to make this distinction, it must be decided whether an inducement should be 
considered a threat.  This is not always a simple exercise, as is demonstrated by the scenario 
where a defendant refuses to continue being in a relationship unless his girlfriend submits to 
his demand for sexual intercourse.
836
  While his demand might appear to be a threat to 
terminate their relationship unless she submits to his demands, the underlying factor is 
whether his proposal deprives her of a right to which she is entitled to.  Legally, she has no 
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right to compel him to continue dating her on her terms and, therefore, his proposal may be 
considered an offer.
837
   
Sexual autonomy is protected, within a Kantian framework, in the dating scenario because 
the defendant’s actions are based on satisfying his inclinations, and therefore he is using her 
merely as a means and not as an end.  Theoretical Kantian autonomy is an effective method 
for the protection of sexual autonomy because it focuses on the actions of the defendant.  
Kantian autonomy examines whether a proposal is aimed at treating a complainant simply as 
a means.   The barrier to the application of Kantian autonomy in a practical context relates to 
the issue that it may prove problematic to prosecute such cases due to the lack of sufficient 
evidence. 
A further issue of concern in relation to the practical application of Kantian autonomy is 
over-extending the limits of the criminal law to include scenarios involving deception in 
relation to the defendant’s feelings or an intention to marry.  Kantian autonomy also renders 
it impermissible where a husband conceals his infidelity from his spouse and continues to 
engage in sexual intercourse with her.
838
  Kantian autonomy makes it an obligation not to 
deceive or conceal facts which are important to a person’s decision to engage in sexual 
activity.  Any deception regarding such a fact might vitiate her consent to engage in sexual 
activity.  The current law does not require an individual to inform his sexual partner of the 
truth about whatever might be of concern to her in deciding whether to engage in sexual 
activity.  Kantian autonomy allows for the purpose of the act, under s 76 of the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003 (SOA 2003), to be extended to include what the parties understood the act 
of sexual intercourse to be about.  Using Herring’s paradigmatic case to illustrate the 
application of Kantian autonomy in a practical context: 
Ted tells Mary he loves her and would like to marry her.  As a result she buys him 
presents and lends him money.  They also engage in sexual relationships.  In fact 
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Ted is a rogue.  He has no feelings towards Mary and is known to have behaved in 
this way towards many women.
839
          
Ted’s actions do not fall within s 76, however, if the facts could be proved, he could be liable 
for obtaining property by deception.  However, Mary’s sexual autonomy is violated within a 
Kantian framework because Ted is employing deception to procure sexual activity.  He is 
using Mary simply as a means to satisfy his own desires.  Under a Kantian framework, if 
Mary discovered his deception prior to engaging in sexual intercourse, Ted could be liable for 
attempting to procure sexual intercourse.  Gross argues that: 
[L]iability for attempted rape seems absurd here, and with good reason. Unlike the 
fraudster attempting to obtain property, Ted's attempt to get Mary into bed does not 
threaten any genuine harm. Mary may be thankful for learning the truth and being 




Gross’ argument focuses on the harm Mary has avoided rather than on the protection of her 
sexual autonomy. It was discussed in chapter one that Gardner and Shute adopt a Kantian 
perspective in relation to identifying the harm of rape.  The authors state that: 
Rape is humiliating even when unaccompanied by further affronts, because the 
sheer use of a person, and in that sense the objectification of a person, is a denial of 
their personhood.  It is literally dehumanizing.
841
   
While the above Kantian analysis assists in identifying the moral wrong of rape, it does not 
state whether or not such conduct should be regarded as criminal.
842
  Gardner and Shute’s 
analysis of a Kantian model can assist in evaluating whether any given conduct violates 
sexual autonomy: 
By much the same argument which condemns rapists, those of us who are 
discussing, legislating, implementing, and enforcing people’s rights must also 
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regard them as people, as beings with value other than use-value.  In particular we 
must regard them as moral agents capable of understanding their own value and 
making up their own minds about their relationships with others.  We must work on 
the assumption that they respect or else we do not ourselves respect them…The 
truth is that [various sexual options] often are dehumanizing, and therefore to be 
avoided by the person who is confronted with them.  But allowing people 
nonetheless to pursue them, is up to a point, rehumanizing, because it credits them 
with moral agency, without which credit their dehumanization is only 
compounded.
843
    
This argument draws attention to the fact that a Kantian model can accord a degree of moral 
credit to individuals who consent to sexual activity, even when what they are engaging in 
may be objectively dehumanizing.
844
  This Kantian analysis, however, does not assist in 
determining which types of non-violent coercions and deceptions should be criminalised.  
The above analysis may assist in the application of Kantian autonomy in a practical context, 
because it requires the recognition of the complainant’s moral credit and holding her, in 
certain circumstances, responsible for consenting to sexual activity, despite the use of 
coercive conduct by the defendant.  The example discussed above, involving a defendant who 
threatens to terminate the relationship unless the complainant agrees to his sexual demands, 
can assist in illustrating that the over-criminalising aspect of Kantian autonomy can be 
curtailed.  According to Schulhofer, sexual autonomy includes ‘the freedom to decide 
whether and when to terminate any personal relationship’.
845
  The defendant’s proposal does 
not appear to deprive the complainant from any right which she is entitled to.  The freedom to 
terminate a relationship unless the other party agrees to the sexual demands must be 
determined in the context of the relationship.  A husband who threatens to divorce his wife, a 
full-time mother with limited career prospects, unless she agrees to his sexual demands is 
violating her sexual autonomy within a Kantian framework.  His proposal is a threat because 
he is forcing her to choose between sexual activity and the security of her marriage.        
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Applying Kantian autonomy in a practical context widens the scope of non-consensual sexual 
offences beyond the narrow constraints of sections 75 and 76.  A jury would, therefore, have 
to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether a complainant consented to sexual intercourse.  
This allows individuals to set their own standards on what facts are relevant to them, when 
deciding whether to engage in sexual activity.  Implementing Kantian autonomy in a practical 
context could attract the same criticism that was levelled on Olugboja; the lack of 
determinacy and the potential for identical coercive conduct to be treated differently by 
different juries. While a Kantian approach may engender unpredictability, the mens rea 
requirement ensures that a defendant will not be prosecuted where he did not realise that the 
complainant would regard a particular fact as fundamental to her consent.
846
 Moreover, the 
prosecutorial policy must follow the Evidential Stage of the Full Code Test, as set out in the 
Code for Crown Prosecutors.
847
 The decision to prosecute will, therefore, depend on the 
likelihood of satisfying the burden of proof on the available evidence.  
Applying Kantian autonomy to the non-consensual offences contained in sections 1-4 of the 
SOA 2003 would increase the protection of sexual autonomy by including scenarios beyond 
those found in ss 75 and 76.  This would allow for the protection of sexual autonomy in cases 
where the defendant used non-violent coercion to procure sexual activity.  It would also allow 
for the protection of sexual autonomy in cases where a female defendant falsely informed a 
male complainant (who did not wish to impregnate her) that she was on the pill.  Kantian 
autonomy is similar to the decision in Olugboja, in that it focuses on the state of mind of the 
complainant and allows individuals to set their own standards in relation to the factors which 
affect their decision to engage in sexual activity.  However, Kantian autonomy is more 
comprehensive in that it focuses on whether the individual is being used simply as a means.  
It also requires that the proposal does not deprive the individual of any rights to which she is 
entitled. While the Court of Appeal in Olugboja allowed non-violent coercion to vitiate 
consent, this decision does not appear to have made any significant practical impact.
848
 This 
may be due to the practical difficulties associated with proving lack of consent in cases where 
violence is absent.  Such difficulties may also arise in relation to the practical application of 
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Kantian autonomy. The wide range of non-violent coercive conduct and deceptions which are 
capable of being protected by a Kantian model may influence charging practice.  The police 
may be sceptical of a complainant who alleges that she has been raped because the defendant 
deceived her about his economic status.  Moreover, individuals may be reluctant to report 
violations of their sexual autonomy if they have no physical evidence to corroborate their 
allegations. 
A further criticism of Kantian autonomy may centre on the fact that it is not uncommon for 
individuals to tacitly conceal facts about themselves.  Rubenfeld argues that: 
Clothing and underclothing can falsify.  Make-up and hair dye can deceive.  All 
cosmetics misrepresent.  They can designedly and quite effectively convey false 
information concerning age, hair color [sic], teeth, skin color [sic] or quality, bodily 
characteristics, genetic predispositions, ethnicity, and so on...Many of us would 
undoubtedly be in jail were every one of them criminal.
849
  
This above argument fails to take into account the fact that if an individual is misled about a 
fact which is fundamental to her decision-making, then her sexual autonomy is not respected 
within a Kantian context.  Rubenfeld concedes that certain lies told to obtain sex ‘could 
sensibly be singled out by statute and criminalized [sic]’, such as concealing a sexually 
transmitted disease.
850
  The author, however, does not elaborate on how certain deceptions 
can ‘sensibly be singled out’ by statute and criminalised.  His argument fails to take into 
account that deceiving another about a fact which is material to their decision-making 
process, violates the FA and amounts to an objectification of another.  Deceptions used to 
procure sexual activity prevent a person from exercising self-determination through which 
the rational will is capable of giving itself law through reason.  In R v McNally (Justine),
851
  
which concerned the material deception of the complainant, the Court of Appeal dismissed 
the defendant’s appeal against her conviction in relation to six counts of assault by 
penetration contrary to s 2 of the SOA 2003.  The defendant, when a 13 year-old-girl, had 
met the complaint, who was a year younger, on a social networking website.  The defendant 
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claimed to be a boy and a relation developed between her and the complainant. The defendant 
visited the complainant on four occasions, when the complainant was aged 16, dressed as a 
boy. During these visits, there were numerous instances of the defendant orally and digitally 
penetrating the complainant. The Court stated that some deceptions, such as in relation to 
wealth, would not be sufficient to vitiate consent.
852
 The Court referred to Lord Judge CJ's 
observation in R (F) v Director of Public Prosecutions,
853
 that the evidence relating to 
‘choice’ and the ‘freedom’ to make any particular choice must be approached in a broad 
common sense way’,
854
 as a method of determining the circumstances which vitiate 
consent.
855
 The Court further stated that ‘the sexual nature of the acts is, on any common 
sense view, different where the complainant is deliberately deceived by a defendant into 
believing that the latter is a male’.
856
 The emphasis on active deception leaves the question 
open in relation to whether non-disclosure would vitiate consent. A Kantian model, on the 
other hand, is capable of providing more certainty in relation to the protection of sexual 
autonomy, because it focuses on whether the complainant was used merely as a means and 
not as an end.   
 
The role of law, practice and policy in relation to a Kantian model 
The essence of this thesis has been to advocate and formulate a Kantian framework as a 
method for interpreting the current law, in order to adequately protect sexual autonomy. The 
law of sexual offences no longer focuses on the application of force by the defendant nor 
does it require evidence of active resistance on the part of the complainant. Therefore, the 
aim of using a Kantian framework is to protect sexual autonomy in cases involving non-
violent coercion and deception. In addition to the barriers discussed in chapter five, it is also 
necessary to examine the implications for law, policy and practice on adopting a Kantian 
framework in relation to protecting sexual autonomy.  
                                                 
852
 Ibid, 207. 
853
 [2014] 2 WLR 190. 
854
 Ibid, paras 25 and 26.   
855
 R v McNally (Justine) [2014] 2 WLR 200, 207. 
856
 Ibid.  
Page 170  
 
 
The current jury direction, given by the judiciary, in relation to the meaning of consent under 
s 74, fails to highlight the fact that the jury must take into account any factors which are 
relevant to the complainant in connection with her decision to engage in sexual activity. In 
order to adhere to a Kantian model, a jury must be directed to the fact that conduct such as 
active deception or capitalising on the complainant’s mistake can negative consent. The 
essence of the direction should be that conduct by the defendant which seeks to use the 
complainant only or his sexual gratification may be evidence that she did not consent.  
In order to protect sexual autonomy in sexual offences cases, it is not sufficient to merely 
adopt a Kantian-compatible jury direction. Jury attitudes in relation to rape myths must also 
be addressed. Research into rape myths has shown that stereotypical conceptions of female 
behaviour can have detrimental effects on the resultant verdicts.
857
 Munro and Ellison note 
that the: 
[F]lexibility that exists with regard to the determination of the presence or absence 
of consent creates scope for the incorporation of stereotypical views about the 




The authors note that there was a high level of insistence amongst the participants of the need 
for information about the complainant's past sexual history.
859
 A Kantian framework can 
assist in eliminating some of these attitudes, displayed by mock jurors, because it draws 
attention to the state of mind of the complainant and focuses attention on the reason behind 
the coercive conduct or deception.   
A Kantian model protects sexual autonomy by widening the scope of circumstances in which 
a complaint’s agreement to sexual activity is secured as a result of conduct involving 
deceptions as to marital status, wealth and religion. Moreover, a Kantian model protects 
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sexual autonomy in cases which do not involve active deception on the part of the defendant. 
However, the number of offences recorded by the police is a small proportion of the number 
of rapes which are committed.
860
 One reason for this may be due to unreported rapes. 
Reasons for non-reporting include: 
Feelings of shame, humiliation and self-blame; the desire to keep the rape secret...; 
the wish to avoid...court appearances which are regarded as an ordeal; the wish to 
avoid trial by newspapers’ publicity.
861
 
Another reason for the lack of reporting is that women who do report rape do not necessarily 
have their complaints accepted by the police.
862
 In her study conducted in 1997, Temkin 
notes that ‘old police attitudes and practices, widely assumed to have vanished, are still in 
evidence and continue to cause victims pain and suffering’.
863
 There is a strong possibility 
that deceptions relating to qualifications and marital status of the defendant might not be 
accepted as rapes by the police. This will render a Kantian model ineffective in a practical 
context.  
In order for a Kantian model to operate in a practical context, juror and police attitudes to 
rapes and sexual assaults need to be addressed by focusing on the defendant’s conduct which 
seeks to use the complaint purely to satisfy his sexual desires. Kennedy argues that: 
[R]ape is one of the most serious and damaging offences. It is essential that the 
police and CPS co-ordinate our efforts and co-operate with each other to investigate 
thoroughly and prosecute effectively those responsible for this dreadful crime.
864
 
A Kantian model requires all elements of the criminal justice system to focus on the state of 
mind of the complainant in order to give complainants the opportunity to report violations of 
their sexual autonomy and have the confidence to proceed with the prosecution process in 
order to ensure a conviction, without any fear that they will be put on trial. Education in 
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society is necessary to ensure that a Kantian model is effective in a practical context. Ewing 
contends that:  
Education would include training for those involved in the rape trial, including the 
prosecution, the judges and most importantly the jury and the public. Raising 
awareness of the effects of myths and stereotypes to those selected for jury service 
is important as their beliefs are highly relevant to the outcome. Education could 
begin in schools and continue, to reach the public at large via the media through for 
example, poster campaigns or adverts on the television.
865
 
A Kantian model requires focus on the actions of the defendant and the effect of his conduct 
on the state of mind of the complainant. The relationship between the parties would also need 
to be examined. A Kantian model allows complainants to set their own standards in relation 
to matters which are fundamental to their consent.   
 
Conclusion  
It has been shown that a consent-centric model is more effective at protecting sexual 
autonomy than a non consent-centric model.  Both the current law and the law prior to the 
SOA 2003 protected sexual autonomy.  While the old law did not provide a statutory 
definition of consent, sexual autonomy was protected by s 3 of the Sexual Offences Act 1956 
(SOA 1956) in cases where sexual activity was procured by deception.  However, this 
provision was not widely used and was repealed by the SOA 2003.  The current law is 
capable of providing an effective method of protecting sexual autonomy in cases involving 
deception and non-violent coercion.  This can be achieved by employing Kant’s CI in 
determining whether an individual’s autonomy has been violated.  Kantian autonomy 
examines whether an individual has been used as merely a means and not as an end in 
themselves.  If a defendant’s actions cannot be universalised then he is acting contrary to 
Kant’s moral law.  The disadvantages relating to the practical application of Kantian 
autonomy, concern the issue of over-criminalising the most trivial of deceptions such as 
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concealing one’s name, occupation or religion.  Lack of evidence in such cases will also 
hinder such cases being prosecuted or reported to the police.  However, these disadvantages 
do not take away from the fact that a Kantian framework has the potential to protect sexual 
autonomy where a person’s agreement to sexual activity has been obtained by deception or 
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